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Abstract
The Louisiana coastal zone supports numerous natural resource-based economies and due
to overlapping demands on the same territory, conflicts among users and resource managers have
emerged. When the state recognized serious depletion of oysters in the late nineteenth century, it
intervened with a set of conservation polices to try to establish sustained yields that produced
one set of conflicts. When the oil industry began operating in the coastal estuaries and wetlands
in the 1930s, it produced additional conflicts with fishing folk. The zone of conflict gave rise to
cyclic adaptations as each group struggled to sustain its environmentally based economic
pursuits.
According to Hollings, adaptive cycles are nonlinear dynamic systems with thresholds
and unknowns, which go through the following phases: exploitation, conservation, release, and
reorganization (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002, Folke 2006, Bures and Kanapaux 2011).
The literature theorizes these adaptive cycles create a panarchy, or a connected set of adaptive
processes that function together across time and space to improve the adaptive capacity of a
social-ecological system (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002). The fishermen, the oil
industry, and state government all had to adapt to new circumstances brought about by
overlapping interests in the same resource rich territory. By systematically examining the legal
measures taken from 1930 to 1970 by oystermen against the oil industry and response to the
lawsuits by the oil industry, an attempt is made to fit these processes into the panarchy model,
but the complexities of the coastal economy and community complicates the model which
inadequately accounts for human agency. The fishermen, the oil industry and state government
each functioned on their own primary objectives, which resulted in the oyster industry remaining
in a consistent state of growth.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The seasonal livelihoods pursued by many coastal Louisiana residents reflect the ways in
which adaptation is fundamental to their everyday lives. Residents have demonstrated their
aptitude for adaptation on the coastline by building houses on higher ground or on stilts to
protect them from the high tides and storm surge. Adaptive practices, including both economic
and geographic mobility, enabled the coastal residents to change with the seasons and as
disruptive events impacted their communities. This flexibility has been crucial to maintaining
resilient communities, an important factor for the continued inhabitance of coastal Louisiana.
The Louisiana coastal zone supports several natural resource-based economies and due to
overlapping demands on the same territory, conflicts among users and resource managers have
emerged. Fishing families in coastal Louisiana have competed among each other and have long
struggled with environmental vagaries and overfishing as they harvested the coastal waters.
When the state Department of Conservation recognized serious depletion of oysters in the late
nineteenth century, it intervened with a set of conservation polices to try to establish sustained
yields that produced one set of conflicts. These new policies forced oystermen to adapt to new
harvesting limits, locations, and techniques.
When the oil industry began operating in Louisiana’s coastal estuaries and wetlands in
the 1930s, a new round of conflicts with fishing folk emerged, prompting another socioecological adaptive cycle to inhabitants on the Louisiana coast. Prior to the development of the
coastal oil fields, the primary hazard residents faced were tropical disturbances1, which they had

1

Tropical disturbances encompass both hurricanes and tropical storms, as modern climatology classifies the systems
based on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale for measuring hurricanes. The term disturbance is used because
classification technology and terminology are not always consistent with modern day usage.
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long coped with and adapted to. The introduction of the new oil industry not only brought
resource competition issues, but also introduced new disruptions for the oystermen to adapt and
respond to. The oil industry also had to adjust its operations in the dynamic coastal environment
that forced them to face tropical disturbances, floods, and changing tides that the oystermen were
accustomed to. Conflict between the two industries gave rise to cyclic adaptations as each group
struggled to sustain its environmentally based economic pursuits.
Before the advent of oil extraction, oyster fishermen were the original leasees of oyster
beds along the coast. However, when the oil industry began extracting crude from their state
assigned leases beneath the oyster beds in 1930, it was not long before “bleed water,” a mixture
of oil and water, other waste, and oil began to damage the valuable bivalves (see: Doucet vs.
Texas Company 1944). The oyster water-bottom leases and the mineral rights leases, which
existed below the water-bottoms, often had overlapping boundaries. The different state divisions
managed the resources separately without policies to integrate or contend with the overlapping,
often conflicting, lease boundaries. Consequently in order to obtain compensation for damages
to their crops, many oyster fishermen decided to utilize common law nuisance and trespass
statutes to their leases. Neither water bottoms nor oysters fell under common law, but the
Louisiana oyster statute granted oyster harvesters the rights to the income gained from their lease
if damage occurred to the oysters, and thus the capability to sue for trespass and nuisance. The
conflicts began in the 1930s and continue through the present day, amplified by the Deepwater
Horizon spill in 2010 and the construction of freshwater diversions since the 1990s. Both
industries have adapted to changing conditions, but remain in conflict.
Oyster harvesters encountered ever-changing ecological systems. In order to continue
their pursuits, they have deployed adaptive practices after tropical disturbances spread sand over
2

their beds or when fresh water from spring floods killed off oyster beds. Tropical cyclones and
flood events coupled with overfishing have occurred in these types of resource communities and
pushed the environmental demands beyond the natural production thresholds and create
economic uncertainty. According to ecologist C. S. Holling and his collaborators such disruptive
events, or what they refer to as “thresholds or unknowns,” have the ability to trigger a socioecological system to go through the following adaptive cycles: exploitation, conservation,
release, and reorganization, see Figure 1 (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002, Folke 2006,
Bures and Kanapaux 2011a).
The panarchy concept has become a foundational concept for the analysis of humanenvironmental systems and adaptation. It is a highly influential and widely used method for
explaining the interactions in a systematic way. Hollings and his co-authors theorize that these
adaptive cycles create a connected set of adaptive processes functioning together across time and
space, improving the adaptive capacity of a society in an environmental setting, which they call a
panarchy (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002). Holling and Gunderson (2002b, 47) state that
“any complex system, if it is adaptive, must generate…two phases” of resource use that function
in sequence. The first phase “maximizes production and growth” in the front loop while the
second “maximize invention and reassortment” in the back loop (Figure 1) (Holling and
Gunderson 2002b, 47). Within the adaptive cycle (Figure 1), they argue it is impossible to
optimize adaptation around a single objective. Yet, the multiple actors in coastal Louisiana
primary motivations were economic gain and not the broader functioning of the social-ecological
system. Thus, one actor’s adaptation can be another’s disruption. Such a situation, not unique to
Louisiana, complicates the panarchy model.

3

In Louisiana, the intersection of the oil and oyster leases are state designated boundaries
that create an environment where conflict over natural resources is inevitable, due to both
groups’ dependence on overlapping territories. The temporal point represents the transition
between phases of an adaptive cycle due to reaching a threshold or an unknown (see Figure 1).
A disruptive event, conflict over natural resources, or political change can cause the intersection

Conservation

Reorganization

Exploitation

Release

Loop

Loop

Front Loop
Back Loop
Temporal Point
Figure 1. Phases of Resource Use in an Adaptive Cycle
(Adapted from Holling and Gunderson 2002)

of adaptive cycles’ which in turn cause the cycles to interconnect creating a policy window
(Wilson 2013). A policy window represents macro-scale processes shaping human decisionmaking on varying scales about the environmental and social transitions (Martens and Rotmans
2002, Wilson 2013). The macro-scale processes further complicates oystermen and oilmen’s
relations, since the state regulating bodies develop the policy and impose it upon the resource
harvesters. A policy window occurs in the adaptive cycle, the adaptations which enable an
4

industry to sustain itself during this period should be evaluated to determine if they can be
integrated into public policy to improve the management and resilience of the community or
ecosystem (Wilson 2013). The places that the adaptive cycles intersect in this particular case
study include not only conflicts between the oil industry and oystermen surrounding questions of
access, but also the adaptive cycles functioning as self-serving goals in each respective industry,
not the unified adaptive process that Holling and others envisioned in the panarchy system
(2002). Natural resource harvesters’ in coastal Louisiana frequently were single owner operators
prior to the oil industry, leading many individuals to have self-serving production goals. The
variation among individual harvester’s goals can create ambiguous and ever-changing social
norms (Lewicki and Gray 2003) that are difficult to integrate with the ecological system, thus
creating nodes of conflict among resource harvesters, as well as the state, and the self-interested
adaptations by each industry.
The oystermen, oil industry, and state government all had to adapt to new circumstances
brought about by overlapping interests in the same resource rich territory. As such, this
dissertation seeks to address the following question: does the panarchy model fit the multiple
objectives of the state, the oil industry, and oyster fishermen in Louisiana? This dissertation will
attempt to answer this broad question by addressing the following three sub-questions: (1) Does
disruptive event, such as resource depletion, an oil spill, or a state-sanctioned freshwater
diversion, prompt actors into a new adaptive cycle? (2) Do the multiple adaptations by different
actors introduce divergent adaptive cycles among the actors? (3) Do the social complexities of
primary interests create adaptation pathways toward multiple objectives?
This work will consider adaptation as a process with numerous participants who do not
share common objectives. The adaptive responses by the two main industries and government
5

regulators contribute to the resilience of coastal industries and their ability to respond to each
other and disruptive events. It is important to recognize that the adaptations of one group may
conflict with the adaptations of another, but the panarchy model of adaptive cycles does not
account for this level of complexity with multiple actors working towards the same goal. This
study will contribute or expose some of the weaknesses of to the panarchy model by expanding
on the idea that adaptation and resilience are multifaceted processes that have influences from
various sources that do not act simultaneously and have varying degrees of importance.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
Three key bodies of literature provide the conceptual foundations for this examination of
economic resources, humans’ relationship with the coast, and environmental change in coastal
Louisiana. To address the issue of “disruptive activities,” which are considered events that
interrupt people’s ability to live in a place or pursue livelihoods, and human adjustment to
change, I include hazards literature and the subfields of resilience and adaptation. The hazards
research illustrates the complex nature of adaption that has occurred over time and evolved
beyond the systematic “panarchy” model of nested adaptive cycles functioning at different
phases. Another major theme in this literature is geographic scholarship on public policy,
particularly environmental policy. With an explicit Louisiana focus, I also address the
distinctive coastal culture of this state. The literature related to the economic dependence on
natural resources will provide an understanding of the cultural and economic relationships that
have developed over time, as well as how management and use policies have evolved. Many of
the resources central to this discussion are located in the coastal marsh areas and offshore waters,
and are extremely vulnerable to tropical cyclones and oil spills due to the geographic proximity
and lack of protection. And finally, I explore the relevant methods used by scholars who have
examined long-term human-nature relations through the analysis of legal proceedings.

2.2. Hazards, Adaptation, and Resilience
The interaction between humans and the environment is an everyday occurrence and has
been since the evolution of humans. The interaction of humans with the physical environment
can result in negative or positive impacts on society and nature. The study of humanenvironment relationships requires a multidisciplinary approach to incorporate both ecological
8

and historical processes (Baker 1994, Turner 2002). As part of this broader area of interest, this
section will examine both early and more recent hazards research in geography and the subfields
of resilience and adaption to establish the framework for my research.
Geography, associated with environmental science, explores the way environments and
cultures interact or influence each other (Porter 1978). The field’s roots in the environment arose
from physical geography, the Berkeley School, and the work of Carl Sauer, as well as the
Chicago school (Williams 1994, Turner 2002). While scholars forging the Chicago school
approach through the examination of social-economic adjustments to changes in nature, those
advancing the Berkeley school were looking at the adaptive nature of both culture and societies
and “how adaptions led to ecological success” (Williams 1994, 14). The Berkeley method
integrated environmental history, landscape study, and human impacts on nature, which led to
the subfield of cultural ecology (Williams 1994, Turner 2002). The methods of both schools
enabled them to examine the ways society and the environment adapt to change in either a
positive or negative way, or to use a more recent term, their resilience.
In his 1923 presidential address to the Association of American Geographers, Harlan
Barrows suggested that the interactions between the physical environment and societies produce
both positive and negative effects, which he explained as a human ecology methodology and a
systems approach (Barrows 1923). In addition to society creating both positive and negative
effects, a society or environment also goes through a chain of modifications to respond to the
event that caused a change in the way society interacts with the natural environment (Barrows
1923). The work of Barrows provided an interrelated systems approach to complex society and
environment interactions in geographic thought and integrated ecological principles into cultural
studies and methodologies. Barrow’s framework allowed subsequent researchers to situate
9

hazards research within the intersecting realms of physical and human geography by attempting
to identify how society adjusts to environmental events and becomes adaptable to changing
conditions (White 1974, Kates and Burton 1986, Tobin and Montz 1997, Cutter, Mitchell, and
Scott 2000, Thomalla et al. 2006).
Gilbert White, a student of Barrows at the University of Chicago, examined the question
of how society adjusts to the natural and physical systems, specifically floodplains, and humans
impacts on them from another angle by looking at why people continued to inhabit floodplains
despite the impact flooding events had on people’s livelihoods and lives (White 1945, White
1974). The work of White in the 1940s and 1950s on floodplains influenced his students’
pursuits, which resulted in Burton and Kates’ development of the natural hazards paradigm
(Kates and Burton 1986). The natural hazard paradigm addressed five areas of hazard research
including: “identification and mapping of the human occupation of the hazard zone,
identification of the full range of human adjustments to the hazard, [the] study of how people
perceive and estimate the occurrence of hazards, [a] description of the process whereby
mitigation measures are adopted, including the social context within which that adoption takes
place, [and the] identification of the optimal set of adjustments to hazards and their social
consequences” (Kates and Burton 1986). This work led others to follow similar courses of
study, which resulted in the recognition that the human dimension of hazards was impossible to
ignore (Drabeck 1986, Kreps 1989, Dynes and Tierney 1994, Tobin and Montz 1997, Moser
2005).
As a larger quantitative movement was occurring within geography and sociology during
the 1960s and 1970s, hazards researchers were beginning to quantify the risk people faced
through chemical, biological, or physical occurrences (Starr 1969, Cutter 2001), but by assigning
10

a value to risk and creating datasets, they obscured the social complexities occurring during
extreme events. This process became the standard for the National Research Council, with a
statistical and probability-based approach, which was predominately focused on public health or
ecological impacts (National Research Council and Health 1983). There was a slight deviation
from this approach by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to a rank-ordered
approach, which included a movement towards the actual potential for risk and steps undertaken
to mitigate the process and approach it in a sustainable method (Cutter 2001). Risk assessments
have also influenced vulnerability assessments, which integrate the basic concepts of
vulnerability or the level of sensitivity to an environmental hazard (Platt 1996, Cutter 2001).
Geographic information systems provide a platform for assessments of biophysical and social
vulnerability, since much of the work is based on storm surge maps, flood prone areas, the
spatial distribution of hurricane strikes, the spatial distribution of hurricane force winds, or other
biophysical hazards (Cutter 2001).
Researchers use the risk exposure of an individual, community, or region to quantify how
vulnerable they are to a disruptive event, but by relying on purely quantitative values they
remove the multiple stressors and pathways that exist in the vulnerability of complex social and
ecological systems (Adger 2006). Vulnerability represents individual, community, or an
ecosystem’s sensitivity to potential loss from an environmental hazard (Bolin 1994, Tobin and
Montz 1997, Cutter 2001, Morello-Frosch et al. 2011), which can vary based on many social
factors and exhibit the complexities that exist in the larger social-ecological system.
Communities can be both vulnerable and resilient, since vulnerability encompasses sensitivities
that render some members of a community more susceptible, while resilience considers looks at
the positive factors that make a community better able to overcome disruption (King 2016). A
11

community’s efforts to mitigate risk can decrease the level of exposure through efforts such as
building levees, developing evacuation plans, requiring houses to be built above the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) flood levels, or not allowing people to construct
homes in flood zones (Bolin 1994, Tobin and Montz 1997, Cutter 2001). Vulnerability is often
linked to social, political, and economic inequities (Bolin 1994, Tobin and Montz 1997, Cutter
2001, Thomalla et al. 2006, Morello-Frosch et al. 2011). Poverty, poor access to resources and
information, and low-wage occupations generally make some individuals or communities more
vulnerable to hazards, partially due to a lack of government planning to account for community
needs (Bolin 1994, Tobin and Montz 1997, Cutter 2001, Thomalla et al. 2006, Peek and
Fothergill 2008, Morello-Frosch et al. 2011).
Vulnerability studies expanded from the assessment phase of process and outcome to
incorporate multiple stressors and pathways, which then provides a methodological and
conceptual basis for the stressors and processes that led to threshold changes in resilience studies
(Adger 2006). Resilience examines a community’s ability to rebound after a disruptive event,
perpetuate functions, and restore structures while responding to change (Gunderson and Holling
2002, Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). Like many of the human-environment-based concepts,
resilience finds its roots in ecology. The use of ecological terms in human geography addressed
the relationships between humans and the biophysical environments, as well as the make-up of
these biophysical environments (Zimmerer 1994). Resilience was originally developed by C.S.
Holling as an approach to consider the response of natural systems to pollution and other
ecologically damaging events while combining resource management principles (Holling 1973,
Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). The resilience panarchy, much like other forms of hazard
study, suggests that human and ecological systems are functionally coupled, also known as
12

socio-ecological systems (SES), which display complex actions and reactions to disruptive
events throughout the systems that could provide management and mitigation strategies
(Vitousek et al. 1997, Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002, Gunderson 2003, Gallopín 2006,
Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007, Cote and Nightingale 2012, Lloyd, Peel, and Duck 2013).
Another analysis method was developed by Butzer to incorporate the variety of paths
communities take to be resilient, which are not always easily accounted for in a rigid systematic
model, like panarchy (Butzer 2012). The Butzer model allows for the integration of the human
factors in a system, whereas the panarchy model with its origins in ecology tends to directly link
to the ecological concepts of the environment, which can be appropriate in certain systematic
analyses. The Butzer model notes that the beginning of a breakdown in the system results
frequently from institutional failure, which includes incompetence, loss of economic networks,
corruption, or major political changes (Butzer 2012). Butzer also incorporates the impacts of
human induced climate and environmental changes, which can prompt change in the system.
Lastly, the Butzer model incorporates ideological shifts in society (Butzer 2012).
The primary factor that differentiates ecological and human systems is the ability of
humans to plan and conceptualize for the future, which allows community systems to develop
systematic plans to respond and recover from a disruptive event (Holling and Gunderson 2002a,
Gunderson 2010). This concept is further complicated by thinking about the land and water as
two separate ecosystems operating independently and when they come together, like when a
river floods the floodplain, it is considered a disturbance to both systems with each having a
varying degree of resilience to the type disturbance (Morris 2016). A disturbance for one system
could be building resilience for another system depending on the differences in human or natural
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forces impacting the ecological system (Morris 2016). Also, human groups may not be
following each phase of the model and thus distorting its elegance.
The complexities that exist in societies may prevent them always responding to change in
a resilient way, so it is necessary to consider whether their response to a change is sustainable for
society and ecological resources over time to determine future feedbacks or responses to
disruptive events (Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). The ability to respond and adapt to changes
is dependent on economic factors, socio-cultural processes, biophysical conditions, and
government systems that are available to a community (Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007, Colten,
Kates, and Laska 2008, Enfield 2008, Wilbanks and Kates 2010, Cote and Nightingale 2012).
The adaptations individuals or communities make can reduce the vulnerability to disruptive
events and make the community more resilient to future events (Wilbanks and Kates 2010). To
determine if the these actions are truly resilient, studies and reports have increasingly moved
towards “box-checking assessments of post-disaster evidence of those processes”
(Wiechselgartner and Kelman 2014, 11). The argument for a resilient and adaptive community
should be based upon long-term understandings of interactions between the various actors,
whether it in a natural system or a social-ecological system (Wiechselgartner and Kelman 2014).
The disruptive events in coastal Louisiana prompt communities to rely on learned
practices or concoct a new way to deal with the problem (Dow 1999, Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo
2012, Colten, Grismore, and Simms 2015). In a complex social-ecological system, the role of
power and knowledge needs to be recognized as dynamic processes that exist in the system, so
political, cultural, and historical meaning can be incorporated (Cote and Nightingale 2012). Not
allowing for the incorporation of these factors in the social-ecological system creates a focal
point on structure and ability of a system to function within that structure (Cote and Nightingale
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2012). Additionally, it is important to examine the disruptive event in its entirety because simply
looking at the state-level responses can isolate the consequences of the event from social and
local contexts (Izdebski, Mordechai, and White 2018). Identifying the array of variables in a
complex social-ecological system is a necessity during a disruptive event, since these variables
allow the social institution to adapt and increase social learning by modifying its relationship
with the environment (Comfort et al. 1999, Mileti 1999, Adger 2000, Cutter and Renwick 2004,
Laska et al. 2005, Tierney and Bruneau 2007). However, it is important to note that the complex
social relationships both privilege the established social structure and can be the result of unequal
power relationships and past injustices (Harvey 1996, Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003,
MacKinnon and Derickson 2013). The negotiation for control of coastal Louisiana’s natural
resources has been an ongoing struggle between multiple parties vying for control and debating
best management practices, many of which are entrenched in societal norms.
Community resilience encompasses the socio-cultural characteristics of a small socially
connected area. Community resilience represents a community or region’s ability “to anticipate,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant multihazard hazard threats” (Wilbanks and
Kates 2010, 723). Community resilience acknowledges that as part of a larger system there is a
dependency on outside forces of government or economic entities (Wilbanks and Kates 2010),
which can have positive effects during extreme events and the more gradual process of
environmental change (Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2003, Tierney and Bruneau 2007, Wilbanks
and Kates 2010, Cheong 2012). A study conducted in Donana, Spain, uses historical evidence of
religious ceremonies to reconstruct the community’s response to environmental events (Erik et
al. 2012). It builds upon the concept of resilience as a capacity that evolved over time, which in
turn increases a society’s ability to cope and adapt (Berkes, Folke, and Colding 1998, Berkes,
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Colding, and Folke 2003, Dessai, Lu, and Risbey 2005, Folke 2006, Thomalla et al. 2006,
Enfield 2008, Erik et al. 2012). Viewing resilience as an evolving process provides a context for
considering the first major oil pollution event off the Louisiana coast and the beginning of the
adaptive process for oyster harvesters to a new disruptive event.
The ability to cope with change is central to the concept of inherent resilience, which
suggests that natural resource-dependent communities have known or learned practices used to
cope with disruptive events (Leong et al. 2007, Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo 2012).2 The concept
of inherent resilience is often overlooked, as much of the resilience work considers the broader
concept and draws upon proxy quantitative measures while neglecting the various subsets of
resilience, which include governmental, private, nonprofit, communities, and individual (Colten,
Hay, and Giancarlo 2012, Chan 2013). The various levels of resilience are important in planning
and mitigating the hazardous events on both a local and national level (Tierney and Bruneau
2007, Colten, Kates, and Laska 2008, Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo 2012, Chan 2013).
A community’s resilient capacity is dependent on the ability to adapt to change through
personal actions and deliberate decisions and learn from past adaptations that did or did not
succeed (Comfort et al. 1999, Mileti 1999, Leong et al. 2007, Bates and Swan 2010, Wilbanks
and Kates 2010). The prospect of enhancing community resilience is a primary goal for many
researchers, which would allow better preparedness and planning for hazard mitigation (Colten,
Kates, and Laska 2008, Wilbanks and Kates 2010, Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo 2012, Colten,
Grismore, and Simms 2015).

2

Cutter and others (2008) define “inherent” resilience as aspects that function successfully between crisis periods
and “adaptive” as the qualities applied in response phase to an extreme event (2008).
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There has also been an evaluation of resilience and adaptation as coupled processes used
to understand social and ecological systems as well as sustainable processes and climate change.
Adaptation is a long-term process or set of decisions carried out to maintain a community or
ecosystem’s capacity to address current or future known change (Nelson, Adger, and Brown
2007, Enfield 2008, Wilbanks and Kates 2010). The adaptive process allows societies to
enhance, subsist, prosper, and preserve their quality of life, and by incorporating this process into
resilience, the complex system allows for flexibility during times of disruption and allows for
comprehensive utilization of the system (Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2003, Folke 2006, Gallopín
2006, Smit and Wandel 2006, Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). The adaptive process allows for
a community or society to manage resilience through its intentions and the capacity of the socialecological system accommodate the intentions (Berkes, Folke, and Colding 1998, Berkes,
Colding, and Folke 2003, Walker et al. 2004, Folke 2006). The adaptive process can be used to
increase resilience and decrease risk, but Pielke suggests that there needs to be further research to
determine if adaptation actually makes communities more or less vulnerable to hazards (Pielke
1998).
Adaptive cycles are part of the larger social-ecological systems that have limits of
adaptive capacity in each phase and also the potential for collapse due to unanticipated events,
such as hazards. The cycles evolve through time and experience the following phases:
exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002).
The ecological literature theorizes these adaptive cycles create a panarchy, or a connected set of
adaptive processes that function together across time and space to improve the adaptive capacity
of a social-ecological system (Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig 2002). Panarchy presents a
system that is productive for the future. To achieve a productive future there must be stabilizing
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and destabilizing forces that reflect the amount of internal and external control, and the resilience
of the system must generate a shift in the balance between vulnerability and persistence
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). An example of this would be the ability of oystermen to be
economically and geographically mobile in order to respond to changes in environmental factors
effecting the oyster beds. It is also possible that the destabilizing forces or disturbances exceed
the system’s ability to absorb them (Hammersley, Scott, and Gimblett 2018).
Intersection points between the nested adaptive cycle can create policy windows enabled
by disruptive adaptation, which forces the adaptive cycle into the next phase and facilitates a
regime change in the structure and function of the system, to be incorporated into public policy
and facilitate improved resources management (Wilson 2013). It is important to note that
changes, especially in the management of a resource, do not signify system collapse, but could
instead cause a gradual decline in the resource (Kokorsch 2018). Each of the adaptive cycles
within a panarchy can operate/function at different adaptive speeds (Gunderson and Holling
2002), as well as a varying scale, but it does not address the possibility that conflict may arise
from multiple objectives of different actors. The panarchy system can only accommodate one
cycle working towards growth while the other is stable and in another phase of the cycle (Holling
and Gunderson 2002a). The coastal Louisiana socio-ecological system may have too many
dynamics to fit neatly into a panarchy model. A more recent literature review of the use of
tipping points and places denoting changings between cycles suggests that social-ecological
systems researchers need to examine if the tipping point or regime change might be different
between social and ecological systems (Mikoreit et al. 2018). The independent actors seeking
their own benefits rather than the good of the entire system or community may be something not
fully accounted for in the panarchy model.
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The work on the concepts of resilience, vulnerability, and adaptation has been amplified
following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the New Orleans area, but much of the current research
fails to look beyond the leveed city to the responses of the coastal residents who have been
enduring disruptive events for centuries and adapted to mitigate them (see for articles on New
Orleans: Burby 2006, Cutter et al. 2006, Hartman and Squires 2006, Kapucu 2006, Kates et al.
2006, Campanella 2007, Landphair 2007, Colten, Kates, and Laska 2008, Olshansky et al. 2008,
Watkins 2008, Bullard and Wright 2009, Colten and Sumpter 2009b, Freudenburg et al. 2009,
Godfrey 2009, Levitt and Whitaker 2009, Seidenberg 2009, Bates and Swan 2010, Giancarlo
2011, Morello-Frosch et al. 2011, Nicholls 2013, Olshansky and Johnson 2015). The works that
do look beyond the levee provide a methodological framework to address the adaptations of
coastal Louisiana by identifying adaptations to disruptive events through archival work, as well
as an organizational matrix for these adaptations (see: Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo 2012, Colten,
Grismore, and Simms 2015). Although it is not as extensive as the work on New Orleans, these
works are concise and provide specific examples of the adaptations occurring on the coast over
time. A study in Apalachicola Bay in Alabama utilized social-ecological systems framework to
look at the collapse of the oyster fishery following tropical weather events3, the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, and drought conditions (Camp et al. 2015). This study looked at these more
recent stressors to determine future options to increase system resilience (Camp et al. 2015), but
they did not utilize long term or historical data.

3

The hurricanes were Dennis (2005), tropical storm Fay (2008), and tropical storm Debby (2012).
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2.3. Natural Resources and Environmental Geography
Louisiana’s coastal residents have relied on a variety of renewable and nonrenewable
natural resources since humans arrived to this location. Coastal brackish marshes provide
habitats for finfish, oysters, shrimp, crabs, and muskrat, while the freshwater lakes and bayous
provide alligator, crawfish, and finfish habitats. Fishermen and trappers have exploited these
resources for more than two centuries (Kniffen 1968, Padgett 1969, Keithly 1991, Davis 2010).
Geological formations have yielded oil, tapped from beneath the coastal wetlands since the early
twentieth century. Natural resource economies, like coastal Louisiana’s, often face exhaustion
due to over exploitation and associated boom and bust cycles (Gramling and Freudenburg 1990,
Kirby 2004a, Mencken and Flynn 2004). In addition, management of these resources must
contend with common property issues and geographic mobility of fisheries resources (Olson
1971, Acheson 1987, Dyer and Leard 1994, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, Cutter and Renwick
2004). With individual exploitative processes at play in coastal Louisiana, the concept of a
unified adaptive cycle as suggested in the panarchy model fits poorly with a social-ecological
community that has participants that are each working for their self-interests which contribute to
resource depletion and exhaustion that has occurred in both the oil and oyster industry.
Resource depletion occurred in the oil industry in Louisiana 1940s and 1970s, similar to
other boom and bust economic cycles. As drilling exhausted shallow on-shore formations,
drillers penetrated deeper formations and then the platforms and operations moved offshore.
Louisiana has faced multiple petroleum production declines during the late twentieth century,
coinciding with similar trends in the cycles in the industry outside of Louisiana (Gramling and
Freudenburg 1990, Austin 2007). The petroleum industry is no longer a reliable source of
employment in coastal communities, although fracking had renewed north Louisiana’s hope for a
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booming energy economy (Austin 2007). Despite the boom and bust cycles associated with
natural resources, many coastal residents are still firmly anchored in place due to the complex
intertwined relationships of their economic livelihoods, community networks, environmental
conditions, and attachments to place (Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010).
Human use has resulted in periodic scarcity among all the resources commonly harvested
from Louisiana’s coastal marshes at some point in the region’s history. The examination of
resource scarcity and overuse began with George Perkins Marsh in the nineteenth century,
although his efforts focused on the western portions of the United States and southern Europe,
many of the principals and issues he identified continue to have wide-ranging applications
(Goudie and Alexander 1997, Olwig 2003, Martin and Martin 2005). Carl Sauer was responsible
for introducing Marsh’s work to geography scholars through Sauer’s own studies of landscape
change caused by humans (Speth 1977, Goudie and Alexander 1997, Sauer 2009). Yet, many of
the ideas of conservation promoted by Marsh, and later the conservation movement, were
frequently depicted as solely those of the scientific and political community, or the elites, not
resource-using communities (Hays 1959). Maximum sustained yield was a core conservation
concept that promoted aggressive fishing to continue until scientists were able to prove
overfishing was occurring (Finley 2011).
Increased consumerism following World War II drove industrial production and
pollution. The consumer growth machine fueled the vision of natural resources as public
commodities to harvest (Wilson 2014). By the 1960s, the nation was facing environmental
problems it could not deny, such as rivers catching on fire, massive fish kills, and the biological
hazards of agri-chemical dependent agriculture. Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962) bought
the possible outcomes of overuse of natural resources and pollution of the environment into the
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public eye, which is considered one of the catalysts for the environmental movement of the
1960s and 1970s (Solecki 1996). At this same time, ideas of resource conservation were
beginning to resurface through Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968) which argued
individuals tended to manage common resources for personal gain, rather than managing them
efficiently for the benefit of the larger society, inevitably leading to depletion, exhaustion, and
overuse.
The concept of the Tragedy of the Commons led scholars to the common property
dilemma that applies to all-natural resource-based economies. Hardin’s concept (1968) relates to
most common resources and highlights the importance of a socially managed conservation-based
approach rather than individual exploitation as a form of natural resources management. The
transition in the oyster industry from local control to state regulation is an example of common
property dilemmas faced by natural resource harvesters, despite having occurred prior to the
development of this theory (Cutter and Renwick 2004). The challenges faced by early industries,
such as the oysters and cypress in Louisiana, helped highlight the idea of mismanagement and
prompt the ideas of conservation across the nation. The oyster industry’s response to a
recognized shortage due to its overharvesting of naturally producing beds and its shift to
cultivation represents an adaptation and a form of resource management.4 This concept suggests,
in terms of Louisiana’s coastal resources, regulation to prevent overfishing or overuse of the
resource (Olson 1971, Acheson 1987, Dyer and Leard 1994, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003,
Cutter and Renwick 2004, Kirby 2004b).

4

See Colten. 2014. Southern Waters. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. For a description of the
transition of the federal government beginning to participate in conservation and hazard planning on the state level.
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The majority of Louisiana coastal resources, from cypress to oysters to muskrat, have all
faced similar resource scarcity due to mismanagement and overharvesting for personal gain at
some point in the region’s history. New settlers thought cypress was an “inexhaustible” resource
(Norgress 1947, 10). In 1849, Congress passed a series of acts, which granted ownership of
swamps lands to the State of Louisiana and thereby opened the land to legal cypress harvesting,
and the possibility of regulation (Norgress 1947). Despite granting ownership of swamp lands,
the management role played by the state was minimal, since much of the cypress was on private
land and the state, like the rest of the nation, did not have a timber harvesting or management
policy (Norgress 1947, Colten 2003). The cypress industry was rampant in the areas north and
south of the New Orleans, as well as further west in the Atchafalaya Basin, and eventually
leading to the cypress forests being stripped from the land (Colten 2003). Louisiana oysters
almost faced a fate similar to the cypress, but were able to recover through mariculture and faster
rates of reproduction, rather than relying on natural reproduction. The transition to reforestation
and conservation approaches occurred in the pine timber industry after the deforestation of the
old growth forest but has not proven successful with cypress stock (Olson 1971).
The management of natural resources can be the responsibility of four different regime
types. The regime types can remain static or evolve over time as demands on the resource and
the needs of the community change. The first is a private property regime in which ownership,
harvesting rights, and the landowner controls all access rights. Common property resource
regimes involve group decision making about management and control of the resource, as well
as rights to income, duties, and respect of the rights of others to the resources. The third
management regime is a state property regime, which gives the harvester no ownership rights but
they are allowed to maintain usage of the area. Lastly, the open-access regime allows everyone
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access to a resource, but there are not clear property lines or rights to the resource (Bromley
1986).
Members of society will form management regimes if there are common goals for the use
and harvesting of a resource, even in the absence of formal government regulations (Bromley
1986, Ostrom 1986). Their formation commonly arises from a group that has been harvesting
from an area for a long time and lives close to the resource. Also scarcity and multiple users of a
resource like in Louisiana’s wetlands, the oysters, shrimp, and a variety of other resources
contribute to the formation of a management regime (Ostrom 1986). Ostrom points out that a
regime or group is not always effective or efficient simply because it has been around a
significant period or has acquired a lot of political power (1986). Familiarity with local
conditions does not ensure prudent stewardship of the resource across the community. The risk a
group faces in managing a resource can be shared enhancing their community’s stability or
adaptability (Ostrom 1986). Competing interests for a resource can increase the stress on both
the management regime and the resource itself (Peters 1986).
There can also be different opinions between the day-to-day user and the centralized
management regime about the best way to manage a resource, as was the case with conflicts in
the management of public lands known as the Sagebrush Rebellions5 (Graf 1990). Looking at a
resource regionally can help identify the relationship between local knowledge, ecological
change, and conservation trends especially when an area has a common culture and landscape to
provide a unifying influence (Judd 1997, Colten 2014). In analyzing the transitional colonial

5

The Sagebrush Rebellion refers to organized resistance to federal public land policies in the Western United States
(Graf 1990). There were four rebellions, from the Civil War era to the 1960s, focused on different issues, which
were irrigation of lands, disposition of forested lands, public grazing control by the states, and wilderness lands(Graf
1990).
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economy extending from coastal Maryland to Georgia, Watson considered the entire region’s
common values and economic characteristics to identify the core meaning of a set of yeoman
farmers’ lawsuits against mill owners, who began blocking access to streams and fish movement
with dams to power the mills (2009). The litigants were not simply attempting to get into streams
or access fish they perceived as rightfully theirs, but seeking a means for them to protest the shift
from subsistence to plantation economies (Watson 2009). The shift from subsistence to
plantation economies represented a shift in the management of resources and shifted control to
consolidated plantations, rather than the yeoman farmer. The plantation economic system did
not have a place for the yeoman and this became apparent looking at the issue on a regional scale
rather than based on a singular suit (Watson 2009).
The economies of the Louisiana coastal parishes are predominately dependent on natural
resource exploitation: including oysters, shrimp, finfish, crabs, natural gas, and crude oil. There
are numerous support industries that provide additional employment, but without the exploitation
of natural resources, the communities would not have viable economies. The dependence on
natural resources makes these communities particularly vulnerable to the disruptive events
affecting the coastal area. Recent natural and human-made events have prompted an increased
interest in the relationship between culture and environment of Louisiana. The increased interest
in Louisiana can be partially attributed to the historical and current bonds with the landscape and
the place that is coastal Louisiana, which some attribute to the water resource-based economies
of coastal communities (Davis 1990, Burley et al. 2004, Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010). The
bond with the landscapes can contribute to the way individuals and communities respond to
disruptive events and how they choose to adapt. A vast majority of shrimpers responded to a
survey that if they were unable to shrimp they would attempt to find work in another fisheries
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related industry (Deseran and Riden 2000). These ties to fisheries partially explain how or why
individuals adapt to disruptive events, as well as the inability to fit the complex social-ecological
community of coastal Louisiana into a systematic adaptive model based on the idea that these
types of systems create a panarchy.
Despite tenuous resource supplies, Louisiana residents have remained in place. Some
attribute this to a strong sense of place (Krogman 1996, Burley et al. 2004, Laska et al. 2005,
Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010). The notion of sense of place can be traced to the term
topophilia introduced to geography by Yi-Fu Tuan (Tuan 1974). He defined it as the emotional
ties that occur between people and a geographic location or landscape (Tuan 1974). Tuan
attempted to clarify the differences between place and space, suggesting that “space” eventually
through familiarity and experience becomes “place” (Tuan and Buttimer 1976, 275, Tuan 1977,
6). Tuan’s study of the feelings a population has towards “space” and “place,” while assessing
the various sensory mechanisms people use to observe and construe a place has been highly
influential (see: Entrikin 1976, Tuan 1977, 6-7, Pred 1983, 1984, Agnew 1987, Altman and Low
1992, Harvey 1996, Cantrill 1998, Gieryn 2000, Agnew and Smith 2002, Burley et al. 2004,
Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010).
In addition to acknowledging that attachments to places exist, attachments at both the
regional and local scale need to be considered, while exploring the association of nature,
meaning, and social functions as a cohesive community structure (Sack 1992). The framework
developed by Altman and Low (1992) in sociology, and utilized by geographers, has been used
to explain the emotional attachments coastal Louisianans have to the land (Krogman 1996,
Burley et al. 2004, Laska et al. 2005, Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010). As the land disappears
due to subsidence, sea level rise, and erosion, it is possible that some ecosystems will fade away.
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The environmental transition could lead to a loss of culture and community. Residents and
researchers are mindful of this impending situation (Burley et al. 2004, Laska et al. 2005, Burley
et al. 2007, Burley 2010, Lloyd, Peel, and Duck 2013). The powerful attachment to place and
the human agency that results from these emotions influence adaptations and responses in ways
that cannot be accounted for in a systematic model.
Environmental sociologists have extensively documented the loss of land and culture, as
well as economic transition occurring on the coast. They have reported on the development of
the oil industry and the community responses to it and its socioeconomic effects, and the
influences the industry has had on cultural patterns and attachment to community (Freudenburg
and Gramling 1993, 1994, 2002, Gramling and Hagelman 2005, Gramling and Freudenburg
2006, Field 2013). Yet, little work has documented historic oil spills or disruptive events and the
resulting community responses or attempts to recoup property damages (Picou, Marshall, and
Gill 2004, Tootle 2007, Freudenburg et al. 2008, Gotham and Greenberg 2014). The legal
response of a community can express not only its inherent resilience, but also the attachment to
community and its location. An attachment exists in both the natural resource-based economy of
oyster harvesting, and in the community and family ties.
Sociology’s focus on human and environmental interactions is rooted in the
acknowledgement that human activities have caused extensive coastal environmental change that
has resulted in a negative impact on the people and their economic dependence on coastal
resources (Catton and Dunlap 1978, Dunlap and Catton 2001, Murphy and Dunlap 2012). The
discipline evolved from simply looking at human and nature interactions to also incorporating
hazards and disaster responses, beyond technological and toxic hazards, through the work of
William Freudenburg and Robert Gramling (Freudenburg and Gramling 1993, 1994, Gramling
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and Freudenburg 1996, Freudenburg and Gramling 2002, Laska et al. 2005, Gramling and
Freudenburg 2006, Freudenburg et al. 2008, Tierney 2012). They have written prolifically about
coastal Louisiana analyzing the intersection of social dimensions of natural hazards and
accessing the long-term effects of hazards on political, historical, and economic developments
(Freudenburg and Gramling 1993, 1994, Gramling and Freudenburg 1996, Freudenburg and
Gramling 2002, Gramling and Freudenburg 2006, Freudenburg et al. 2008, Tierney 2012).
Hurricane Katrina was a major catalyst for studying the coastal community’s long-term
recovery methods, as well as short-term responses. Hurricane Katrina prompted researchers to
compare damage in the fishing communities of Venice and Grand Isle. They report that the
degree of damage directly affects a community’s ability to recover despite fisherfolk and
residents’ desire to rebuild (Ingles and McILvaine-Newsad 2007). This scholarship also
suggests that additional work needs to be done on fishing communities to provide information
used to improve strategies and methods for a comprehensive community recovery and not simply
rebuilding (Ingles and McILvaine-Newsad 2007). The lack of literature relating to how people
historically responded to the events suggests that further research is needed in these areas, as
well as an attempt to link the more recent place attachment concept with the documented
responses of people to oil spills of the past (see: Dyer, Gilll, and Picou 1992, Burley et al. 2004,
Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004, Burley et al. 2007, Burley 2010, Gill, Picou, and Ritchie 2012).

2.4. Public Policy and Litigation-based Research
The rural communities, economically dependent on natural resources, are susceptible to
disruptive events due their location on the natural high ground lining the bayous, which pierce
the shoreline of Louisiana. Resources that sustain coastal economies may also support important
historical, cultural, and ethnic practices, further strengthening ties to place. A reliance on
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renewable fisheries may be sustainable, but overfishing and disruptive events can have
detrimental effects on a coastal resource (Harrington 2009). By nature, fisheries are a mobile
common resource, which makes them difficult to manage, but innovative top-down approaches
have included aquaculture, leasing production areas, and licensing fishermen (Wicker 1979a,
Harrington 2009). Coastal communities, like many in Louisiana, share a mutual relationship
with resources management and social organization, while recognizing that governance of the
resources exists at the state level (Brewer 2012a). Public policy and litigation are fundamental
tools used to manage common resources, as well as ensuring a community’s ability to adapt and
maintain resiliency. Three issues falling under these tools include water resources management,
property rights, and pollution damage, and all are central to coastal Louisiana’s resource
management, which ultimately affects a community’s livelihood.
Water is one of the many natural resources that have become a commodity for society’s
consumption. The U.S. has implemented water law at different scales across the country due to
the value placed on water, the resources it contains, and its mobility (Matthews 1992, Graf 2001,
Wescoat and White 2003, Davis 2009, Colten 2010, Lane 2011a, Colten 2014). Resource
regulation can vary in geographic scale, by resource harvester’s definition of the resource, and by
regulatory agency or court interpretation of the importance or value of the resource (Emel and
Brooks 1988, Graf 2001, Davis 2009). Decisions about the management of water resources can
impact ecological systems as well as social systems (Wescoat and White 2003). By looking at
the spatial, social, environmental, and cultural impacts of laws governing water resources,
geographers contribute to legal studies by connecting law back to society and the landscape
(Bromley and Clark 1990, Platt 1996, Thompson, Shelley, and Wiji 1997).
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Laws are bound by place, which causes them to have spatial effects, thus through the
study of law, geographers are able to decipher information about places (Bromley and Clark
1990, Palm 1997). Craig Colten addressed the issue of public policy and the impacts it had on
both the economy and environment (2010). His article, as well as Kircher’s article on the water
navigability, also brings up the importance of knowing the basis of the legal system for the area
or region a researcher is working in, as that provides the ground work for many rulings (Kirchner
2000, Colten 2010). Understanding the legal basis for the oyster harvester’s ability to sue can
guide research on potential points of conflict and places for adaptation, as well as provide
political, social, and economic context about why lawsuits or rulings occurred. Kirchner also
acknowledges that the study of water resources is inseparable from geographical methods, since
the resource itself is a spatially distributed one and it naturally evokes a sense of place that
connects a group to it (Kirchner 2000). The spatial distributions of the oyster beds suggest that
the oyster harvesters developed a place attachment to both their social communities and the
landscape, which also could motivate legal action in defense of specific places.
The social or economic values and beliefs of natural resources regulators can influence
the development of legal and management policies, which affect the way a resource is managed
or mismanaged (Platt 1996). Emel and Brooks use a legal-system analysis to evaluate the roles
and responsibilities of parties involved in managing a resource (1988). Acknowledging these
actors and their activities is important for addressing the complex social-ecological system in
Louisiana, since there are multiple managers, who change over time. Emel and Brooks
compared the regulatory efforts of the states in the 1960s and 1970s with the prior common-law
practices (Emel and Brooks 1988). Through this analysis the authors determined the utilitarian
basis of ground water property rights had not changed drastically despite increased stress on the
30

resource, but in fact the society’s definition of property had evolved and became more rigid and
uniform rather than looking at situations on a case by case basis to determine resource ownership
(Emel and Brooks 1988). Were there comparable changes in the social definition of property in
Louisiana that enabled oystermen to sue for damages?
Emel and Roberts analyze the regulatory effectiveness of community organizations,
central state governance, and unmanaged private property based regulation as ways to manage
groundwater (1995). By conducting a thorough comparison of each regulatory form and the
policies established in three states, they conclude that mismanagement is better than no
management (Emel and Roberts 1995). Their findings suggest localized and state-run efforts
provide for better resource allocation and conservation than with the unmanaged private-property
approach. The shift to state regulated resources is often a result of resource scarcity, which
causes a shift from common law to conservation-based regulation (Emel and Roberts 1995). A
shift like this was observed in the oyster industry in Louisiana in the early 20th century from
local control to state level management (Wicker 1979a). The main difference between localized
and state efforts is the incorporation of culture and local practice is often lost at the centralized
state level (Emel and Roberts 1995).
Lane reviewed the settlement of water control and resource management cases at the state
level (Lane 2011a). She found judges in New Mexico during the early 1900s, as Rosen
discovered in the U.S. northeast, encountered little legal precedent to follow and a lack of
environmental pollution knowledge (Lane 2011a). Lane suggests that science, meaning
resources management in the study, and law are interrelated. As a researcher, it is important to
look at how laws shaped resources management policy and how management policy has
formulated or informed legal decisions (see: Colten 2010, Lane 2011a). This concept further
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builds on the work of Rutherford Platt and the relationship between the physical, cultural, and
legal spheres as a factor in land-law interactions and ultimately resources management practices
(Platt 1996). These separate spheres all influence the policy formulation process in Louisiana
and how the state chooses to manage the oil and oyster industries and enables them to remain
economically viable.
The work of legal, historical geographers to triangulate resources that inform policy is
further exemplified in the work of Georgina Enfield. The incorporation of multiple source
materials and perspectives is critical to provide a complete picture of what the basis is for a legal
action and how it affects a community. Georgina Enfield and her collaborators employ a breadth
of sources in their study of colonial Mexico in order to determine how three different regions
responded to flood events and droughts through legal measures (Enfield, Tejedo, and O'Hara
2004, Enfield 2008). Their studies drew upon the legal record of water resource disputes, tax
records, church records, and other sources found in the National Archive in Mexico City, as well
as local and private repositories found in the individual regions (Enfield, Tejedo, and O'Hara
2004, Enfield 2008). Enfield examined the records chronologically and identified references to
weather-related events such as floods and storms, general observations of seasonal change
indicators such as late or early rainy seasons, and indirect documentation of changes in climate
such as gains or losses in harvests (Enfield 2008). Enfield attempted to corroborate evidence
found in one document with multiple documents as well as other records of climate change like
archaeological and dendrochronological data (Enfield 2008). Enfield acknowledges the records
are subjective, since people facing a crisis are much more likely to record events. These
conclusions suggest the importance of historical archives in framing both historic and modern
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climate change events as well as the ways the societies attempted to make themselves more
resilient (Enfield 2008).
The work of Christine Rosen also provides a methodical framework. Rosen employs
both the legal-system approach when comparing the legal rulings across states, but also links the
ruling to the social, political, and economic situation within and among states (Rosen 1993,
1998). Her 1998 article provides a specific framework for analyzing historical legal cases by
focusing on the interrelated social, economic, and political situations that framed pollution
conflicts (Rosen 1998). She notes that the judges’ political affiliations could affect the verdicts,
but there could also be underlying community factors, such as the level of employment in the
industrial sector engaged in the suits, that influence the cases (Rosen 1998). The article brings to
light the social or economic backdrop for legal rulings and how external factors can affect the
execution of the law at the local level.
Rosen continues her work in an article that attempts to bridge the gap between
environmental history and legal history through the examination of litigation prior to the Civil
War involving industrial pollution (Rosen 2003c). Through this approach, she explores how
people made sense of industrial pollution problems, which like in her 1998 article represented a
society unsure of how to deal with pollution problems caused by industrialization (Rosen 2003c).
The deviation among rulings were so wide ranging she concludes that political or economic
reasoning could not be the only factor. This led Rosen to examine the cultural construction of
the environment and the preexisting conceptions of normal and polluted (Rosen 2003c). By
looking at the rulings based on cultural constructions of pollution, Rosen was able to examine
how the pace of industrialization in America was proceeding faster than cultural norms and legal
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tenants could evolve, which meant pollution levels rose to an unacceptable level prior to
acknowledging a problem existed (Rosen 2003c).
An extensive literature focuses specifically on water resources while incorporating a legal
perspective. Articles reviewed here emphasize the spatial aspect of water and pollution. Though
these works may not discuss coastal Louisiana and its fisheries specifically, they do bring into
light specific areas of legal doctrine and geographical research methods for a comprehensive
examination of a legal approach to resource management. The integration of both the legal and
cultural aspects of a pollution event provide a methodology to evaluate the cases in this
dissertation. The existing literature points out that it is important to examine the cultural and
legal elements together and not as separate factors. Key considerations include the
acknowledgement that legal rulings have impacts on the environment; surface water and its
resources are mobile, which make it difficult to regulate and manage; and the political, social,
and economic contexts of the decisions. These factors are necessary to provide a truly
geographic perspective on a legal ruling.

2.5. Conclusion
The conceptual foundations addressed in this chapter are rooted in the economic resource
use and human activities in coastal Louisiana. These two factors are at risk from disruptive
events and can inadvertently become disruptive to another resource user, coastal resident, or
community. The incorporation of hazards literature provides the foundation for human
adjustment and response to disruptive events, as well as the complex nature of adaptation and
resilience to show that places like coastal Louisiana are unable to fit into a systematic analysis of
adaptation and the panarchy model of nested adaptive cycles functioning at different phases.
The role of human agency and place attachment that exists on the coast is something that cannot
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be fit into a model or systematically accounted for in an analysis of the resilience of a socialecological system. The natural resource literature and work of environmental sociologists,
especially Gramling and Freudenburg, further exposed the ties of the coast to the natural
resources and the cultural relationships created over time, as well as the various overarching
management plans that have been employed in natural resource-based economies.
In order to build not only a literature foundation but also a methodological foundation, an
examination of public policy and litigation-based research was conducted. The work on how to
examine litigation and conduct a legal analysis based on factors that are outside of what is
written in rulings, such as political affiliations of judges, potential for societal perceptions
changing, and disruptive events. The literature also incorporated the importance of scale
especially when trying to analyze a fluid resource such as water, which in this case is the fluidity
of pollution in the water. The legal geographers also stressed the importance of triangulating
material recovered from lawsuits and relying on a variety of source materials in an attempt to
grasp the full picture and avoid any political or basis that may be contained in the legal
documents. By following these methodological guidelines, I have attempted to pool the
resources available to begin to develop a process to document the relationships between the oil
industry, the state of Louisiana, and the oyster industry from 1930 to 1970 in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 3. Methods
3.1. Introduction
A historical comparison of the oil and oyster industries from 1930 to 1970 enabled the
identification of points of interaction between the independent industries. In Louisiana, this
period represents an optimal historical period for conducting a geographic analysis of the
adaptations made within each industry to cope with disruptive pollution events, since the oil
industry began to move into the coastal marshes during the 1930s. During this time, the state
also began recognizing the need to regulate water pollution and created the Stream Control
Commission (SCC) in 1940.6 By continuing the study period through 1970, the exchanges
leading up to the passage of the federal Clean Water Act in 1972 provide insight into individual
and cooperative adaptations the industries were making prior to the passage of uniform federal
regulations.
Given the wide range of processes interacting during this forty-year period, it was
necessary to consult a diverse array of source materials in order to conduct an adequate historical
analysis of what transpired between the two industries, while incorporating the states’ role in
these interactions. By utilizing a variety of source materials, the complex relationships that
existed in coastal Louisiana revealed the ability of natural-resource harvesters to adapt in the face
of multiple disruptions. The main source material focused on parish civil suits, manuscript
collections related to the industries, oil and gas trade literature, and state documents, all of which
provide additional information about the motivations for the legal actions and the social,

6

The Stream Control Commission (SCC) consisted of state officials from the Department of Conservation, the
Attorney General’s Office, Public Health Department, and other state agencies. The SCC was responsible for
controlling the pollution of state waters, which it was able to accomplish through legislative authority to create rules
and regulations to prevent pollution that harmed aquatic life or created a public health hazard (Colten 2000a).
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economic, and political influences on those decisions. The archival and scientific materials, like
conservation reports, newspaper articles, correspondence, and field studies or experiments,
provide critical background information about how the community continued to sustain itself
when damage occurred to the oyster beds. To identify the genesis of the adaptations among
oyster fishermen and the oil industry in coastal Louisiana, a review of historical legal documents
uncovered evidence of cases using common law for the first time to challenge pollution and
enable oystermen to recoup damages after harm to oyster beds. It is also important to note that
civil law provides a referable set of codes for judges and lawyers, while common law bases its
decisions on precedent – or previous court decisions (Yiannopoulos 1961). Louisiana civil code
recognized oyster leaseholders as “owners” of property and enables them to sue the oil
companies based on common law concepts of trespass and negligence.
In order to accomplish a focused review of relevant material, the study area is located in
southeastern Louisiana, and specifically focused on Plaquemines, Jefferson, Lafourche, and
Terrebonne parishes. These political units represent historically significant harvesting locations
for both the oil and oyster industries during the study period from 1930 to 1970 (Deseran and
Riden 2000, Austin 2007). St. Bernard Parish contains historically significant locations for both
industries; however in 2005, Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the Clerk of Court’s civil suit
records which made parish lawsuits inaccessible to the public due to mold contamination. The
inability to conduct a chronological survey of St. Bernard Parish resulted in removing it from the
study region. St. Mary, Iberia, Vermillion, and Cameron Parishes were not included because the
Department of Conservation Oyster Harvest Statistics does not show consistent harvesting in
these parishes during the study period (Appendix 1 and The Louisiana Department of
Conservation Biennial Reports, Division of Oysters and Water Bottoms).

54

3.2. Legal Material
In a top-down approach to identify pertinent cases, I consulted the American Digest
System, Southern Reporter, Federal Reporter, and West’s Louisiana Digest 2d, which cite
appeals court cases, for topics related to fisheries, oil spills, oysters, and water resources to
compile a list of available cases filed in Louisiana. In addition, a key word search of the online
legal database Lexis-Nexis on these subjects identified additional cases not previously recovered
in the American Digest System, Southern Reporter, Federal Reporter, or West’s Louisiana
Digest 2d (Appendix 2). The keywords utilized derive from the terminology used by the
American Digest System, as well as the defendants and the companies who sponsored the Texas
A & M Research Foundation to conduct experiments to determine the effects of oil on oysters.7
The Lexis-Nexis database only contains lawsuits at the state and federal appeals level, which is
problematic because the only record of the Doucet vs. Texas Company case, the earliest major
oyster/oil pollution case, in this national database was the appeal motion before the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in 1944. There could have been additional cases filed at the parish level not
included in Lexis-Nexis. Due to the potential shortcomings of the Lexis-Nexis database, each
parish Clerk of Court record vault was visited to identify court filings that were settled at the
parish level, dismissed, or not appealed to the state or federal court level between the oyster and
oil industries from 1930 to 1970. Any case pertaining to oil and gas company work damaging
oysters was recorded and copied, and alternatively any oil and gas company taking legal claim to
their property rights against oyster harvesters was collected as well.

7

The Texas A & M Research Foundation participated in a contract research project funded by oil and gas companies
to encourage the Foundation to conduct scientific research to determine if oil and gas operations were impacting the
oyster population in Louisiana and Texas during the past twelve months starting in 1947 (see:Mackin and Hopkins
1961).
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In addition to lawsuits filed by oyster harvesters against the oil industry, I conducted a
search following the same procedure to account for any lawsuits filed by the oil industry or the
state against other parties involving conflict over damages, pollution, or access to resources. The
oil industry may have filed suit against oystermen for retaliatory damage to their equipment or
trespassing. Since the state manages and protects public seed grounds, the search included suits
by the state for damages to its water bottoms. I did not recover any lawsuits by the state during
this time period for damages to the public seed grounds. The oil companies may have filed suit
against the state for access to oil reserves, to dredge a canal, or to install a pipeline. Key terms
related to these potential searches are included in Appendix 2. However, I did not find record of
the oil companies suing for damages by oyster harvesters.8 The lack of other lawsuits filed by
the state and oil companies enabled me to limit the search parameters to suits by oystermen.
After finishing the parish and Lexis-Nexis searches, it became apparent that the volume of
material was extensive and the data needed to be limited to a very specific set of lawsuits. Since
the initial focus of the study was the adaptations each industry made to pollution events, the final
set of lawsuits studied pertained only to oil, sulphur, bleed water, natural gas, and other waste
products that were being released into the coastal waters by oil companies and their subsidiaries
due to negligent and unregulated practices. 9 By limiting the court records to only pollution
events damaging oyster beds, there were 135 relevant lawsuits for analysis.
A thorough review of resources related to litigation between oystermen and oil
companies during the most contentious period, 1930-1970, of Louisiana’s coastal conflicts

8

The lawsuits by oil companies were primarily royalty issues or mineral right issues that did not relate to oyster
beds or seed grounds.
9
The additional lawsuits relate to dredging, seismic activity, and tug boat damage to oyster beds were excluded
from this analysis.
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reveals the points of conflict and the areas where the legal system offers points for social
adaptation to previously un-encountered challenges. Drawing on methods used by Rosen (1993),
Endfield (1998), and Colten (2009a), I classified suits filed by oystermen against oil companies
first by the parish court where the action was filed. All the lawsuits related to pollution were
entered into an Excel spreadsheet to enable easy sorting and tabulation based on similar
characteristics arranged by columns. The suits were then sorted by the date of the primary
complaint to determine if, like in the Doucet vs. Texas Company lawsuit, oyster harvesters with
beds in close proximity to each other were banding together and filing a lawsuit against the oil
company they believed was responsible. Next, the suits were examined to determine the basis
for legal action to determine the common theme throughout the lawsuits both temporally and
spatially. Lastly, I conducted a comparison of the parties involved in the lawsuits across parish
lines to determine if individual oystermen repeated their complainants in different jurisdictions
and how the lawsuits align with the growth of the oil industry. These organizational steps will
enable the identification of the complex cultural and legal relationships that existed in the oyster
bays and the temporal dynamics in this legal arena.

3.3. Additional Archival Material
Following the verdict in the Doucet vs. Texas Company lawsuit (1944), five oil
companies, including the Texas Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, the California
Company, Tide Water Associated Oil Company, and Humble Oil & Refining Company, sought
their own defense strategy against the oyster mortality complaints arising in Louisiana (Fournet
1944). In 1947, these companies began funding a consortium of scientific experts on coastal
biology, chemistry, ecology, bacteriology, parasitology, geology, and physiology, called Project
9, based at the Texas A & M University and which specifically focused on determining the cause
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of oyster mortality (Jakkula 1947). The investigations by Texas A & M Research Foundation
researchers continued into the 1960s. All of these endeavors and formal reports are collected in
the Sewell Hopkins Collection housed at the Texas A & M Cushing Memorial Library.
The reports complied by the Texas A & M Research Foundation sought to determine if
the sponsoring companies’ oil extraction was in fact damaging oysters in Louisiana and Texas.
The Sewell Hopkins collection was reviewed for corroborating information relating to trials and
adaptations to both conserve resources and to avoid further legal troubles. This archival work
exposed the adaptations made by the industry to environmental change occurring on the coast, as
well as, the adaptations made to deal with the legal conflict brought about by oyster harvesters.
The Sewell Hopkins Collection revealed points of conflict between the industry and the
Louisiana Department of Conservation which enabled the determination of how these conflicts
changed state policy or improved industry through self-regulation. The Sewell Hopkins
Collection also contains correspondence among the oil companies’ legal counsel, scientists at the
Texas A & M Foundation, and Louisiana and federal officials. The communications document
the motivation for the oil companies’ scientific inquiry, as well as the Louisiana and federal
officials’ responses to these projects and reports.
In addition to the Texas A & M Foundation, the oil companies and the scientists at Texas
A & M University were working with Charles Coates, an LSU chemist and namesake for a
university building. The Coates Family Papers, housed at Hill Memorial Library contain
correspondence regarding findings, but also field experiment notes and some trial testimony.
The Coates Papers provide field interactions with oyster harvesters who were claiming damages
to their beds, as well as his scientific findings based on field experiments to determine the cause
of the damage. The petitions identify co-defendants which enable the comparison of specific
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legal cases to additional formal legal measures. By connecting the legal results with the
scientific outcomes, it becomes possible to isolate the complex roles of the economic, social, and
political entities in legal disputes. This procedure follows the lead of Rosen and Lane (Rosen
1993, 2003c, Lane 2011b). These connections enable researchers to look at adaptation and
change from a multifaceted approach by recognizing that a single variable is not responsible for
all change or adaptation.
In order to determine another way the oil industry was adapting, the Applied Science and
Technology Index Retrospective: 1913-1983 database was reviewed for discussions of
developments in technology and public policy in trade periodicals. To accomplish this, a
keyword search of the database was conducted to locate the relevant articles in trade periodicals
detailing relevant technological adaptations. The keywords are listed in Appendix 2. The review
identifies the adaptations that reflect adjustments to environmental issues at stake in lawsuits or
citations by the Department of Conservation, such as leaking pipelines, improper drainage
basins, or drilling too close to the oyster beds. The trade literature details adjustments and
adaptations made by the oil industry to avoid litigation or fines from the state by changing the
drilling or disposal practices. The trade literature was cataloged chronologically in a table,
which enables chronological comparison with the other tables relating to state legislation,
litigation, and complaints to the SCC. Linking the trade literature with the policy changes
highlighted how regulatory changes affected the oil industry and how they adapted at their own
pace rather under pressure of legal threats.
To triangulate the information provided by the litigation and manuscript collections, a
review of the Acts of the Louisiana Legislature from 1860 to 1970 was conducted to collect bills
and laws related to the oil and oyster industries and reveal the formal government responses to
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damage allegations. The bills reveal legislative attempts to accommodate both industries at the
various points of conflict and opportunities for policy creation or improved resource
management policies. By specifically looking at the role legislation played in supporting or
opposing each industry, the analysis exposes how the policy maker’s support for economic
interests changed and how the opinion evolved based on the economic significance of each
industry. The analysis of legislation follows the legal-systems analysis conducted by Emel and
Brooks (1988). In order to identify the sources of policy adjustments, a policy timeline (table)
was used to plot the legislative action chronologically and enable comparison with the
chronological SCC compliant, technological evolution in the trade literature, and litigation
tables. In order to connect the legislative action with intent and to encompass the complexities
associated with political affiliations and cultural backgrounds (Rosen 2003b), the analysis and
policy timeline includes the sponsoring party and the parish of origin.
In addition to consulting the Acts of the Louisiana Legislature, the available SCC
documents provided reports of pollution events and/or citations to the oil and gas industry for
waste of resources. These documents are available for rudimentary query through the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Equality Electronic Document Management System (LDEQEDMS). The citations and complaints about pollution in coastal waters found in the SCC
documents were recorded in a table for comparison with the legislation, trade literature, and
litigation tables. Utilizing the SCC’s records exposed the resources management approaches of
the SCC under the frequently broad legislation contained in the Acts of the Louisiana Legislature
affecting the oil and gas industry. The records in the LDEQ-EDMS also contain correspondence
with the polluting parties involved, and these records provided additional insight into the
political, monetary, or resource motivations of each party.
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The Department of Conservation Oyster Division, as well as the federal Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted studies on the natural resources of Louisiana but this project
focuses on the studies pertaining to the oysters and oyster cultivation, as well as reports used to
inform policy changes in the management of oyster resources. Review of these reports provided
another lens into the identification of points of intervention where adaptations could preserve the
natural resource.

3.4. Melding the Material with the Literature
The foundations of community resilience, which are the ability to anticipate, to take steps
to reduce vulnerability, to respond, and to recover (Wilbanks 2008), form the analytical
framework for comparing and contrasting the pollution events and the adaptations by the oil and
oyster industry. Colten and his collaborators created a matrix using these elements and practices
used by government, industry, and communities to refine the organization of resilience practices
into either formal or inherent (2012). The characteristics of inherent resilience represent
practices that have been passed down from generation to generation and represent learned
behaviors in the way communities respond to disruptive events (Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo
2012).10 Whereas, formal resilience represents top-down government and corporation practices
that dictate the way a community responds to a disruptive event (Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo
2012). By categorizing the practices associated with oil spill responses from the 1970s through
the BP spill in 2010 that were identified in the scientific, archival, and legal documents, this

10

Cutter and colleagues also address “inherent resilience” as the community’s ability to maintain stability during
non-event phases, as well as the qualities that enable a community to adapt during the response to an extreme event
(2008, 601).
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work exposed the contrasting strengths of government/industry resilience with community-level
resilience.
The adaptations a community makes are critical to its ability to be resilient and learn
from past adaptations that did or did not succeed (Mileti 1999, Wilbanks and Kates 2010). By
adapting over time, societies are able to subsist, prosper, and preserve their quality of life; thus
by incorporating adaptations into resilience, the ecological and/or social systems have flexibility
during times of disruption (Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2003, Folke 2006, Gallopín 2006, Smit
and Wandel 2006, Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). Times of disruption by pollution are
specifically what this dissertation examines and how those times of disruption prompted the oil
or oyster industry to adapt and how the adaptations made by one industry affected the other
industry. The times of disruption were identified through the litigation, complaints made to the
SCC, and events or problems noted in the trade literature.
Classifying the historical evidence material in the matrix allows systematic and
comparative evaluation to determine if adaptations create competing adaptive cycles across the
larger coastal system. An adaptive cycle evolves following the specific phases of exploitation,
conservation, release and reorganization (Holling and Gunderson 2002a). By looking at an
entire social-ecological system, the various adaptive cycles within that system are supposed to
create a panarchy, or multiple adaptive cycles operating at different phases and speeds towards
adaptation, but this concept does not take into account that only one of the adaptive cycles within
a social-ecological system can be working towards growth (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Thus
in the case of the oil and oyster industry, they each function as independent actors working
towards their own primary goals, not the good of the overall system.
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The longitudinal nature of the lawsuits lends itself to a historical categorization and
comparison, since as time progressed so did the environmental harm and the collective rationale
for oystermen to file suits. Was this due to changing science? Were they successfully adapting
to the previous hazard, only to find a new one as oil operations expanded? Dividing pollution
events into categories based on the cause of the damage, such as oil or gas leaks from pipelines
or valves, bleed water, waste pit overflow, and other types of pollution events, enabled the
comparison of what prompts actors into a new adaptive cycle and if the process is systematic. In
addition to categorization by pollution events, each lawsuit was analyzed to identify the date,
water body, parish, and primary complaint which helped enabled comparison with the legal,
trade literature, and scientific material to see the long-term evolution of the industries with each
other.
Through the analysis of the lawsuits, it became clear that there were two distinct periods
of legal action that correlated with the archival material collected from the Sewell Hopkins
Collection and the Coates Manuscript Collection. The 1930s and 1940s series of lawsuits
provide two distinct periods to compare and contrast the changes in policy and how these
affected the oil and oyster industries ability to adapt. The knowledge already gained from the
study conducted by Colten and others provides an additional lens of comparison.
A sample matrix (Table 1) illustrates the framework used to classify the period of conflict
and the adaptive cycles the participants went through to determine how or if the natural resource
management practices adapted to new disruptive events. The adaptive cycle is assumed to
follow a growth, conservation, release, and reorganization pattern (Gunderson and Holling
2002). This pattern lends itself to classification as well as fitting the into the processes the
adaptive cycle underwent, since some of these practices are in response to the cycle and some to
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human agency. The adaptations will be classified based on issues of access to the resource,
harvesting methods, economic issues, protection of rights, disruptive events, and policy creation
or change.
Table 1. Example of Matrix for Adaptive Cycle Categorizing
Adaptive Cycle
Characteristic
Adaptive phase system starts in
Structure:
Institutional
Economic
Demographic
Feedbacks
Disturbance
Adaptive phase system ends in

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

(Adapted from: Bures and Kanapaux 2011b)

By utilizing matrices to incorporate information gleaned from the legal documents, the
scientific reports, and the archival information, Table 1 enables the visualization of the adaptive
cycles and shows if the oil and oyster industries were adapting in a similar fashion or if they
were adapting to maintain their own livelihoods, not for the betterment of the entire ecosystem.
Cataloging the oystermen’s adaptations, legislation, and industry changes in matrixes, presents a
tool to gauge whether or not the action of either industry created a policy window to improve the
conservation and environmental protection of natural resources, or if each group was focused on
nature as a commodity. By utilizing the four principals of resilience identified by Wilbanks,
Table 1 will incorporate the defining features of each adaptive cycle. By doing this for each
adaptive cycle, the matrix will begin to show if the adaptations were passed down over time and
if the industries attempted to correct errors in construction, community engagement, or science
by comparing the adaptive cycles and the regulation matrix.
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Chapter 4. Oyster Harvesting: From Family to Industry
4.1. Introduction
To maintain their cultural and economic livelihoods, Louisiana’s coastal residents have
harvested a variety of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources. Fishermen and trappers
have exploited these resources for more than two centuries (Kniffen and Hilliard 1968, Padgett
1969, Nelson et al. 1997). These same coastal marshes provided oil deposits and other mineral
resources, and, by the 1940s, the exploration and discovery of these resources extended into the
Gulf of Mexico. Aggressive human consumption of these resources has resulted in scarcity with
almost all the resources common to Louisiana’s coastal marshes at some point in the region’s
history. In order to better understand the relationship between human resource harvesting and
the environment they rely on, this chapter examines the historical development, relationships,
evolution, and adaptations of the both the oyster and oil industry.11 This chapter also reviews the
initiation of distinct legislation and regulation concerning these two industries.

4.2. Beginning of the Louisiana Oyster Harvesting
Shell middens or trash heaps assembled by Native Americans are common features of the
coastal region. The shell middens contained a variety of the discarded rangia cuneata or clams,
oyster shells, and other faunal material following consumption. The shell middens served
various purposes for the Native American residents, but all resulted in the building up of the
coastal landscape and created an elevated area above sea-level (Kidder 2000). These first
residents of the Louisiana coastal plain also established ways to live in the unpredictable
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The concept that “people-environment relationships are changing, not constant” relates to the argument of L.
Rodwell Jones in his 1925 Presidential Address for a historical perspective in geography (Jones 1925, see Baker
1997for additional information on historical geography methods and limitations).
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environment with spring floods taking over the landscape and tropical disturbances bringing in
storm surge (Kniffen and Hilliard 1968, Kidder 2000). Most Native American residents
constructed their settlements on the higher ground rather than extending their settlements beyond
the natural levees like the later European settlers (Kniffen and Hilliard 1968). The settlement
patterns of Native Americans also provide direct linkages to the deltaic processes of the
Mississippi River based on the work of McIntire, who combined archaeological and geological
data to date the river channels (McIntire 1958, 1978). The shell middens later provided modest
elevation for European settlers’ homes to avoid flood waters, as well as, a place for their
cemeteries (Comeaux 1972).
On the Louisiana coast, shell middens date to 2,000-year B.P. and contain a mixture of
oyster shells and rangia, which suggest that oysters were a staple in the diet of Native Americans
(Russell 1936, McIntire 1958). The middens range in size from several square feet to a few
acres and range in depth from only a few inches to ten feet (Gagliano and Weinstein 1979). The
oyster collection process of prehistoric people involved wading through the coastal marshes and
removing the oysters by hand or later with a wooden tool similar to a rake (Dyer 1917). The
possibility of trade among coastal and inland tribes is highly unlikely due to the inability to
transport a raw oyster without proper refrigeration and with the shells intact. The oysters would
have been heavy to carry overland. This suggests that harvesting was primarily for individual
consumption or for barter within the village for other goods (Wicker 1979b). Conditions were
not drastically different when European settlers began to exploit the oysters using similar manual
techniques employed by Native Americans. 12

12

It is unclear in the literature and research which techniques utilized by Europeans were brought from Europe or
learned from the Native Americans.
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By establishing New Orleans as the economic gateway to the Mississippi River Basin,
Europeans not only created a strategic geographic location but also a developing economy
centered on trade throughout the Mississippi River basin. The influx of people to the region in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began the shift in the economic value of oysters. In
the early colonial period, domestic, subsistence motivations dominated the industry, but with the
influx of Europeans a commercial demand slowly began to rise for all local resources (Wicker
1979b). The utilization of natural resources was shifting away from Native Americans huntergather style lifestyles to plantations with slaves in the countryside and the port city of New
Orleans for the export of commodities (Kniffen and Hilliard 1968). The sedentary lifestyle
prompted a shift to commercial production of oysters, which centered on New Orleans (Kniffen
and Hilliard 1968, Wicker 1979b). These shifts developed economies “down the bayou” solely
focused on the export of natural resources from rural Louisiana to New Orleans, as well as other
portions of the country.
The bayou and marsh systems of Louisiana created the ideal salinity range for oysters to
flourish. The oyster has a very narrow salinity range that is ideal 15 to 22.5 parts per trillion
(ppt), but can survive from 5 to 40 ppt (Wicker 1979a). The wide range enables the oyster to
adapt to the changing seasonal conditions and annual fluctuations (Wicker 1979a). In order for
oysters to be able to reproduce naturally in Louisiana, the best salinity range is between 5 and 15
ppt, but continual salinity lower than 6 ppt can impair reproduction (Wicker 179a).
With the development of New Orleans as a major port in the early 1800s, the ability to
transport oysters from the harvest locations to market in New Orleans, and later Biloxi, had
improved, as well as the growth of plantation lifestyles and the desire for oysters. The port city
provided a migrant workforce that was willing to work in an industry that demanded relatively
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hard manual labor, involving either wading or using a boat to collect the oysters from their beds
(Wicker 1979b). In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the market for oysters was still
relatively small, so a seasonal socioeconomic life evolved among bayou residents (Wicker
1979b). The ability to harvest multiple resources from the marsh throughout the year was, and
continues to be, an adaptive practice to life on the coast.
The Croatians13 were pioneers in the Louisiana the oyster industry, possibly due to their
experiences harvesting oysters in the Mediterranean Sea coupled with excellent navigational
skills (Lovrich 1968, Wicker 1979b, Melancon et al. 1994). Many of the Croatian immigrants
were from Mali Ston located in present day Croatia on Bistrina Bay, an area known for the
cultivation of oysters by the suspension method for centuries (Vujnovich 1974). Providing a
canal, pond, or inlet to oystermen for the suspension, or the holding the oysters in saltier water,
was a part of the laws of Fisheries for Austria in 1874 and utilized in the area of the Adriatic Sea
where the oystermen emigrated from (Peyrer 1874, Wicker 1979b). Established Croatian
oystermen would recruit newly arrived countrymen from the New Orleans port to work as
helpers which enabled them to learn a trade (Zacharie 1898). The Croatians claim a role in
launching the citrus (orange) groves in the fertile delta soil as a way for them to earn additional
income and diversify their economic pursuits (Lovrich 1966).
As the industry expanded in the 1850s by employing more people, quality standards
concerning the acceptable size of an oyster began to develop among consumers. Oystermen
would regularly harvest from the beds and then store the oysters in the fresher waters closer to
their camps, which enabled the oysters to plump up and fetch a higher price at the market. In
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Dalmatia is a cultural region and historical country along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. In present day, it is
predominantly located in Croatia. Overtime, the Croatians in south Louisiana have been referred to by the following
names: Slavs, Dalmatians, Austrians, and Takos (Lovrich 1968).
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addition to attempting to plump the oysters, the oystermen learned that it was important to keep
the harvested oysters in the water as long as possible until a buyer arrived or they could transport
them to market in order to preserve freshness (Wicker 1979b).
As the nineteenth century continued, the population in New Orleans grew, as did the
demand for oysters, which prompted more settlers to embark on this profession and settle further
down the bayou to find more oysters to harvest and sell in the city (Wicker 1979b, Melancon et
al. 1994). Ingersoll estimated that in 1880 as many as 1,400 people were employed in the oyster
industry and harvested 295,000 barrels of oysters annually (Baird, Ingersoll, and Goode 1881).
Many of the oystermen began working together communally since harvesting was such a
rigorous process, and they established camps on the bayous near the oyster harvesting areas
(Wicker 1979b). The increased harvests necessitated wholesale dealers to establish themselves
in New Orleans (Wicker 1979b). The growth of the industry did not change the fact that the
majority of oysters were still consumed locally (Wicker 1979b).
The increase in demand for oysters had created a sizable industry in Louisiana, which
increased pressure on the naturally occurring reefs (Wicker 1979b, Melancon et al. 1994).
Overharvesting resulted from the oystermen’s response to the growing urban demand and
depleted many of the natural reefs and rendered them unable to replenish themselves (Zacharie
1898, Wicker 1979b). The operations of the Louisiana oyster industry were considered
“primitive, loose, and careless” as compared to the eastern states and Europe where fishermen
utilized “skill, industry, and science” (Zacharie 1898, 301). Scientists who surveyed the oyster
beds between 1890 and the 1910s viewed the oystermen as uneducated, careless, and poor
stewards of the resource. This depiction ties directly into the ideas about conservation promoted
by George Perkins Marsh, and later the conservation movement, that conservation was the

72

responsibility and vision of the scientific and political community, or the elites, not the common
residents (Hays 1959). Additionally, the concept that local oystermen’s lack of scientific
knowledge was a factor in the declining productivity in coastal reefs and that it was the scientific
community and state government’s responsibility to correct the problem as touted by Moore,
with the U.S. Fisheries Bureau (Moore 1898, Moore and Pope 1910). Observers noted that the
Croatian fishermen, “was accustomed to hostility and difficulty” but they “worked without
resting” day and night “and after a long time his long-empty pockets were filled with money”
(Lovrich 1968, 134). Despite what many scientists considered to be an inefficient harvesting
method and not conducive to conservation of the state’s resources,14 the Department of
Conservation considered the oyster one of the most valuable natural resources of Louisiana
fisheries and the oyster bottoms “the finest…in this or any other country” and worth conserving
(Payne 1912, 7, Watkins 1939).
The resource that oyster harvesters industriously collected had two primary markets: raw
shops and steam canneries. Raw shops sold oysters shucked in bulk or by the sack to
restaurateurs. The advent of the steam canning process in the mid-nineteenth century responded
to an expanding inland demand and enabled the harvesting of all oysters once they reached the
legal harvesting size (McConnell 1934, Deseran 1997). The oysters sent to canneries often had
misshapen shells, odd size, or were of lower quality, which caused raw and counter shops to
reject them (McConnell 1934, Wicker 1979b). The primary site for steam canning factories was
Biloxi, Mississippi, where seventeen factories operated 19.5 miles from the LouisianaMississippi border. Transporting raw oysters from the harvest site to the factories presented a
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The ideas of resource scarcity and overuse, discussed by George Perkins Marsh, were frequently depicted as the
responsibility of the scientific community, or the elites, not the common resident (Hays 1959).
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challenge to avoid spoilage, especially in the warm months of the year (McConnell 1934). At
the canning industry’s height, the Louisiana oyster, due to its size and flavor, was the “unit of
price fixing [for the entire nation]– all because of its superior quality” (McConnell 1934, 34).
Two of the first steam canning factories on the Louisiana coast set up operations in Morgan City
and Houma, but despite their ability to export from the region, the majority of oyster
consumption remained confined to the Gulf Coast (Wicker 1979b).
In addition to process specialization, the trade spawned divisions of labor creating
specific roles across the industry. Part of this labor specialization could be attributed to the view
echoed by Colonel Samuel H. Lockett, a chief engineer for the Confederate Army in Alabama,
Mississippi and east Louisiana, that the Louisiana coast was an “oyster kingdom” that stretched
from the Atchafalaya Bay to St. Bernard (Dennett 1883). The growth of the industry had created
a demand for individual oyster buyers from New Orleans and canning factories in the second
half of the nineteenth century. The buyers would station their boats at the end of bayous to
enable oystermen to offload and sell their cargo to buyers, and not waste the time traveling to
market in New Orleans (Wicker 1979b). Despite the diversification of roles in the industry, the
steam canning industry did not last much past the 1980s since it could not compete with the
imported canned versions from South Korea and Japan (Wirth and Minton 2004).

4.3. Legislation and Cultivation
In the face of an expanding market created by increased demand, the oyster harvesters
began to face a common problem among natural resource harvesters – depletion of the marine
species they relied on. In the absence of conservation laws, self-imposed restrictions on
harvesting a common resource, or the acknowledgement of resource limits, depletion occurred.
The decrease in oyster availability in the late 1860s and early 1870s caused concern among
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oyster farmers, who depended on these natural resources for their livelihoods (Wicker 1979b,
Melancon et al. 1994). The depletion prompted oyster harvesters to transition to oyster
cultivators and farmers, which made them much more aware of the environmental influences on
the oyster and how different areas within the coastal areas were better suited for the oysters at
different stages of their development (Wicker 1979b, Nelson et al. 1997). The depletion of the
oyster beds caused some self-proclaimed scientific experts15 to speak out about the need for
better legislation to promote the natural regeneration of beds rather than overharvesting oysters
of any size (Dennett 1883). In response to a disappearing resource, the Louisiana legislature
passed rules in 1870 to regulate the industry and begin to conserve the resource. Policies
included closing the season from April to September and established penalties for harvesting
during the closed season (Payne 1920). These initial policies were not enforced and the
destruction of the oyster beds continued (Payne 1920).
The transition to cultivation slowly evolved around the Civil War in three different areas
on the coast, but each had the same motivation of replenishing the natural stocks to increase
production (Wicker 1979b). The areas were Grand Bay on the east side of the Mississippi River,
Bayou Cook on the west side of the Mississippi River, and Whale Bay on the South Pass of the
Mississippi River (Wicker 1979b). The land defining these bays and bayous once used for oyster
harvesting no longer exists due to coastal erosion and land loss in the delta (Nelson et al. 1997).
The temporal changes in the coastal landscape, coupled with disruptive events like floods and
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Dan’L Dennett wrote a column in the New Orleans Times-Picayune about the importance of the Louisiana oyster,
the need for legislation, and what oystermen wanted the state to do. Dennett was a journalist prior to the Civil War.
After the Civil War, he focused on researching and writing about the development of resources in Louisiana
(Dennett 1876).
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Figure 2. Location of Initial Oyster Cultivating Locations.
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy)

tropical disturbances, created an environment of adaptation for oyster harvesters. Moore’s
survey noted the environmental and manmade disruptions in Bayou Cook as early as the later
nineteenth century and concluded that the salinity levels had been elevated due to natural marine
erosion and human alterations to the landscapes, coupled with the overfishing, resulting in the
inability of these beds to reproduce naturally (Moore 1898). The frequency of disruptive
environmental conditions, such as fresh water influxes, salinity changes, temperature
fluctuations, and silt deposition, had forced oyster harvesters to develop new methods to
continue their trade. The oystermen began to use the reefs and mud flats closer to New Orleans
and the areas with denser populations that were first used as commercial harvesting areas that
76

were either depleted by overfishing or damaged by natural causes became seed ground for
planting oysters as early as 1892 with Act 110 (Bolten and Parlange 1892). The Department of
Conservation officially declared the protected beds public seed grounds in 1944 (Deramee 1944,
Wicker 1979b, Nelson et al. 1997). These areas where still rich in nutrients that allowed the
oysters to flourish in areas somewhat protected from the salinity influxes that would quickly kill
the sensitive young spat (Wicker 1979b, Nelson et al. 1997).
In 1886, the state took additional action to regulate oyster harvesting. The legislature
established the water bottoms16 as state property, which was based upon the U.S. Supreme Court
decision on James W. McCready vs. Commonwealth of Virginia and gave states the rights to
tidal waters and beds within their jurisdictions, regarded fishing a property right not a privilege
of citizenship. The constitution of the U.S. does not grant common property interests across state
lines for citizens of another state, and gave a state the ability to grant its citizens exclusive access
while denying access by citizens of other states (Wicker 1979b). With ownership clearly
established, the state established a procedure to lease areas no larger than three acres to
oystermen (Ogden and Knobloch 1886). They also began to require oystermen to get licenses a
pay taxes on their boats, and noncompliance with the new laws would result in penalties (Ogden
and Knobloch 1886). At this time, the state assigned water bottom leasing to the parishes and
consequently they controlled and collected revenue from the leases, which granted exclusive
fishing rights to the leaseholder by parish, thus limiting the traditional geographic mobility of
resource harvesters. In 1892, legislation attempted to prevent the parish level entitlement that
was a carry-over from the previously established laws by providing public beds that were open to
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Water bottoms consist of the bottoms or beds of the bodies or streams of water along the coast of the Gulf of
Mexico and the water of the Gulf of Mexico within the jurisdiction of Louisiana that are a common for harvesting
oysters or other shell fish by residents of this State (Sanders and Estopinal 1902).
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all residents of the state (Bolten and Parlange 1892). This legislation also increased the size of
the lease from three to ten acres and regulated the size of a harvestable oyster. In 1892, they also
outlawed the use of tools other than tongs for harvesting oysters harvesting of oysters, which
provided equal competition for everyone, including those who could not have afforded to
purchase a dredging machine (Bolten and Parlange 1892).
The beginning of commercial cultivation in 1897 followed the national pattern of state
governments recognizing that there was a need to regulate and record this significant natural
resource, which served as the foundation for specific community’s economic wellbeing (see for
examples of national conservation policies: Matthews 1992, Graf 2001, Wescoat and White
2003, Davis 2009, Colten 2010, Lane 2011a, Colten 2014). In Terrebonne Parish, “every line of
business feels the good effects” related to the growth of the oyster industry (Duval 1896).
During this early period in Houma, the local newspaper suggested the majority of money put into
circulation was the result of the canning operations that had taken root there due to the proximity
of rich oyster beds and leases (Duval 1896).
At this time, the Louisiana government requested a formal survey of the oyster beds by
the U.S. Fisheries Commission, which found that many of the reefs were “‘extinct from an
economic point of view and fast approaching that condition biologically’” (Moore 1898, 70).
This finding is contrary to a survey of the nationwide oyster industry conducted just fifteen years
previously, which suggested that there was no need for cultivation in Louisiana because the beds
were so plentiful (Baird, Ingersoll, and Goode 1881). H.F. Moore conducted the survey and
suggested state officials take steps to rebuild the population, which would involve the return of
harvested shells to the reefs to increase potential areas for private leases, the provision of
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permanent ownership of areas currently leased, and increasing the quantity of acres a leaseholder
could hold (Moore 1899).
In 1902, the oyster industry underwent further regulation with the creation of an Oyster
Commission, later known as the Oyster Task Force, which shifted authority over all oysters from
the parishes to the state. The 1902 Act also required oystermen to have a state surveyor map and
record every lease requested. These measures revitalized an industry that seemed to be on its last
legs prior to these state efforts. The number of leases had increased by 1,469 and added 19,700
acres to the state recorded leased areas by 1908 (Figure 3). The legislation underwent further
revisions but the basics remained the same and allowed the industry to thrive and grow (Wicker
1979b). Cary and his surveyors documented depletion in various locations across the Louisiana
coast in 1907 and exposed the industry’s unsustainable growth. His report reveals
overharvesting, the central theme of Moore’s survey a decade before, remained a common
problem and was prompting oyster gathers to continually move to new, more distant locations
that were still productive.
Commercial cultivation of oysters involved planting small seed oysters in their bedding
grounds, which were either fertile mud flats or previously used beds (Wicker 1979b). The
natural reefs provided seed oysters, which could be collected first tonging and later dredging.
Oystermen would then break the clumps into singular shells and plant them, like seeds, in their
leases (Dauenhaur 1930). The seed oysters normally grew in the protected areas with a lower
salinity for about a year. After the initial growth period, harvesters would transfer the oysters to
larger bays and tidal areas to provide greater salinity for faster growth. Oystermen would often
have leases for both seed grounds and reefs for the maturing oysters (Wicker 1979b).
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Figure 3. Historic Locations of Oyster Reef Locations in Coastal Louisiana.
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy)

This process forced the state to take a proactive role to ensure that there were seed oysters
available in the public grounds for both commercial and recreational oystermen (Dauenhaur
1930, Wicker 1979b). In addition to supplying seed oysters, the Department of Conservation
required all shells harvested from Louisiana beds for commercial purposes be returned to the
water, which enables the young spat to attach to the old shells and reuse them (Dauenhaur 1930).

4.4. Oystering in the Twentieth Century
With both the onset of commercial cultivation and state regulation of the early twentieth
century, the oyster industry began to thrive again. The oyster bars of New Orleans had gained
national recognition and were drawing tourism to the city (McConnell 1934). The local
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newspapers publicized the Louisiana oyster as a treatment for anemia, gotrie, and other ailments
associated with poor nutrition and these notions fueled the demand for oysters (McConnell 1934,
Wicker 1979b). The marketing of oysters increased the demand in places like Cincinnati, St.
Louis, Kansas City, Denver, St. Paul, and Chicago (Wicker 1979b). Despite the ability to market
and transport to these new retail outlets, the Louisiana oyster still had difficulty competing with
Atlantic coast oysters due to the distance involved and the notable reputation of those oysters
(Wicker 1979b). To get around the perceived inferior quality, one company, A. Booth Packing
Company in Morgan City, began shipping its oysters to distributors in the major Midwest cities,
who would then repackaged them and market the Louisiana oyster as originating from Baltimore
(Wicker 1979b). A primary reason for the public’s perception of the low quality of Louisiana
oysters was due to the fact that the best oysters were consumed locally in the raw shows, while
the inferior or odd shaped ones were canned and shipped out of state (Wicker 1979b).
Like many consumer goods produced in a consumer driven economy, monopolistic
operations emerged in the form of oystermen leasing out the maximum allowable water bottoms,
hiring lower wageworkers, and creating fleets of oyster dredging boats (McConnell 1934,
Wicker 1979b). The industry also began to transition from sailing boats to motorized vessels in
the 1920s, further increasing efficiency in movement but also increasing the cost of fuel and
maintenance (Deseran and Riden 2000). Vertical integration of the industry from the bays to the
markets in New Orleans came to be dominated by Croatians, further emphasizing monopolistic
tendencies seen in the present-day markets (see Wirth and Minton 2004).
This period represented the transition and growth of local niche economies to global,
international operations. The Department of Conservation reported on a new refrigeration
system invented by a New Zealand company that was used to ship oysters frozen in their shells
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to London. The department observes that frozen exports had not been tried yet in Louisiana, but
companies were exporting fresh oysters in the shell via refrigerated rail cars to both coasts. The
ability to freeze oysters in shell would have made it possible to harvest oysters in season and
then sell them in the offseason when the “freshly caught oysters are of inferior quality” (Guillot
1933b, 1). With the advent of new technology, industry experts hoped to extend the season
“beyond the ‘R’ months to every month of the year” (Guillot 1933a, 19), which is still a
commonly held belief about safe oysters in the twenty-first century.
In 1930, oystermen of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts harvested upwards of fifteen million
bushels of oysters, with 109,090 bushels of these being canned. The primary producing area was
the Chesapeake Bay with just over five million bushels of oysters harvested. Mississippi
oystermen were harvesting two and a half million bushels, while New Jersey and New York
produced just under one and half million bushels. Louisiana trailed with just over one million
bushels. In 1933, the U.S. Department of Commerce anticipated 17,000 men would be
employed in the oyster industry nationwide and harvest over twelve million dollars’ worth of
oysters (Guillot 1933a). Gulf oystermen frequently suggested that they had a superior product,
which was endorsed by a Baltimore resident who was in Berwick, Louisiana (Berry 1917).
Prior to the arrival of the oil industry to the coastal marshes, the most prominent disruptions to
oystering were changes in salinity levels due to freshwater crevasses, spring flooding, and
tropical disturbances. Sometimes increased salinity produced what consumers considered an
improvement in flavor, but crevasses flushed fresh water into the oyster beds and diluted the
salinity and flavor of the bivalves, or worse caused mortality (Cary 1907). 17 The spring flood
waters typically move slower than the waters escaping a crevasse in the levee, resulting in more

17

Also called freshets (Cary 1907).
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deposition of silt and sediment on oyster beds from spring floods causing a reduction in oxygen
and killing the oysters (Cary 1907). As early as 1867, the oyster beds in Barataria Bay were
destroyed by “overflows” of the Mississippi River, which caused the oystermen to move to
different locations for a couple of years until their beds recovered (Times-Picayune 1867). The
Nita Crevasse in 1890, which broke into Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne eventually
dispersed freshwater into St. Bernard’s oyster beds (see The 1893 hurricane that caused the
relocation of Cheniere Caminada further inland to Leeville (Davis 1990), also brought
destruction to the oyster beds. Shortly after clean-up was complete from this storm, the Croatian
oystermen returned to their camps, rebuilt them stronger and safer, built better boats, and
restocked their reefs (Davis 2010). The storm surge associated with the hurricane washed mud
on top of the oyster beds causing destruction of beds in St. Bernard Parish (Moore 1899).
During Moore’s survey in 1898, he noted mud covered oyster beds in southeast Jack Williams
Bay in St. Bernard Parish, which the oystermen considered the result of the 1893 storm (Moore
1899).
A tropical disturbance in 1909 destroyed or seriously damaged the homes of oystermen in
Terrebonne, Lafourche, and St. Mary parishes (Dupre 1909). In response to this storm, the
Oyster Commission decided to waive the fees for leases, since they were due shortly after the
storm struck and “dozens of poor oystermen have lost everything, including their humble homes”
(Dupre 1909). The Oyster Commissioner made it clear that this exception applied to those selfemployed oystermen not the large manufacturers, canneries, or “others who are able to stand
their losses without much inconveniences” (Dupre 1909). The 1915 storm destroyed the
Mississippi River levees from Ostrica to Olga which allowed freshwater to flow into the beds of
Grand Bay, either killing the oysters or covering the beds with sand (Payne 1918). In order to
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protect the state’s interests, the Department of Conservation contributed $1,000.00 to rebuilding
the levee at Olga (Payne 1918), which presently is only productive when there is an influx of
freshwater (Conservancy 2017).
The principal exception to prior environmentally induced disruptive events was in 1903.
A barge carrying oil ran aground on a sand bar in the South Pass of the Mississippi River
(Times-Picayune 1903). The remedy to the threat was to pump the oil out of the hull. This
action did not prevent oil from being carried out into Whale Bay by winds and tides (TimesPicayune 1903). The oil destroyed the majority of the oyster beds in the bay (Times-Picayune
1903). The Oyster Commission thought this incident could have been prevented had the Lone
Star and Crescent Oil Company sent a lighter schooner rather than overloading a barge (TimesPicayune 1903). The Oyster Commission did not view this action as something they could take
action against since the vessel was in distress and the damage was not intentional or due to
negligence (Times-Picayune 1903).
In order to reduce travel times from harvest to market and minimize spoilage before the
innovation of refrigerated boats, coastal residents began to modify the landscape. By installing
canals, the oystermen were able to access oyster beds that were previously inaccessible or where
only small quantities were available (Times-Picayune 1900a, Viosca 1928).). Oysters producers
considered it a disruption and sought a solution by letting the beds replenish themselves by
“resting” (Moore 1898, Zacharie 1898). Zacharie, with the U.S. Fisheries Bureau, also notes the
“depredations of fisherman” as a cause for the depletion of oyster beds, and suggests the solution
was the same as a crevasse (Zacharie 1898).
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Figure 4. Overview of Crevasse Locations and Historic Oyster Beds
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy and Vogel 1931)

By allowing the beds to rest and replenish themselves naturally following the Bohemia
Crevasse in 1897, the oystermen subsequently found the beds in Quarantine and California Bays
contained dense young growth that was “numerically far richer than before the crevasse” (Moore
1899, 68). A 1924 article in the Times Picayune cites prior destruction of millions of oysters
due to Mississippi River crevasses causing the loss of value and flavor (Times-Picayune 1924).
The influx of freshwater by crevasses killed predators that thrive in higher salinity waters, such
as the conch, boring sponge and clams, and the oyster drill, which could have devastating effects
on the oyster population (Moore 1899, Times-Picayune 1950). The Poydras Crevasse in 1922
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caused destruction of the oyster beds near shore, but the previously depleted beds in Chandeleur
and Breton Sounds rebounded (Payne 1924). Following the Poydras Crevasse and a break on the
west bank benefitting Barataria Bay, the Department of Conservation determined it was in favor
of creating spillways to deliver fresh water and mimic the effects of these crevasses (Payne
1924).
The effects of tropical disturbances have also been an unavoidable. The wetlands and
coastal marsh has always provided a “first line of defense” for coastal settlements against the
storm surges, waves, and winds associated with tropical disturbances (Davis 2010, 36). The
1893 hurricane that caused the relocation of Cheniere Caminada further inland to Leeville (Davis
1990), also brought destruction to the oyster beds. Shortly after clean-up was complete from this
storm, the Croatian oystermen returned to their camps, rebuilt them stronger and safer, built
better boats, and restocked their reefs (Davis 2010). The storm surge associated with the
hurricane washed mud on top of the oyster beds causing destruction of beds in St. Bernard Parish
(Moore 1899). During Moore’s survey in 1898, he noted mud covered oyster beds in southeast
Jack Williams Bay in St. Bernard Parish, which the oystermen considered the result of the 1893
storm (Moore 1899).
A tropical disturbance in 1909 destroyed or seriously damaged the homes of oystermen in
Terrebonne, Lafourche, and St. Mary parishes (Dupre 1909). In response to this storm, the
Oyster Commission decided to waive the fees for leases, since they were due shortly after the
storm struck and “dozens of poor oystermen have lost everything, including their humble homes”
(Dupre 1909). The Oyster Commissioner made it clear that this exception applied to those selfemployed oystermen not the large manufacturers, canneries, or “others who are able to stand
their losses without much inconveniences” (Dupre 1909). The 1915 storm destroyed the
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Mississippi River levees from Ostrica to Olga which allowed freshwater to flow into the beds of
Grand Bay, either killing the oysters or covering the beds with sand (Payne 1918). In order to
protect the state’s interests, the Department of Conservation contributed $1,000.00 to rebuilding
the levee at Olga (Payne 1918), which presently is only productive when there is an influx of
freshwater (Conservancy 2017).
The principal exception to prior environmentally induced disruptive events was in 1903.
A barge carrying oil ran aground on a sand bar in the South Pass of the Mississippi River
(Times-Picayune 1903). The remedy to the threat was to pump the oil out of the hull. This
action did not prevent oil from being carried out into Whale Bay by winds and tides (TimesPicayune 1903). The oil destroyed the majority of the oyster beds in the bay (Times-Picayune
1903). The Oyster Commission thought this incident could have been prevented had the Lone
Star and Crescent Oil Company sent a lighter schooner rather than overloading a barge (TimesPicayune 1903). The Oyster Commission did not view this action as something they could take
action against since the vessel was in distress and the damage was not intentional or due to
negligence (Times-Picayune 1903).
In order to reduce travel times from harvest to market and minimize spoilage before the
innovation of refrigerated boats, coastal residents began to modify the landscape. By installing
canals, the oystermen were able to access oyster beds that were previously inaccessible or where
only small quantities were available (Times-Picayune 1900a, Viosca 1928). These canals
initially provided an advantage, but once oystermen realized that they also brought an influx of
damaging saltwater, some sought to negate this negative impact. In 1900, twelve oystermen
filled in a pass (or canal) in Bayou Chute, and the local courts found them guilty of criminal
charges (Times-Picayune 1900b). The oystermen believed that the saltwater flowing from the

87

pass was going to damage their large beds in the vicinity (Times-Picayune 1900b). In addition to
introducing saltwater, the canals enabled rainwater from heavy rain events to reach the outlying
marsh habitats quicker as compared to having to “drain slowly through the swamps to the bays,
now [the rainwater] has a ready avenue of escape” (Cary 1907, p. 33). The influx of freshwater
created areas that by 1907 were too fresh to produce oysters, but previously produced prolifically
(Cary 1907).
In the early twentieth century, natural resource harvesters and their families strengthened
their socio-economic ties to the places where they lived and worked by establishing a union.
Following legal challenges by Louisiana oystermen against poaching across state lines by
Mississippi oystermen, the Louisianans formed the Louisiana Oyster Handlers Protective
Association to drum up support for a homegrown industry, and talked about the possibility of
“carrying on the fight, even into the halls of the general assembly at Baton Rouge” (DailyPicayune 1902, p. 7). The Oyster handlers were deeply concerned about the revenue they lost as
a result of “Mississippi fishermen . . .thieving and looting” from the Louisiana reefs (DailyPicayune 1902, p. 7). They also expressed apprehension about the ability of state appointed
officials in Baton Rouge to write legislation that would not harm the oystermen and constrict
their livelihoods (Daily-Picayune 1902). The growth of social organizations for the promotion of
economic pursuits continued into the 1930s. The establishment of the Louisiana Oyster
Exchange in 1933, which was devoted to “conservation, development, advertising and sale on a
national scale of the Louisiana bivalve” (Menville 1933, p. 2). The Louisiana Oyster Exchange
wanted to multiply the 1933 value of oyster industry of $2,500,000.00 “many times and work for
the wellbeing of everyone connected to the industry” (Menville 1933, p. 2).
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4.5. Introduction of a New Industry
As the oyster industry rose to prominence in the Louisiana economy, there was also a far
more lucrative enterprise on the rise. The 1901 oil gusher in Jennings, Louisiana was just 90
miles east of the famous Texas gusher called Spindletop (Wiencek 2015). The Jennings area was
previously a rural rice farming community that grew into an oil boomtown almost overnight
(Wiencek 2015). The boom initially expanded across inland parishes that stood astride the rich
subsurface deposits. Oil and its lucrative revenues seemed like an ideal solution for a state that
lagged behind the nation in economic development and even stood behind regional peers when
companies looking to move to the South invested in other states (Parsons 1950, Cobb 1993).
Drilling expanded from inland locations to the coastal wetlands as geophysical knowledge of the
region improved during the 1920s (Posgate 1949). The salt domes dotting the Gulf Coast
trapped Pleistocene-era organic material and created natural hydrocarbon deposits that were
easily accessible once they drillers knew how to locate salt domes (Davis 2010). Initially drillers
considered the coastal landscape as a severe setting compared to the on-land operations of north
Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma that many of these companies were accustomed to
operating exploration and drilling work in. After the companies developed the technology and
the equipment to drill on the coast, a high ratio of successful well completions encouraged
companies to continue development further from tierra firma ("Unusual Canal System Facilitates
Field Operations in Louisiana's Marshes" 1955).
Venturing into coastal marshes required that the oil companies develop or adapt
equipment previously utilized in the shallow bays and lakes to marsh settings that were not a
stable surface for drilling equipment. Equipment developed to operate on the firm ground of the
inland operations and was not versatile enough navigate up and down the bayous. The absence
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of equipment required for this type of landscape hindered the initial exploration and development
of marshes and, despite comparable natural resources, the southern fields in Louisiana were
initially unable to maintain the same pace that discovery and production that was occurring in
northern parishes. With many individuals and companies working towards viable technologies,
there were a variety of adaptations that allowed operators to use equipment they were familiar
with in different settings (Posgate 1949). To protect coastal wells from high tides and flood
waters, drillers installed common wood-matting and added an earthen dike around drilling
installations (Posgate 1949). In the Bayou des Glaise field, the companies developed a
combination of the wood-mats for stability and a piling structure to elevate the rig above
potential floods. When using just a piling structure, seasonal inundations and erosion around the
pilings led drillers to combine methods, including utilizing a floating barge to hold the power
equipment and hydraulic system (Posgate 1949). The fluctuation of water heights on the coasts
forced the drillers to moor the barges on a human-made island heaped up high enough to
accommodate the changes in water heights and prevent flooding. By 1940 some of these
“islands” contained multiple wells (Posgate 1949).
The last major advancement enabled drilling in deeper, open water. The piling
foundation structures were difficult to transport through the marsh, which led to the development
of the floating drilling barge in 1931 (Posgate 1949). The floating barge eventually evolved into
a submersible barge that was able to drill deeper and accommodate the heavier deep-drilling
equipment (Posgate 1949). By utilizing a floating barge, the Texas Company was able to
increase the number of days that its employees were spending on production rather than rigging
up and tearing down, since the majority of the drilling equipment was in situ on the barge
(Williams 1934).
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In addition to drilling adaptations, there was also the issue of transporting the oil,
reaching drilling locations, and housing workers in the remote and undesirable locations (Flude
1936). The remote and often water-based location of the wells caused issues in transporting the
oil, since the product could not simply be pumped into a holding tank placed nearby on solid
ground or pumped into a tanker truck. In 1936, the Lafitte Field began utilizing a pipeline to
transport oil to the Texas Pipe Line Co.’s terminal in Marrero 20 miles due north (Williams
1936c). Prior to this direct connection, a barge would be loaded, and then haul, the oil 40 miles
through the Dupree Cut into the Intercostal Waterway to the Mississippi River and finally to the
loading dock in Marrero (Williams 1936c).
Transportation was an issue in terms of delivering equipment to the drilling locations.
The distance of drilling operations from the places of coordination of supplies and management
posed a serious problem for marsh drilling operations. Prior to working in the Louisiana
marshes, packing the right “number of pieces or the quality of the equipment [was] a very shortsighted policy,” but this extra effort would save time, and thus money (Flude 1936, 142). By
taking the time to account for all equipment and parts, the workers ensured their ability to
resolve a problem that occurred in a remote location quickly, rather than having to wait on
another barge to arrive with supply parts. The use of marsh buggies became essential transport
devices in the soft marsh terrain, since they utilize a multiple wheel and gear system (Flude
1936). Dredged canals proved invaluable to augment to exiting the coastal bayou system. In the
Venice field, located 90 miles south of New Orleans near the Mississippi River, canals were
dredged to each drilling location to allow for the transportation of crew and floating drilling rigs,
and as the drilling progressed around the dome the canals were extended with slips and tank
batteries ("Unusual Canal System Facilitates Field Operations in Louisiana's Marshes" 1955).
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Since many of the well locations were only accessible by boat and located miles away
from the operations’ centers, the oil companies had to adapt the way employees got to work and
where they lived. The operations’ centers and warehouses would be further inland in
communities and serve multiple well operations (Times-Picayune 1929). The drilling contractor
J.S. Abercrombie from Houston utilized a base of operations in Montegut, fifteen miles south
Houma, to direct seven drilling locations in Lake Barre, Lake Pelto, and Timbilier Bay (TimesPicayune 1929). One way to accommodate the drilling crew was to build large floating
quarterboats to serve the proliferating number of water based oil-fields (Posgate 1949). The
large floating houseboats were structurally similar to those utilized by the cypress industry to
navigate the marsh conditions (Davis 2010). Some of these boats could house seventy people, as
well as a kitchen, dining hall, and recreation facilities (Williams 1936c). Other companies
stationed camps on an island closest to the drilling operation (Times-Picayune 1929). Learning
from previous coastal residents, the oil companies constructed these outlying camps on footings
or pilings to protect the housing from spring floods and storm surge (Williams 1936c), like the
majority of coastal residences had been doing. Occasionally, the families of workers would be
housed in “attractive camps” at central locations near wells (Posgate 1949, p. 87). Rather than
providing company cars, some companies opting for providing speed boats to enable employees
to perform their daily duties at each drilling station and maintain production levels ("Unusual
Canal System Facilitates Field Operations in Louisiana's Marshes" 1955).
The adaptations to the coastal environment the industry made, along with plentiful
reserves, enabled southern Louisiana oil fields to surpass north Louisiana production quantities
in 1932 (Leyendecker 1934; see Figure 1). In 1927, the northern fields produced just over 13
million barrels more oil per year than the southern fields (Leyendecker 1934). Starting in 1932,
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the southern fields began producing 1.3 million barrels more oil per year than the northern fields
(Leyendecker 1934). By 1934, the southern fields were producing 4.3 million barrels more oil
per year than the northern fields (Leyendecker 1934). The increase in production across the Gulf
Coast can be attributed to adaptations in drilling technology, geophysical knowledge, and
increases in leased acreage. Production increases led to expansive operations. In 1933,
prospectors had leased 650,000 acres in the coastal region, but by 1934, they had leased
1,850,000 acres (Leyendecker 1934).
Lakes Pelto and Barre were the first coastal areas producing large quantities of oil in
1929. Drillers were extracting upwards of 40,000 barrels of oil at Lake Barre and 30,000 barrels
of oil at Lake Pelto ("Bottom Hole Chokes Have Numerous Applications in Gulf Coast Wells"
1935). This activity posed problems for many oystermen, since the locations of many oil
derricks and natural gas wells were either in the oyster leases or in nearby estuarine waters
(McGuire 2006). The governor had discretion over the initial oil and gas leasing regulations, but
the State Land Office managed and maintained records of this activity (Roberts 1914b). The
Governor could authorize leases of unappropriated state lands, lakes, and water bottoms, but
could approve specific leases when a State Land Office survey deemed an area of value (Roberts
1914b). In 1938, the legislature moved the power of leasing from the governor and transferred it
to the newly created State Mineral Board (Lindsey and Peltier 1938). The Mineral Board had its
headquarters in Shreveport with satellite offices in Monroe and Lake Charles. It lacked a
southeast office, which would have been more familiar with the vast majority of oyster bed
locations (Simoneaux and Moresi 1936). The State Mineral Board was a part of the DOC, which
held responsibility for issuing oyster leases. In 1934, the Division of Minerals (State Mineral
Board) officially moved its main office to New Orleans due to both logistical issues and the
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Figure 5. 1920 Oyster Reef Locations and the Oil Fields Established Prior to 1932
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources SONRIS Data)

increased oil production in south Louisiana (Simoneaux and Moresi 1936). A contributing factor
for the move was the negative effects of drilling operations on the fish, oysters, and other aquatic
life (Guillot 1934a). The DOC also oversaw the Division of Water Pollution Control, which was
responsible for enforcement of pollution regulations (Campbell 1958). Despite having
established divisions to manage the minerals and regulate the pollution, the DOC still lacked the
desire to resolve the conflict in spatial boundaries that was occurring between the established
oystermen and the newly arrived oil and gas industry.  
The conflict between oyster and oil enterprises lies in the fact that each industry was
leasing a natural resource, not the actual ground. The DOC had previously been the root of
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controversy stemming from biases in the oyster leasing system, which created a monopoly in the
industry and also contributed to declining the revenues (Maestri 1929b). The legislation that
required oystermen to obtain leases stated that the lease only covered the oysters belonging to the
State not the water bottoms where the beds were located on (Henry and Synder 1896). The
initial leases for mineral rights were written in a similar format, which gave the lessee the right to
the commodity but no real right to the land or property (Martin and Yeates 1992). A major
revision took place in 1938, which granted the mineral lessee real property rights (Martin and
Yeates 1992). The idea behind this revision was further engrained in 1989 when the Mineral
Code granted lessees the ability to follow the mineral lease regardless of who owned the land
above (Martin and Yeates 1992). This concept is the root of the conflict in coastal Louisiana,
which allows two natural resource harvesters to obtain leases either adjacent to each other or on
top of one another. Yet, each resource harvester continues to look out for its own interests,
which resulted in pollution and lawsuits.

4.6. Pollution Regulations in Louisiana
As the oil industry began drilling across Louisiana, the state Legislature faced the
problem of regulating its pollution. The issue of oil field water pollution began onshore with the
exploration and discovery of the Jennings field, and became an issue amongst farmers, who were
dealing with oil and brine discharges into local streams used for rice irrigation (Colten 2000b).
In the early 1900s, land owners filed property damage lawsuits following pollution at a time
when there were no specific statutes prohibiting it (Colten 2000b). Local courts repeatedly
awarded damages to the plaintiffs in the absence of regulations (Colten 2000b). The monetary
benefits of this early legal action were often small, because as one judge reasoned, if the state
gave industry a chance to flourish, the entire state would do the same. This same judge accepted

95

damages from industrial pollution as a necessary evil that residents and other industries needed
to accept in order for the state’s economy to flourish (Colten 2000b).
The other major focus of pollution control efforts was the utilization of the Mississippi
River as part of the industrial transportation system. In 1903, there were various complaints
regarding the discharge of fuel oil into the Mississippi River by barges and boats that were
traveling between New Orleans and Texas, by way of the Gulf of Mexico (Times-Picayune
1903). The fuel oil entered the Mississippi when the boats would enter the South Pass area and
begin to empty their bilge pumps “which were frequently in a leaky condition” (Times-Picayune
1903). Given the location and the low banks of the river at this location, there was concern that
the oil would overflow into the nearby oyster beds (Times-Picayune 1903). The Oyster
Commission passed a resolution making it an offense to discharge fuel oil into the river, and
followed up with the U.S. War Department to get further support (Times-Picayune 1903). The
War Department concurred with the Oyster Commission and informed the Commission that the
discharge was in violation of section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1890 (TimesPicayune 1903). The War Department requested the local Engineer Officer distribute literature
prohibiting the discharge of oil into South Pass, and if it did not stop, the U.S. District Attorney
would pursue charges (Times-Picayune 1903).
Up until 1910, state legislation focused on the wasteful discharges and burning of natural
gas. Subsequently, legislators turned their attention to preventing the waste of the state’s natural
resources during the extraction process (Barrett 1906). Act No. 254 established a department of
mining and minerals in order to monitor unsafe and wasteful mining practices, as well as provide
penalties for the waste of the state’s natural resources (Dupre and Representatives 1910). In
1912, the legislature went further to ensure that the state fully benefited from and controlled its
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ability to benefit from the extraction of mineral resources from state-owned lands (Butler and
Representatives 1912). The legislature authorized the governor to lease vacant or unappropriated
state-owned lands for mineral exploration and extraction (Butler and Representatives 1912). In
1914, the House expanded the governor’s authority by granting the position with the power to
cancel the sale of vacant or unappropriated lands if “they appear to be more valuable for mineral
than for any other purpose” (Roberts and Representatives 1914).
In 1910, the Louisiana legislature began to address the industrial pollution issue by
passing an act that protected farmers during the prime irrigation months, March to September,
from industrial discharge into streams that would make the water unusable (Colten 2000b). As a
follow-up, the legislature, in 1924, expanded the 1910 act to include year-round protection from
the release of oil and brine (see Lindsey 1924, Colten 2000b). The modified act placed
enforcement responsibility with the Department of Conservation and allowed a misdemeanor
fine for fish kills, but left out provisions protecting agricultural interests (Colten 2000b, 2006).
These laws focused, as so many other attempts at pollution control, on the issue at hand and
lacked foresight toward the future development of the industry. These laws primarily focused on
land, and did not recognize the need to protect the waters closer to the Gulf of Mexico where the
oil industry was beginning exploration and development.
In 1936, the Legislature passed Act 225 to conserve oil, natural gas, and sulphur while
also preventing the discharge of surface or underground waste from production efforts (Burke,
Morvant, and Stich 1936). This act took effect three years after the Department of
Conservation’s investigation into allegations of pollution damages by Terrebonne Parish
oystermen against the Texas Company. The act primarily emphasizes the mismanagement and
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wasting of state mineral resources that result in pollution, but does not specifically mention
oyster beds or leases (Burke, Morvant, and Stich 1936).
In 1940, the creation of the SCC enabled the state to regulate its waters in relation to
pollution (Colten 2000b). The Commission’s main goal was to develop and implement rules and
regulations to prevent the damage to fish and protect public health (Colten 2000b). The creation
of the SCC began Louisiana’s slow transition toward regulating the oil industry. Next, the
legislature passed Act 203 in 1950, which established fines for polluting waters used for
irrigation, but also for emitting pollution in quantities that could cause fish kills. Despite the
motivation for these regulations that primarily focused on inland pollution, it seems they could
be applied to coastal waters used by the oystermen or in other words to the situation that
prompted the Doucet vs. Texas Company lawsuit and other subsequent lawsuits filed in
Plaquemines and Lafourche Parish in the 1950s, which will be discussed in the following
chapters.

4.7. Conclusion
The coastal communities in Louisiana have grown dependent on natural-resource based
livelihoods, which have led to resource scarcity and the need for state-level regulation. Both the
oyster and oil industry began as spatially mobile industries, moving around the coast to find the
best oyster beds, or drilling locations. As the state rolled out regulations, an unforeseen
consequence for both industries was concentrating activities in the same coastal territories and
the leasing system created geographic limits on their activities. Frequently the activities of the
incompatible activities overlapped or were immediately adjacent to each other. Despite the fixed
location of leases, the coastal landscape continued to change, both because of natural processes
that have been occurring since before Native Americans resided on the coast and the structural
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adjustments made by European settlers to enable them to live outside the natural levee system
and to facilitate access to their respective resources by both the oil and oyster industries. The
independent actions of each industry culminated in conflict due to each industry’s lease
locations, extraction of natural resources, and state legislation. The responses and adaptations of
each industry will be discussed further in the following chapters.

99

4.8. References Cited
References
Baird, Spencer Fullerton, Ernest Ingersoll, and G. Brown Goode. 1881. History and Present
Condition of Fishery Industries. D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office.
Baker, Alan R. H. 1997. ""The Dead Don't Answer Questionnaires": Researching and Writing
Historical Geography." Journal of Geography in Higher Education 21 (2):231-43.
Barrett, Thomas C. 1906. Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the
Regular Session and Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Fourteenth Day of May,
1906. In Senate Bill No. 71: The Times, Official Journal of Louisiana,.
Berry, Bert S. 1917. "Industries of Morgan City: The Berwick Bay Fish & Oyster Co." The
Morgan City Daily Review, 1/22/1917, 1.
Bolten, G.W., and Charles Parlange. 1892. "No. 110 " In The General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana at the Regular Session, Begun and Held in the City of Baton Rouge on the
Ninth Day of May, 1898. Baton Rouge, La.: The Advocate, Official Journal of Louisiana.
"Bottom Hole Chokes Have Numerous Applications in Gulf Coast Wells." 1935. Oil & Gas
Journal 33:48-48.
Burke, Edmund G., Camille A. Morvant, and Frank J. Stich. 1936. "House Bill No. 455 " In
Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session Begun
and Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Eleventh Day of May, 1936. Baton Rouge,
La.: Louisiana Legislature.
Butler, Robert B., and Louisiana House of Representatives. 1912. "House Concurrent Resolution
No. 36 " In Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular
Session and Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Thirteenth Day of May, 1912. Baton
Rouge, La.: Ramires-Jones Printing Company, by Authority of the State.
Campbell, John. 1958. Proceedings of Meeting of Stream Control Commission of Louisiana
August 21, 1958. edited by Louisiana Department of Environment Equality. Electronic
Document Management System.
Cary, L.R. 1907. The Cultivation of Oysters in Louisiana. In Bulletin No. 8. Baton Rouge, La.:
Gulf Biologic Station.
100

Cobb, James C. 1993. The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial
Development 1936-1990. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
Colten, Craig E. 2000b. Transforming New Orleans and Its Environs: Centuries of Change.
Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Colten, Craig E. 2006. "Contesting Pollution in Dixie: The Case of Corney Creek." Journal of
Southern History 72 (3):605-634.
Colten, Craig E. 2010. "Navigable Waters: A Different Course in the American South." Water
History 2:3-17.
Colten, Craig E. 2014. Southern Waters: The Limits to Abundance. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana
State University Press.
Comeaux, Malcolm Louis. 1972. Atchafalaya Swamp Life: Settlement and Folk Occupations.
Edited by Leslie L. Glasgow. Vol. 2, Geoscience and Man. Baton Rouge, La.: School of
Geoscience, Louisiana State University.
Conservancy, The Nature. 2017. "Coastal Resilience Mapper: Gulf of Mexico." The Nature
Conservancy, accessed 7/13/2017. http://maps.coastalresilience.org/gulfmex/.
Daily-Picayune. 1902. "Oyster Handlers Organize to Fight." The Daily Picayune, 04/21/1902.
Dauenhaur, J.B., Jr. 1930. "Louisiana Fisheries Benefited by Newly Created Scientific Bureau:
Bedding of Oysters in La Waters." Louisiana Conservation Review I (11):20-21, 32.
Davis, Donald W. 2010. Washed Away?: The Invisible Peoples of Louisiana's Wetlands.
Lafayette, La.: University of Louisiana at Lafayette Press.
Davis, Mark. 2009. "Preparing for Apportionment: Lessons from the Catawba River." Sea Grant
Law and Policy Journal 2:44-55.
Dennett, Dan'l. 1876. Louisiana as It Is: Reliable Information for Farmers, Patrons of
Husbandry, Laboring Men, Manufacturing, Capitalists, Men of Enterprise, Invalds -- Any
Who Desires to Settle or Purchase Lands in the Gulf States. New Orleans, La.: Eureka
Press.

101

Dennett, Dan’l. 1883. "The Oyster Fields of Southern Louisiana. Their Great Importance to New
Orleans and to the State." The Daily Picayune, 10, 10.
1944. Senate Bill No. 161. No. 227.
Deseran, Forrest A. 1997. Louisiana Shrimp Fisherman and Local Economies: A Survey. edited
by Louisiana Population Data Center and Department of Sociology and Rural Sociology
Louisiana State University. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana Sea Grant College Program.
Deseran, Forrest A., and Carl Riden. 2000. Louisiana Oystermen: Surviving in a Troubled
Fishery. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana Sea Grant College Program.
Dupre, H.R. . 1909. "Relief to Be Given Oyster Fishers by State Commission. President
Dossman Decides to Extend the Ground Rentals in the District Affected by the Recent
Storm." The Thibodaux Sentinel 10/2/1909.
Dupre, H.R., and Louisiana House of Representatives. 1910. "House Bill No. 281 " In Acts
Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session and
Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Ninth Day of May, 1910. Baton Rouge, La.: The
New Advocate, Official Journal of Louisiana, by Authority of the State.
Duval, Easton 1896. "Growth of the Terrebonne Oyster Industry." The Houma Courier,
11/28/1896.
Dyer, Joseph O. 1917. The Lake Charles Atakapas (Cannibals) Period of 1817 to 1820.
Galveston, Tex.: Dr. J. O. Dyer.
Flude, J. W. 1936. "Exploring in Marsh and Water Areas of Louisiana and Texas Gulf Coast."
Oil & Gas Journal 34:142.
Gagliano, Sherwood M., and Richard Alan Weinstein. 1979. Cultural Resources Survey of the
Upper Steele Bayou Basin, West-Central Mississippi. Baton Rouge, La. : Coastal
Enviroments Inc.
Graf, William L. 2001. "Damage Control: Restoring the Physical Integrity of America's Rivers."
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91 (1):1-27.

102

Guillot, James P. 1933a. "Harvesting of Large Oyster Crop to Give Employment to 17,000."
Louisiana Conservation Review III (I):19.
Guillot, James P. 1933b. "New Refrigeration to Ship Oysters." Louisiana Conservation Review
III (1):1.
Guillot, James P. 1934a. "Conservation Minerals Division Moves to New Orleans." Louisiana
Conservation Review IV (4):1.
Hays, Samuel. 1959. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation
Movement, 1890-1920. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Henry, S.P. , and R.H. Synder. 1896. "Act No. 121 " In The General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana at the Regular Session, Begun and Held in the City of Baton Rouge on the
Eleventh Day of May, 1898. Baton Rouge, La.: The Advocate, Official Journal of
Louisiana.
Jones, Ll. Rodwell 1925. "Geography and the University." Economica (15):241.
Kidder, Tristram. 2000. "Making the City Inevitable: Native Americans and the Geography of
New Orleans." In Transforming New Orleans and Its Environs: Centuries of Change,
edited by Craig Colten, 9-21. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh.
Kniffen, Fred B., and Sam Bowers Hilliard. 1968. Louisiana: Its Land and People. Baton Rouge,
La.: Louisiana State University Press.
Lane, K. Maria D. 2011a. "Water, Technology, and the Courtroom: Negotiating Reclamation
Policy in Territorial New Mexico." Journal of Historical Geography 47:300-311.
Leyendecker, Charles. 1934. "Southern Louisiana Is "Hot Spot" of Gulf Coast." The Oil Weekly
74 (8):67-68.
Lindsey, Coleman. 1924. Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the
Regular Session and Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Twelfth Day of May, 1924.
In Senate Bill No. 181, edited by Louisiana State Senate. Baton Rouge, La.: RamiresJones Printing Company, by Authority of the State.
Lovrich, Frank M. 1966. "Croatians in Louisiana." Journal of Croatian Studies 7:31-163.
103

Lovrich, Frank M. 1968. "Work among the Yugoslavs on the Mississippi Delta." The American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 27 (2):133-146.
Maestri, Robert S. 1929b. Oyster Bottoms. In Biennial Report of the Department of
Conservation. New Orleans, La.: Department of Conservation.
Martin, Patrick H, and J. Lanier Yeates. 1992. "Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas Law: An
Overview of the Differences." Louisiana 52 (4):786-835.
Matthews, Olen Paul. 1992. "The Ark: A Tale of Two Rivers." In The American Environment,
edited by Lary M. Dilsaver and Craig E. Colten. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.
McConnell, James. 1934. "Louisiana Oyster: Its Habitat and Value." Louisiana Conservation
Review IV (3):33-37.
McIntire, William Grant. 1958. Prehistoric Indian Settlements of the Changing Mississippi River
Delta, Louisiana State University Studies. Coastal Studies Series: No.1. Baton Rouge,
La.: Louisiana State University Press.
McIntire, William Grant. 1978. "Methods of Correlating Cultural Remains with Stages of
Coastal Development." In, 117-125. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University,
Department of Geography and Anthropology.
Melancon, Earl Jr., Tom Soniat, Vincent Cheramie, Mark Lagarde, Ron Dugas, and John Buras.
1994. The Oyster Resource Zones within Louisiana's Barataria and Terrebonne Estuaries.
edited by Barataria-Tereebonne National Estuary Program. Thibadaux, La.: BaratariaTereebonne National Estuary Program.
Menville, Joseph J. . 1933. "The Organization of La. Oyster Exchange Is Good News for
Terrebonne Parish." The Houma Times, 4/1/1933.
Moore, H.F. 1898. Report on the Oyster Beds of Louisiana. In Appendix of Report of the
Commissioner for the year ending June 30, 1898, edited by U.S. Commission on Fish and
Fisheries Fish Commission. D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Moore, H.F. 1899. Report on the Oyster-Beds of Louisiana. In Report of the Commissioner for
the Year Ending June 30, 1898, edited by George Bowers. D.C.: Government Printing
Office.
104

Moore, H.F., and T.E.B. Pope. 1910. Oyster Culture Experiments and Investigations in
Louisiana. In Bureau of Fisheries. D.C.
Nelson, David M., Mark Monaco, Mark E. Pattillo, and Thomas Czapia. 1997. Distribution and
Abundance of Fishes and Invertebrates in Southeast Estuaries. In NOAA's Estuarine
Living Marine Resources Program, edited by National Ocean Service National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Ogden, H.W., and Clay Knobloch. 1886. Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana at the Regular Session, May 1886. In No. 106. Baton Rouge, La.: Leon
Jastremski, State Printer.
Padgett, Herbert R. 1969. "Physical and Cultural Associations on the Louisiana Coast." Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 59 (3):481-493.
Parsons, James J. 1950. "Recent Industrial Development in the Gulf South." Geographical
Review 40 (1):67-83.
Payne, Charles. 1912. Report of the Board of Commissioners for the Protection of Birds, Game,
and Fish. Baton Rouge, La.
Payne, Frank T. 1918. "Report of the Oyster Division." In Biennial Report of the Department of
Conservation from April 1st 1916 to April 1st 1918, edited by Department of
Conservation, 163-169. New Orleans, La.: Palfrey-Rood-Pursell Co, LTD.
Payne, Frank T. 1920. "Report of the Oyster Division." In Biennial Report of the Department of
Conservation from April 1st 1918 to April 1st 1920, edited by Department of
Conservation, 163-169. New Orleans, La.: Palfrey-Rood-Pursell Co, LTD.
Payne, Frank T. 1924. "Report of the Oyster Division." In State of Louisiana, Department of
Conservation, Sixth Biennial Report, January 1, 1922 to December 31, 1923, 99-102.
New Orleans, La.: Department of Conservation.
Peyrer, C. 1874. Fisheries and Fishery Laws in Austria and of the World in General. . In Report
of the Commissioner for 1873-1874 and 1874-1875, Part III, U.S. Commission of Fish
and Fisheries. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Posgate, J.C. 1949. "History and Development of Swamp and Marsh Drilling Operations." Oil
& Gas Journal 47:87.
105

Roberts, Robert, Jr., and Louisiana House of Representatives. 1914. "House Bill No. 124 " In
Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session
and Held in the City of Baton Rouge, on the Eleventh Day of May, 1914. Baton Rouge,
La.: Ramires-Jones Printing Company, by Authority of the State.
Russell, R. J. . 1936. Lower Mississippi River Delta: Reports on the Geology of Plaquemines and
St. Bernard Parishes, Geological Bulletin: No. 8. New Orleans, La.: Department of
Conservation.
Sanders, J.Y., and Albert Estopinal. 1902. Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana at the Regular Session, Begun and Held in the City of Baton Rouge on the
Twelfth Day of May, 1902. In No. 153. Baton Rouge, La.: The Advocate, Official
Journal of the State of Louisiana.
Times-Picayune. 1867. "About Oysters, Commencement of the Half Shell Season." The TimesPicayune, 9/8/1867.
Times-Picayune. 1900a. "Another Canal Plan Which Will Give Impetus to the Oyster Industry."
The Times-Picayune, 6/24/1900.
Times-Picayune. 1900b. "Lower Coast: The Oyster Industry Somewhat Injured by the Storm, but
the Section Is Rapidaly Recovering-Rear Levees Needed More Than River Banks." The
Times Picayune, 9/16/1900, 19.
Times-Picayune. 1903. "Oil in South Pass. The Government Issues Orders to Stop Discharge
There, the Oyster Commission." The Times-Picayune, 2/6/1903.
Times-Picayune. 1924. "Lack of Rainfall Causes Salty Flavor of Oysters, Shrimp Ingress." The
Times-Picayune, 09/02/1924, 20.
Times-Picayune. 1929. "N.T." The Times-Picayune, 8/4/1929.
Times-Picayune. 1950. "Spillway and Oysters." The Daily Herald.
"Unusual Canal System Facilitates Field Operations in Louisiana's Marshes." 1955. Oil & Gas
Journal 54:122-123.

106

Viosca, Percy. 1928. "Louisiana Wetlands and the Value of Their Wildlife and Fishery
Resources." ECOLOGY 9 (2):216-229.
Vogel, Hebert D. . 1931. Annex No. 5, Basic Data, Mississippi River. In Control Of Floods in
The Alluvial Valley of The Lower Mississippi River, House Document No. 798, Volume 1,
edited by 71st Congress 3d Session. D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Vujnovich, Milos M. 1974. Yugoslavs in Louisiana. Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing Company.
Watkins, Marguerite E. 1939. "History of Terrebonne Parish to 1861." Master of Arts,
Department of Histiry, Louisiana State Normal College.
Wescoat, James L., and Gilbert F. White. 2003. Water for Life: Water Management and
Environment Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Wicker, Karen M. 1979b. "The Development of the Louisiana Oyster Industry in the 19th
Century." Doctoral of Philosophy, Department of Geography and Anthropology,
Louisiana State University, EBSCOhost.
Wiencek, Henry. 2015. "Boomtown? Reconsidering the Beneficiaries of Louisiana's Oil Boom."
Oil-Industry History 16 (1):133-140.
Williams, Neil. 1934. "Practicability of Drilling Unit on Barges Definitely Established in Lake
Barre, Louisiana, Tests." Oil & Gas Journal 33:14, 16, 18.
Williams, Neil. 1936c. "Lafitte, Coastal Louisiana, Recorded as World’s Deepest Commercial
Feild." Oil & Gas Journal 35 (7):71-72.
Wirth, Ferdinand F., and Tara M. Minton. 2004. "A Review of the Market Structure of the
Louisiana Oyster Industry: A Microcosm of the United States Oyster Industry." Journal
of Shellfish Research 23 (3):841-847.
Zacharie, F.C. 1898. The Louisiana Oyster Industry. edited by United States Commission on
Fish. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

107

Chapter 5. Oyster Industry Responses
5.1. Introduction
Louisiana’s oyster harvesters had been adapting to disruptive events prior to the entry of
oil extraction into the coastal marsh. The seasonal crevasses and tropical disturbances brought
salinity, silt, predator, and parasite changes that forced the oystermen to be both geographically
and economically mobile to maintain their economic livelihood. The oil industry brought new
challenges. The collision of oil pollution and oyster beds brought the issue of common property
rights to the forefront, since the oyster leases and mineral leases often had overlapping
boundaries. The mineral leaseholders had the rights to the subsurface minerals, while the oyster
bed leaseholders had rights to harvest the oysters from the water bottoms and the monetary value
they generated. Under common property rights, oystermen had the ability to utilize trespass,
negligence, and nuisance common-law provisions to address pollution damages to their beds
even if there are no specific pollution laws addressing the issue (Review 1970).
Prior to the arrival of the oil industry, oyster farmers had seen losses in harvests due to
tropical disturbances or flood waters, but never on the scale or in terms of flavor that they
experienced from October 1932 to January 1933 due to oil pollution (Caillouet, Peltier, and
Lafargue 1933, McConnell 1934). The 1932 and 1933 losses began a period of contention over
resource access and the right to harvest the resources each individual leased from the state.
There are two distinct periods of extensive legal maneuvers between the oystermen and the oil
industry. The first beginning in October of 1933 and lasting through January 1934, when
nineteen oystermen filed suit against the Texas Company and two of its employees for pollution
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damages to oyster beds in the Terrebonne Estuary (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia18). The
second occurred in 1947 in both the Terrebonne and Barataria estuaries. There, oystermen filed
ninety-eight lawsuits against nine different oil companies (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia).
Seventy-eight of the lawsuits were in the Barataria Estuary, while twenty were in the Terrebonne
Estuary (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia). This chapter examines the existing practices pursued
by oystermen in their trade and the legal methods employed to recoup the losses entitled under
state law. A review of the legal methods used in the period from 1933 through 1970 will
document how practices changed over time in relationship to the evolving pollution and oyster
harvest regulations and the intersection of the two resource-dependent enterprises.

5.2. The First Period of Contention Over Pollution
The first complaints of damages surfaced after the oil industry had been in production in
the Terrebonne Estuary since 1927, an area encompassing Lake Barre, Lake Pelto, Terrebonne,
Bay and Timbalier Bay (Hemphill 1937). Drillers in the Lake Barre field, leased solely by the
Texas Company, were increasingly production steadily at the time and reflected the installation
of new wells – up from three in 1931 to six in 1932 (Langston 1932). The Lake Pelto field was
slower to develop due to the size and the number wells operating. The Lake Pelto field operated
a single well on a 25-acre lease, while the Lake Barre field encompassed 500 aces and operated
22 wells (Hemphill 1937). Prior to 1932, the Lake Barre field produced a total of 1,491,610
barrels19 of crude oil and the Lake Pelto Field produced 111,838 barrels (McGee 1933). During
1932, the Lake Barre Field produced 2,766,558 barrels and the Lake Pelto Field produced 20,727
barrels (McGee 1933). Timbalier Bay had the potential to be effected by wells drilled in Lake

18
19

Doucet vs. Texas Company et al. and inter alia will be used to represent all lawsuits summarized in Appendix A.
Barrels are measured in 42 gallons.
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Barre, Lake Pelto, Lake Washington, Bay St. Elaine, and Caillou Island (Bradley 1939), whose
waste and overflow could be carried by the coastal currents onto and over the oyster beds (Figure
6).
Ludwig Doucet filed the first lawsuit in October of 1933 in the Seventeenth Judicial
Court in Terrebonne Parish.20 After an additional fifteen oystermen filed suits against the Texas
Company for damages to their beds, the court consolidated the suits under the umbrella of the
Doucet vs. Texas Company et al. a civil lawsuit for losses in Lake Pelto, Lake Barre, and
Timbalier Bay (Caillouet, Peltier, and Lafargue 1933). This notable lawsuit began the debate,
which had been going on in New England and elsewhere in the South since industrialization, on
whether water was a sink for industry or common resource that needed protection for fishermen
and trappers’ livelihoods (Cobb 1984, McCay and Acheson 1987, Rosen 1993, Tarr 1996,
Cumbler 2001, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, Rosen 2003a, Colten 2006, Brewer 2012b).
There were three additional lawsuits that were filed but were not lumped into the sixteen other
Doucet and other lawsuits. The only distinguishing factor for the smaller class was that the
lawyers for plaintiffs were different, and Harvey Peltier was not the primary counsel (Doucet vs.
Texas Co., inter alia).
The civil suit was possible because beginning in 1870 state regulations granted citizens
unrestricted access to the state’s reefs, bays, and coasts to “fish, bed and remove oysters for their
own use and benefit, or for sale, or for any other purpose” (Carr 1870). By 1886, the state
recognized the need to distinguish between state-owned commons, which were open to all

20

The Doucet vs. The Texas Company lawsuit provides the most robust primary documentation, since it includes
testimony and items entered into evidence. It contained 19 volumes and consisting of 4,577 pages, 3,533 of which
are testimony and 862 of which contain exhibits. The remaining lawsuits are limited to the initial petition and the
settlement documents.
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residents, and the state conveyed leases for the “exclusive right to use said body or bodies of
water for planting oysters and other shell fish…” and enabled oyster harvesters the right to
enforce their civil right to harvest from said beds in a court (Ogden 1886, p. 195). These laws
did not anticipate or make adjustments for Act No. 271 passed in 1914, which allowed the state
to lease “any vacant and unappropriated public lands and lake beds or bottoms belonging to…the
state, for the development and production of oil, gas, coal, salt, sulphur, lignite, and any other
minerals” (Roberts 1914, p. 540). The state then passed Act No. 258 in 1926. This Act
solidified the relationship between oil lessees and oyster lessees. The act benefited the oyster
industry and declared all oysters property of the state (Fisher 1926). Act No. 258 specifies
certain terms that will not constitute interference with leasing the coastal waters for mineral
extraction (Fisher 1926). However if a lessee attempted to acquire a mineral lease on a
previously leased oyster bed, the act required the state to get written consent from the original
lessee (Fisher 1926). The other stipulation was that the mineral lessee was responsible for “any
and all damages sustained by said oyster lessee,” and the responsibility included compensation
for the damages (Fisher 1926, p. 436). Yet, the appellant judge in Doucet vs. Texas Company et
al. notes that the underlying intention of the legislation was to allow the state to grant mineral
leases without securing the consent of the previous or present oyster lessee (Fournet 1944).
Judge Founout suggests that while the legislature wanted to freely lease the state’s water
bottoms, it did not give or grant the mineral lessees the right to operate in a negligent manner
that caused pollution “over the… beds and bottoms in utter disregard of the rights of the lessees”
(Fournet 1944, p. 3). Act No. 258 provided Doucet and others legal standing to sue for damages
due to negligent actions by the oil lessees.
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Attorneys representing Doucet claimed the damages caused by Texas Company’s oil
pollution was the result of negligent action because the company improperly disposed of waste,
inadequately maintained the oil rigs, pipelines, and did not shut off pipelines swiftly after
discovering leaks. The improper disposal of waste had been occurring for much of 1932 and

Figure 6. Overview of 1932 and Prior Oil Fields and General Locations of 1933 Lawsuits
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources SONRIS Data)

continued into January 1933. Doucet observed an example of this improper waste disposal of
while helping a fellow fisherman. Doucet stayed the night on Lake Barre and woke up to see the
waterbody “full of oil as far as my eye could see” (Ludwig Doucet, Doucet v. Texas Co. et al.
1944, Volume II, p. 246). The company’s improper disposal ceased only after the State
112

Department of Conservation (DOC) demanded that Texas Company halt drilling operations for
two months due to oyster mortality in January 1933 (Caillouet, Peltier, and Lafargue 1933). The
oystermen acknowledged that there was not a single event, but rather it was the accumulation of
pollution over the years that caused the massive die off in the fall and winter of 1932 to 1933
(Caillouet, Peltier, and Lafargue 1933). A preliminary DOC survey confirmed the oystermen’s
perception when it that found that a gas pipeline in Lake Pelto had been leaking from the rig’s
separator for two years based on an employee’s statement (Gowanloch 1933).
Ludwig Doucet was an oysterman who had worked oyster leases in Lake Pelto since
1925. Before obtaining his own leases, Doucet learned the trade in the employ of other
oystermen. In early November of 1932, he discovered his oyster beds in poor condition after the
“winds started to blow from the north and northeast…and they [the oysters] started dying”
(Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume II, 185). After harvesting, he brought the oysters to
his normal buyer, Charles Boudreax, who refused to buy them because they were dying. The
buyer testified that his refusal to buy the oysters distressed Doucet and that he cried. Doucet
next attempted to sell them to a packinghouse, which did not require high quality oysters, but
they also refused to buy them. By January of 1933, Doucet’s beds did not have any marketable
oysters. After the damages to his beds, Doucet abandoned the leases in Lake Pelto and bought
leases in Plaquemines and Jefferson parishes (Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume II, 195).
Other oystermen were discovering oysters in their leases either dead or damaged to the extent
that they were unmarketable. As the oystermen realized that the oil could be the problem, they
contacted the DOC to investigate. The preliminary inquiry led the agency to shut down the oil
wells (Caillouet, Peltier, and Lafargue 1933). During this initial inquiry, the DOC staff had to
overcome trust issues, due to their “outsider” status, since the oystermen were anxious about the
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fate of their livelihoods and this was compounded by their inability to communicate with the
French-speaking fishermen. These obstacles remained an issue as the case went to court and
while the Texas A & M Research Foundation was conducting its work (Gowanloch 1933).
James Gowanloch, chef biologist for the DOC, suggested that the survey would not have been
successful had the boat captain not had “special knowledge of the region, his ability as [an]
interpreter, and especially the fact that he so completely possesses the confidence of the
fishermen and oystermen of the region” (Gowanloch 1933, p. 1).
In January 1933, the Commissioner of the DOC ordered the temporary shutdown of all
the Texas Company’s wells under Act No. 250 (Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume III,
114), which allowed them to close any sources of pollution into any stream (Boyer 1920). The
defense questioned whether the bayous and coastal Gulf waters could be classified as streams,
which reflects the larger debate of pollution of waterways and the definitions associated with
terms used in these laws (Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume II, 115). The DOC “believed
that… [the oil pollution] …was so suspicious that something had to be done to stop putting oil
on those waters even if the wells had to be closed” (James N. McConnell, Doucet v. Texas Co. et
al. 1944, Volume III, 114). The Louisiana Board of Health also got involved by issuing letters to
oyster buyers telling them to refuse to buy oysters from beds within ten miles of oil wells
(Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume IV, 167).
During the legal proceedings, sixteen oystermen requested $144,830 in damages. The
basis for this amount was the fair market value of oysters and the quantities they estimated losing
in the 1932-1933 season. Texas Company challenged the validity of the estimate, and the
oystermen faced difficulty verifying their estimates since many did not keep formal books.
Ludwig Doucet testified during trial that he did not file taxes or keep financial records because
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he had poor reading and writing skills, and most of the trial testimony was in French and
translated into English (Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume III, 66). Terrebonne Parish
Civil Court dismissed the case in favor of the defendant. Ludwig Doucet was the only one of the
plaintiffs to appeal the district court’s dismissal in favor of the defendants to the Supreme Court
of Louisiana. His persistence paid off with a judgment of $10,650 in February 1944. The total
included interest from the date of the petition until the judge’s initial [?] decision (Caillouet,
Peltier, and Lafargue 1933). The other fifteen oystermen, who did not appeal the decision,
settled out of court for a payment of over $211,000 (McConnell 1946). The DOC saw the
decision as establishing clear precedent for the rights of oystermen to a geographic location
where the both oystermen and oil companies had previously been granted rights (McConnell
1946).

5.3. Scienctific Evidence Presented
The DOC conducted an in-depth study regarding the 1932-1933 pollution claims with the
assistance of federal Civil Works Administration funds over the course of 1934 (Galtsoff et al.
1936). Gowanloch, the Chef Biologist for the DOC, notes that oil pollution research and
literature had been neglected (Gowanloch 1934). He suggests that despite conflicting studies in
the past, the work conducted by Louisiana showed a relationship between the oil and oil-well
wastes and oyster mortality (Gowanloch 1934). The preliminary inquiry, conducted by state
biologist Herbert Prytherch in 1933, failed to correlate the distance of the affected oyster beds
and oil wells to the mortality rate (Galtsoff et al. 1936). Galtsoff and his collaborators note that
the mortality during the 1932-1933 period could be partially attributed to the oystermen’s
traditional practice of densely planting 700 to 900 barrels of oysters per acre which increased the
exposure of oysters to pollution (Galtsoff et al. 1936). During the 1934 season, the oysters did
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not fatten to harvesting size until February or March, which suggested either a decrease in food
availability or an inability to feed (Galtsoff et al. 1936). Prytherch and Galtsoff, found oil
slowed the growth of Nitzchia, a marine diatom which is a primary food source for the oyster
(Galtsoff et al. 1936). Additionally, the dissolved oil irritated the ciliated, which slowed the
movement of water through the gills and decreased the feeding ability (Galtsoff et al. 1936).21
The study by Galtsoff and his collaborators, as well as subsequent studies conducted by
the state, exposed multiple facets of the oil industry’s operating procedures, process, and
byproducts that could be harmful to oysters and their food sources. The primary elements were
pure crude oil, bleed water (a brine/saltwater and oil combination), natural gas, or drilling muds
containing hydrocarbons. The studies conducted in the 1930s failed to provide a crucial link to
the effects of bleed water or salt water, but did provide enough evidence of the dissolved soluble
element that the researchers believed was causing the oysters to consume food slowly and
ultimately die (Galtsoff et al. 1936). These studies also neglected the taste and inability to sell a
inferior product.
Despite federal and state scientific studies that showed a correlation to oyster mortality
and the oil production processes, the SCC continued to grant permits to discharge oil field brine
into coastal waters (Nixon 1941). Previous research includes studies in the 1910s focusing on
inland waterways that showed undiluted brine disposal caused fish kills (Theriot 2016). Both of
these studies focus on the physical mortality, which was a large issue in the legal disputes in the
1930s and 1940s, but both negate the idea that both fishermen and oystermen could harvest
product that was tainted in terms of taste, smell, or appearance. SCC regulations called for the

21

Galtsoff also studied the effects of temperature on oyster gills in 1928 focusing on oysters from the Chesapeake
Bay, the Long Island Sound, Wellfleet Harbor, Ma., and Wareham, Ma. (Galtsoff 1928).
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brine to be free from oil, but regardless, the SCC was not monitoring or taking preventative
steps, as was the case in other states, and continued allowing industry to use waterways as a sink.
Instead, the SCC approved two brine permits in 1941 in the Barataria Estuary, which saw the
majority of the next wave of lawsuits (Nixon 1941, Figure 6). In the Terrebonne Estuary, the
Texas Company had been ramping up production, increased the number of its wells from
fourteen to twenty-four over the period from 1941 to 1947, which also meant increasing the
amount of bleed water these wells were discharging from an average of 300 barrels a day to
upwards of 900 barrels a day (Menzel 1950).
According to lawsuits filed for oil damages to oysters in 1947, the Louisiana Department
of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF)22 received a request in 1945 to survey the Lake Barre and
Calliou Island area to determine the cause of oil contamination. It conducted a survey jointly
with the Texas Company which revealed several slicks and leaking well heads, but nothing that
could be attributed to the compliant (Trotter 1945). As a result of these inspections, the Texas
Company issued “positive instructions” to correct problems causing contamination of
surrounding waters in south Louisiana (Stewart 1945). In 1945, state politicians began reaching
out to SCC officials about the potential for disastrous impacts from mineral leases of the water
bottoms in the Gulf of Mexico (Conservation 1945). A SCC official states that the Louisiana
Mineral Board studied the possible effects that exploration and development could have on other
industries prior to issuing a mineral or seismic lease (Conservation 1945). As a result of the
various studies that had been conducted, the SCC believed that the oil companies were
“employ[ing] every possible modern method of preventing pollution and contamination and that

22

Act No. 328 divided the Department of Conservation into three separate departments in 1944. The Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries was designated with protecting, conserving, and propagating the wildlife in Louisiana (Appel
1946).
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these operations…will not result in harm to fish and shrimp,” (Conservation 1945, p. 1). The
state’s expectation was that the operations were properly supervised, but there is not any explicit
explanation what that means (Conservation 1945).
Inspections in December 1946 were much more conclusive. The state received requests
from twenty-two oystermen from July to December of 1946 to inspect the high oyster mortality
on their beds (McConnell 1948). LDWF was able to sample, record, and provide reports for
eighteen of these oystermen (McConnell 1948). One such request came in from the Lake
Washington area, located directly west of Empire, to determine the causes of 75-90 percent
oyster mortality there, which resulted in the discovery of a “stream of black, hot liquid being
discharged from the sulpher works into the bayou, which flowed into the surrounding water
areas” (Coogan 1946, p. 1). According to the investigation notes, the sulphur plant had
previously been treating the waste before it was released into state waters but for an
undetermined or disclosed reason stopped the treatment process (Coogan 1946). Since there was
a neighboring oil field to the sulphur plant, the inspectors determined that the oil field was in
compliance and not allowing waste to spill over by utilizing the required impervious decks and
gutters (Coogan 1946). The LDFW viewed the reports and inspections as impartial and expert
based, and some led to out-of-court settlements between oil companies and oystermen in cases of
seismic damage (McConnell 1948).
Inspections like the one of the Lake Washington incident, as well as the previous federal
and state investigations, led the LDWF to conclude that there are two phases of pollution
associated with oil production that affect the coastal resources. The first being oil dispersed as
film, due to the coastal water dynamics. In these instances, the oil particles traveled long
distances and to be absorbed into the silt and substrate mud (Montgomery 1946). Investigators
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presumed the silt and substrate mud in the bottom of the bays and bayous absorbed oil which
then gave off a water soluble substance that was capable of damaging the oysters (Montgomery
1946). The second phase in oil production thought to cause damage to oysters was the discharge
of bleed water (Montgomery 1946). Bleed water is a byproduct of the drilling process that is
separated from the oil and discharged or disposed of properly (Montgomery 1946). Researchers
presume the bleed water had been in contact with the oil allowing it to absorb toxins over the
course of long geologic periods of time, which was one of the reasons it was believed to be
capable of damaging oyster life (Montgomery 1946). The 1946 report notes that scientific
experiments had not yet been performed to measure it toxicity to fish or shrimp, but the report
suggests the effects on the diatom indirectly affected all of the coastal marine life since it is a
primary food source (Montgomery 1946). The 1946 report also requested the SCC to take action
to prevent the direct and indirect effects of pollution on marine life (Montgomery 1946). This
request resulted in the SCC passing a resolution to prohibit discharging oil field wastes,
including salt water and brines into coastal waters (Montgomery 1946).
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Figure 7. Overview of 1933 and 1947 Lawsuits Compared to Oil Field Locations
(Adapted from Louisiana Department of Natural Resources SONRIS Database
and Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia)

5.4. The Second Period of Contention
In 1946, the LDWF saw the oyster industry facing a “grave emergency…due to
unprecedented oyster mortalities…occurring in many of the best production areas in the State”
(McConnell 1948, p. 291). The level of concern was due to the fact that the LDWF had focused
its efforts on finding the cause of these mortalities then replanting beds to increase production
where normal conditions existed (McConnell 1948). The oystermen and the LDWF were not
just contending with the issue of coastal water pollution. Every year they dealt with disruptions
from storms and other natural events to living and economic conditions in coastal Louisiana. In
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the wake of the pollution studies and the heightened level of concern they prompted, the 1947
hurricane stuck the coast and caused mud and debris to be swept onto the beds, as well as, wave
and tide action damaging beds and spat (McConnell 1948).
In addition to contending with the normal disruptions of coastal Louisiana, the newly
formed SCC was attempting to address the increase in oil production in coastal waters by
developing a Coastal Waste Control Section in the Division of Oyster and Water Bottoms of the
LDWF (McConnell 1946). The development of the Waste Control Section was the result of a
memo from the Attorney General’s office stating: “the Commissioner of Conservation is no
longer concerned with waste from oil wells in-so-far as that waste affects aquatic life. This is
now the concern of the LDWF only to the extent of enforcing the rules, regulations, and orders
of the Stream Control Commission” (McConnell 1946, p. 315). The Waste Control Section had
two boats to monitor, inspect, and supervise oil production activities in all coastal waters to
prevent the contamination of coastal areas with waste (McConnell 1946). The Section also
utilized an airplane in coordination with boats to spot oil-well waste (McConnell 1946). Despite
developing this section, the Division of Oyster and Water Bottoms still did not feel the SCC was
helping the pollution problem, since it reacted only after a pollution event became a problem and
was not being proactive to prevent the pollution from occurring (Crumholt 1946).
Following the settlement of the Doucet lawsuit in 1944, the oystermen not only had
sufficient legal standing to seek damages to their property but also the scientific basis to make a
persuasive case for compensation when new damages arose. In 1947, there were ninety-eight
lawsuits filed against oil companies across the Barataria and Terrebonne estuaries following the
completion of the LDWF study. Fourteen of these lawsuits were filed by family conglomerates
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or corporate entities (Table 2). The Barataria Estuary was the site of many of these disputes over
oyster bed damage, resulting in seventy-eight lawsuits in 1947.
Table 2. Family or Corporate Based Lawsuits
Parish filled
Lafourche
Terrebonne
Lafourche
Jefferson
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines
Plaquemines

Year
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1948
1947
1947

Parish Case #
9047
13223
9048
19958
2242
2275
2249
2259
2204
2447
2252
2399
2236
2241

Plaintiff
Morgan City Packing Co.
Morgan City Packing Co.
Morgan City Packing Co.
Morgan City Packing Co.
Farac & Rodriguez
A. Farac & Son
A. Franceski & Sons
A. Franceski & Sons
Martina & Martina Inc.
Pobrica Brothers
Taliancich Brothers
Vezich, Zaninovich & Co.
Zibilich Brothers
Zibilich Brothers

This new round of suits provide no testimony or extensive evidence documents like the Doucet
Case did. The trial documents consist of the initial complaint, a motion to dismiss, and a written
decision. The same group of lawyers filed all these suits, and the majority of the petitions are
carbon copies providing very little information about the adaptive practices of the individual
oystermen.
Starting in April of 1947, the oystermen began filling suits against the oil companies and
their individual employees who were “conducting mineral operations, seismographic operations
and/or operating pipe lines, separators, refineries and conducting various other activities in
connection with the drilling, production, distribution and refinement of minerals and mineral
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Figure 8. Distribution of General Locations of 1947 Lawsuits Compared to Oil Fields
(Adapted from Louisiana DNR SONRIS Database and Appendix 3)
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products” (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 1; see Appendix 3 for additional suits). The
lawsuits cite damages that were the result of rigs releasing oil, gas, bleed water, oil refuse
(Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 1; see Appendix 3 for additional suits). These lawsuits
specifically state the oil companies were discharging “mineral and mineral products…in…bodies
of water that directly or eventually flow into [the location of the damaged oyster beds]…and/or
on lands draining into these and other waters, that eventually pass over petitioner’s said beds”
(Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 1; see Appendix 3 for additional suits). This language and
concept appears to be directly linked to the 1946 DWF report that suggests the oil pollution may
be transported long distances and that the local currents change regularly allowing for constantly
changing conditions making it impossible to predict the acceptable amount of discharge for an
area (Montgomery 1946). The oystermen also cite that the exact composition of the substance
causing damage to the oyster beds was unknown to them, but was “well known by the
defendants” (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 2, 4; see Appendix 3 for additional suits).
The basis for the suits was the nuisance caused by the pollution to individuals utilizing
the water bottoms of the coast. Oystermen believed the oil companies could have prevented the
pollution damages had they operated and used “their property with due regard to the rights” of
themselves and others (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 4; see Appendix 3 for additional suits).
In 1920, the state had passed a law aimed at “empowering and authorizing the Department of
Conservation to take charge of, control, or securely cap or plug any natural gas well or oil well
wasting oil or gas and not in control,” which was the authority the state used to stop production
to conduct inspections in 1933 (Burke 1935). Following the initial filling of the Doucet et al. vs.
Texas Company et al., the Legislature addressed production waste to prevent oil and mineral
resource depletion, but did not address the issue of waste in terms of pollution control,

124

prevention, or management (Burke 1935). In this same bill, the Conservation Commission was
required to enforce production at reasonable market demands23 which were based on the
determination and estimation by the Commissioner of Conservation for each month (Burke
1935).
Table 3. Summary of Time Ranges Damages Filed For
Years Damages Claimed for
1941-1943, 1946-1947
1941-1944, 1945-1947
1941-1944, 1946-1947
1941-1947
1943-1947
1944-1947
1945-1947
1946-1945
1946-1947
1940-1947
1942-1943, 1945-1947
1943-1944, 1945-1947
1944-1945, 1946-1947

Number of Suits
1
1
1
28
8
41
7
1
5
2
1
1
1

These lawsuits document the perceived negligence of the oil companies in regards to the
outcome of general practices, but generally failed to mention specific occurrences of pollution.
The oystermen’s petition cited “noxious, offensive, and lethal” pollution that occurred over a
period of time, and thus damaged the oyster’s ability to feed. The pollution was thought to be
“collective, continuous, and progressive,” as well as, continuing without control which caused
the consecutive damages to the oysters (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, p. 2; see Appendix 3 for
additional suits). The oystermen also thought that the oil companies knew, or should have
known, about the damages their negligent operations were causing to the oysters and beds

23

Reasonable market demand is defined in Act No. 13 of 1935 as the quantity of crude oil produced in a given
month that can be reasonably expected to be purchased by pipelines, refineries, and crude oil purchasing agencies.
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(Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, see Appendix 3 for additional suits). The argument made in the
series of 1947 petitions was consistent with the idea supported by the federal judge in the Doucet
case, which suggests that continuous and consistent pollution damaged the oyster’s ability to
feed, causing death even though not explicitly stated. Many of the suits cite damages over a
period of years (Table 3). Twenty-eight of the cited damages occurred between 1941 and 1947,
while forty-one cited damages occurred between 1944 and 1947, further integrating the concept
of prolonged exposure producing loss. The 1947 suits also cite the mental anguish suffered by
the petitioners due to the potential loss of livelihood resulting from the negligent and unlawful
operations of the oil industry (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947b, see Appendix 3 for additional
suits). The role of mental anguish was complex since the plaintiffs did not suffer any direct
bodily effects or witness a specific event due to the negligence. Louisiana tort law views mental
anguish as something that can be the indirect result of an actual event, and despite not having
physical injury or witnessing the event, the law does not consider the pain and suffering any less
real or the action any less compensable (Cooks 1976). The impact of the mental anguish claim is
unknown since all these suits were settled out of court and then dismissed.

5.5. Linkages Between Response and Practices
The responses by the oystermen to the pollution and destruction of their oyster beds
appear to put in motion adaptations previously utilized during tropical disturbances or large fresh
water influxes. Information from the 1947 lawsuits, reveal practices, and responses to pollution
that represent the ability of the oystermen to employ actions that mirror resilient practices used in
other situations in order to maintain traditional livelihoods. The pollution caused some
oystermen to leave the business. Cheramie Duet, for example, had been in in the oyster industry
for thirty years. Cheramie decided to abandon his beds since “there was no future to remain
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there working, because of the oil that was always going to be coming on them” (Cheramie Duet,
Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume IV, 44). While he did not actually leave the industry,
the concept of economic abandonment of one livelihood may not seem like an adaptive or
resilient practice on its own. This does not mean that individuals left the coastal social network,
and, more than likely, they utilized their social networks and community to find another
livelihood on the coast. They found a familiar livelihood, like shrimping, trapping, or crabbing,
and remained in a familiar place. This type of adaptation continues to take place among
shrimpers (Deseran and Riden 2000).
Other oystermen attempted either economic or geographic mobility. Constant Henry,
who had been an oyster buyer, shifted to buying and marketing shrimp after the poor oyster crop
in 1932 (Constant Henry, Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume V, 179). Onezime Hebert,
laid off by Cheramie Duet, turned to trapping and shrimping (Onezime Hebert, Doucet v. Texas
Co. et al. 1944, Volume V, 89). Hubert Lafont also pursued shrimping in order to support
himself (Hubert Lafont, Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume V, 24). Geographic mobility
of oystermen to find productive oyster beds has been part of the occupation since it first began in
Louisiana. Abandonment of destroyed beds was a learned behavior that began prior to
regulations when the oystermen would move further down the bayou to find productive beds. It
was reported following the crevasse of 1915 in Plaquemines Parish (Payne 1918).
Mobility for economic reasons is apparent when looking at plaintiff residency and the
court’s location (see Table 4). Cases had to be filed in the same parish as the oyster beds.
Approximately 50 percent of complainants surveyed traveled into a different parish to harvest
oysters in the wake of pollution, displaying geographic mobility. Additionally, following the
damages to beds in Timbalier and Terrebonne bays in the early 1930s, five of the oystermen
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leased new beds in the Barataria Estuary and after these began to see an increased mortality, they
again sued for damages in 1947 (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia). It is important to note that
Cheramie Duet, who was leaving the business following the destruction of his beds in the 1930s,
was one of the oystermen from Barataria who sued a second time for beds in a different location
(Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia). Following the 1930s events, another strategy among
oystermen was to try to salvage the oysters that remained and move them into other portions of
Terrebonne estuary that was free of oil pollution (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia, see matrices
Appendix 3).
In addition to providing money for the ecological and habitat studies, the U.S.
government authorized production credit associations, established by the Farm Credit Act of
1933, to make loans to “oyster planters” who operated on a state-owned lease or political
subdivision thereof (Fulmer 1935, p. 1). Congress amended the nationwide Oyster Production
Loan Act of 1933 to include “oyster planters” who owned their own beds and/or operated
franchises that have been in existence pre-dating state lease laws (Fulmer 1935, p. 1). The DOC
saw this as an opportunity for both oystermen whose beds were damaged as a result of the
Table 4. Comparison of Parish of Residency and Parish the Suit was filed in
Parish Suit
Parish of
Filed in
Plaintiff
Residency** Jefferson
Lafourche
Plaquemines Terrebonne
Jefferson
12
5
Lafourche
13
16
1
20
Orleans
9
11
Plaquemines
40
1
St. Bernard
1
St. Mary
Parish
1
Terrebonne
2
9
**including co-plaintiffs in the following cases: Parish Case no.2204 B. Martina (Orleans), G.
Martina (Jefferson); Parish Case no.13223 P. Cheramie/B. Cheramie/N. Cheramie (Terrebonne),
R. Trosclair/E. Trosclair (Terrebonne); Parish Case no.2265 J. Crynjak (Orleans), V.
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Stipelkovich (Plaquemines); Parish Case no.2260 P. Tesvich (Orleans), K. Tasvich/J. Slavich
(Plaqumines); Parish Case no.19956 B. Cheramie (Terrebonne), C. Duet (Lafourche); Parish
Case no.19822 E. Callais (Lafourche), E. Vinnet (Orleans); Parish Case no.20048 H. Eymard
(Lafourche), E. Callais (Orleans); Parish Case no.19958 P. Cheramie/B. Cheramie/N. Cheramie
(Terrebonne), R. Trosclair/E. Trosclair (Terrebonne)
mineral development in coastal Louisiana, but also for the oystermen who had been affected by
the “unfavorable weather conditions” during the preceding year (Guillot 1934b). The production
credit associations served as federal intermediaries to function under regulations issued by the
governor (Guillot 1934b).24 The unfavorable conditions and overfishing caused the Terrebonne
Chamber of Commerce to approve measures to seek aid for the rehabilitation of the oyster beds
in 1941 (Dupont 1941). The Chamber did not have the means to restore the beds on their own,
but knew the economic significance they had for residents to maintain their livelihoods (Dupont
1941). The Chamber of Commerce also sought and received support from the Federal Works
Progress Administration, since they had rebuilt the exhausted oyster beds in the Mississippi
Sound (Dupont 1941). Despite both of these periods of contention and the threat of pollution,
the oyster industry in Louisiana did not see the declines observed in Texas, Alabama, and Florida
during the 1930s and 1940s (Gunter 1949). Gunter, a biologist with Scripps Institute of
Oceanography, further suggests in a rebuttal piece to Dr. Chipman that a lack of growth does not
indicate decline of the industry, but also notes the large scale mortalities that were yet to be
explained could account for a large portion of this perceived stagnation or decline (Gunter 1949).

5.5. Conclusion
By examining these two similar periods of legal contention, the role of subsequent
events, the regulatory responses between the two periods, and the oyster industry’s response

24

The distribution of agricultural aid is a wide-ranging topic and the specific mechanisms and procedures for this
were not part of the scope of this project.
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following the discovery of pollution expose the social complexities of primary interests related to
multiple resource-use/management objectives. Leading up to the pollution events of the 1930s,
the oystermen had been economically and geographically mobile. They also had the ability to
abandon leases with the knowledge that the state would step in to rehabilitate the beds, since the
water bottoms were state property. The state agencies followed the sustained yield conservation
principles to support the oyster industry, while the oystermen themselves were exploiting a
resource. This makes sense given that the oystermen sought to make a living and had selfserving interests that did not extend beyond their own beds, while one of the state’s primary
missions to generate revenue by leasing an increased number of productive beds.
The state struggled to delegate clear and concise authority over who was responsible for
pollution enforcement and prevention, which frequently led them to be reactive rather than
proactive in responding to pollution events. There were two different departments, in two
separate commissions, responsible for portions of waste and pollution management and
enforcement. The Waste Control Section of the LDWF, was limited to identifying the problem
and enforcing the SCC regulations in a reactionary fashion rather than anticipatory. The state
also relied heavily on outside grants and support from the federal government to find the root
cause of the large-scale mortality in oysters that seemed to correspond to the arrival of the oil
industry.
Following the large-scale mortalities during both periods, the steps taken were very
similar. The oystermen requested a survey by LDWF, which could not determine the exact
cause of the damages, then additional experts were called in, and then these experts determined
that both oil and a variety of other environmental factors, including overfishing or harvesting,
could contribute to these large-scale mortalities. The oyster industry undoubtedly faced
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numerous challenges due to the constantly changing salinities, silt composition, fresh water
influxes (or lack thereof), subsidence, and tropical disturbances. Yet, the things they could
correct, like over planting reefs and managing their harvests to avoid overharvesting and
completely depleting the reefs, were actions they were unwilling take. The DOC Annual Reports
consistently indicate that the state was rebuilding reefs, planting seed oysters, and rehabilitating
beds, but the reports for this period also repeatedly observe that the oyster beds were depleted.
There were repeated calls for DOC to do more than just engaging in their ongoing bed
rehabilitation program. The oystermen may have adapted the legal system to address the losses
they were faced from the oil industry, but the oyster trade industry had not developed into the
renewable resource it was envisioned to become in the 1920s and 1930s. Over time given the
management of oysters, they have become a nonrenewable resource with heavy indirect
subsidies from the state through rebuilding beds and planting seed oysters.
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Chapter 6. Oil Industry Responses
6.1. Introduction
In the years leading up to the oil and oyster industry collision in the Terrebonne and
Barataria Estuaries, the oil company personnel had been responding to the accelerated demand
for petroleum in country. The price per barrel of oil had been on the rise causing the resources in
the less accessible portions of the coast to become more desirable and attainable at a profit. The
oil production and exploration was also fueled by the demand during and following World War
II (Kastrop 1950). This region was viewed as the “bright spot in the U.S. oildom for many years
to come” (Kastrop 1950, p. 58). Production in the region and the U.S. had reached an all-time
high by 1948, with the Gulf Coast producing almost one million barrels a day (Kastrop 1950).
Given the rapid growth of production in coastal Louisiana a conflict over rights to resources was
bound to happen.
The conflict first began in the 1930s as production and exploration were expanding into
areas previously limited to more traditional coastal pursuits (Figure 9), like shrimping and
oystering. In 1906, the state legislature made it misdemeanor offense to permit natural gas wells
to remain uncapped and required the lessee to close or plug the well (Barrett 1906). This law
repeatedly states the need to not allow natural gas to “wastefully escape or burn uncontrollably”
(Barrett 1906, p. 112), but like with later laws does not specify pollution waste and so implies
monetary waste. Laws, like the 1906 Act, were what set the stage for the conflict over access to
natural resources. This chapter will examine the first period of conflict by considering the oil
industry and state’s responses to oystermen's claims. Following the first 1930s period, the 1940s
period will be discussed. Lastly, it will examine the technological improvements and general
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practices that the oil industry made to improve their efficiency in conserving resources and
decreasing production losses.

6.2. 1930s Responses
Resulting from the initial oystermen's complaints about excessive mortality due to oil
pollution to the Department of Conservation (DOC) in 1932, the Texas Company took a number
of steps on to determine the causes of the pollution, but these steps centered around biology and
ecology, not the idea that an oysterman might be turned away by his normal buyer due to the
taste or appearance of the oysters. The initial inspection conducted by the DOC in January of
1933 recommended the company improve its efforts to purify the waste waters because existing
practices were not removing all the sulfides (Gowanloch 1933). During the initial inspection, the
DOC concluded the primary culprit was the hydrogen sulfide that was in the water and settling to
the bottom (Gowanloch 1933). At the request of the State Land Office, the Texas Company
enlisted the expertise of three Louisiana State University (LSU) scientists: Charles E. Coates, a
chemist; A.R. Choppin, a chemist; and William H. Gates, a zoologist (Coates 1933f, Grace
1935). The investigation’s intent was to determine the biological facts underlying the oyster
mortality, regardless of culpability (Grace 1935). The three professors meet with C.E. Lauer,
chef chemist for the Texas Company, at the Lake Barre Field in February of 1933 (Coates
1933f). Lauer had conducted a water analysis similar to the DOC's, but did not find similar
results which was partially attributed to the heavy rains that had occurred for several weeks
(Coates 1933f). The Texas Company also took mud and water samples at the damaged beds that
were submitted to an outside lab in Fort Worth, Texas to “get beyond any question of local
influence or reaction to local conditions” (Blish 1933d).
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The LSU scientists determined that there was no conclusive evidence that the hydrogen
sulfide was the primary factor in the oyster mortality, but neglected the taste and quality factors
that make an oyster marketable. The first reason was that gas containing the hydrogen sulfide
naturally leaked from the ground and was present regardless of the waste releases (Coates
1933f). The second reason was the mud deposits on top of the beds were a more probable

Figure 9. Oil Fields Before 1932 in Barataria and Terrebonne Estuaries
(Adapted from Louisiana Department of Natural Resources SONRIS Database)

cause of damages than the hydrogen sulfide that can be naturally dispersed or destroyed by
chlorination treatment (Coates 1933f). Chlorination had proven to be a successful response in
Corpus Christi when high sewage with high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide damaged oyster
beds there (Coates 1933f). A final reason to question the role of hydrogen sulfide was that there
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were healthy beds within close proximity to the wells in Lakes Barre and Pelto (Figure 9), while
the beds considered to be damaged by oil pollution were five to ten miles away (Coates 1933f).
Scientists could find no direct spatial correlation between the suspected pollution sources and the
damaged beds. Additionally, the scientists recommended that the Texas Company carry out
experiments to determine the oyster mortality cause (Coates 1933h). Dr. Coates believed that the
disposal of oil waste would become an increasingly important problem and that the Texas
Company should know about its effects on oysters (Coates 1933b). These reports boosted the
confidence of the Texas Company that “there has not and will not be damage caused by oil well
brines in the Houma area” (Stewart 1933). They also decided to install a chlorinator at the Lake
Barre field to decrease the discharge of hydrogen sulfide (Stewart 1933).
In April of 1933, the Texas Company began meeting with Harvey Peltier, an established
lawyer from Thibodaux, Louisiana. Peltier would later go on to represent the majority of the
oystermen’s lawsuits. During the discussions with Peltier, the idea that oil caused the damage
was suggested (Blish 1933b). The Texas Company acknowledged that there had always been
rumors about the damages oil could cause, but the company never developed any factual proof
(Blish 1933b). The Texas Company also meet with Cassius Clay, with the State Board of
Health, in an attempt to determine what course of action the state was going to take and what
remedies the company could begin to install (Coates 1933c). By the time of these May meetings,
state officials had convinced themselves that the hydrogen sulfide was not the problem but “were
groping around, trying to figure out why these oysters died” (Coates 1933c, p. 1). The DOC told
the Texas Company that they believed the wells were killing oysters, but were unable to prove
how the mortality was occurring (Coates 1933c). The Texas Company told Mr. Clay that it
would install “any reasonable safety device or method…and that…[the company]…would gladly
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take any steps to avoid any damage” (Coates 1933c, p. 1). The Texas Company also stated that
it would be useless to install a device without knowing the cause of the mortality (Coates 1933c).
The Texas Company also suggested that the State bring in an outside investigator to avoid
partisanship or conflicts of interest in the reports (Coates 1933c).
When Dr. Prytherch with the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries began the federally funded study
in 1933 (Chapter 5), the Texas Company wanted to be fully engaged in the process. Initially,
company personnel wanted the LSU scientists to assist in its investigations, but the timing
conflicted with the end of the semester at LSU (Blish 1933d). Since the LSU faculty were only
able to go into the field on the weekends, Charles Blish, the chef attorney in Louisiana for the
Texas Company, wanted them to acquaint themselves with Dr. Prytherch while he was
conducting his fieldwork in Lakes Barre and Pelto (Blish 1933d). Blish thought that if Dr.
Prytherch was going to publish a report the professors should inform him of their previous
investigations conducted with the Texas Company in the spring of 1933 (Blish 1933d). The
Texas Company wanted Dr. Prytherch to have the “first-hand information concerning the full
investigations” before “committing himself to any written or published statement upon the
questions involved” (Blish 1933d, p. 2).
Dr. Coates, who had consulted with the Texas Company, scheduled a May 25, 1933
meeting in Baton Rouge (Coates 1933g). At this meeting, the LSU scientists provided Dr.
Prytherch with copies of their reports, as well as, the reports conducted by the Fort Worth Lab
(Coates 1933g). Dr. Prytherch disclosed that the Texas Company had been “absolutely fine in
every aspect” but the DOC was the one not providing him with any information (Coates 1933g,
p. 2). The group then went on a field inspection that included Mr. Gowanloch, with the DOC.
During this trip, Dr. Prytherch suggested to Dr. Coates that if anything was done to interfere or
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disrupt the operations of the Texas Company that they could appeal to the U.S. Bureau of
Fisheries to get results (Coates 1933g). Dr. Prytherch also encouraged the Texas Company to
appoint Dr. Koehring, from the U.S. Fisheries Laboratory in Beaufort, South Carolina, to run a
separate six-month study (Coates 1933g). Dr. Coates also suggested that a joint investigation be
done by Dr. Prytherch, LSU scientists, and the DOC, but then realized that it would not be
possible under the circumstances (Coates 1933g). After the meeting and field investigation, Dr.
Coates was given the impression by Dr. Prytherch that he “did not feel that the Texas Company
was at all responsible for the death of these oysters” (Coates 1933g, p. 1). Additionally, Dr.
Coates was unclear if Mr. Gowaloch still thought the Texas Company was at fault (Coates
1933g).
Dr. Prytherch’s investigation concluded that the oyster mortality was not due to the
effluent from the Texas Company wells (Coates 1933d). Dr. Coates was worried that the DOC
would still blame all the management issues on the oil companies (Coates 1933d). The
Department of Health came to the conclusion that oil companies were to blame, and also found
that leaking barges used for transferring the oil and the storage ships that were anchored in
Timbilier Bay contributed to the situation (Clay 1934). This conclusion followed the collection
of twenty-five of the thirty mud samples from the Terrebonne Estuary where high mortalities
occurred and that showed oil residue in laboratory experiments (Clay 1934). Once the DOC
focused all the blame on oil companies, Dr. Coates believed that there was a real possibility for
the trappers and fishermen to “organize a small riot and actually bring about bloodshed and loss
of property” (Coates 1933d, p. 1). Dr. Coates implied that he had seen people killed over these
type of matters and serious property damage caused (Coates 1933d). Dr. Coates was now
emphatically insisting the Texas Company needed to heed his previous recommendations that
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they conduct their own research to figure out the cause of the mortality and how the company
can control chemicals released into the adjacent waters (Coates 1933d). Dr. Coates thought that
by conducting this study it would “save…[the Texas Company]…trouble at the hands of the
trappers and would also satisfy the Board of Health” (Coates 1933d). The Texas Company was
grateful for Dr. Coates’ effort to work “in harmony with the community in the end that there may
be no friction between citizens and employees of the [Texas] Company” (Blish 1933c).
In July of 1933, the Humble Oil Company experienced a gusher on its oil well in Lake
Washington in Plaquemines Parish (Coates, Behre, and Choppin 1933). The Humble Oil
Company enlisted the services of Dr. Coates to complete an investigation of the area (Coates,
Behre, and Choppin 1933). Dr. Coates concluded that the only oysters damaged were those
owned by Franks. The Franks beds had both temporary and permanent damages. The temporary
damage was an oily taste, so they were not marketable at that time but would be improved
overtime without continued exposure (Coates 1933a). The primary cause of the permanent
damages to Frank’s beds were the dredging activities of the Freeport Sulphur Company not the
oil released from the Humble Oil Company gusher (Coates, Behre, and Choppin 1933). Dr.
Coates determined that there were “a certain amount of damages coming to this one man which I
am unable to estimate…and nobody else has any claim at all” (Coates 1933a). Dr. Coates
thought the maximum damage Franks could claim would be to Reef I, which he would be unable
to sell oysters from September to October (Coates 1933e). Coates also noted that during his
survey, the experienced oystermen believed Lake Washington’s bottom too muddy for good
oyster beds (Coates 1933e).
The survey also brought up a problem that has the plagued coast since commercialization,
and this was overfishing and exploitation that caused abandonment of exhausted beds for more
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profitable ones. While inspecting beds, the team came across places that were denoted on the
map as oyster leases, but were not; places that were staked but had been abandoned for over a
year and had no productive oysters, and productive oyster beds that were not marked or staked25
(Coates 1933a). Following the completion of this survey, the Humble Oil Company sent copies
of the reports to various oil companies with interests in the Lake Washington area (Saunders
1933).
After the Lake Washington investigations, there were no official legal proceedings in the
1930s arising from the Humble Oil Company gusher, but the beds and the leases that were
surveyed in 1933 would later file suit in 1947 against the Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur Company, Gulf Refining Company, Danziger Oil and
Refining Company, The California Company, and The Lafitte Company (Doucet vs. Texas Co.,
inter alia; (Coates 1933a). The beds surveyed in 1933 were leased by Franks and Vujnovich,
Jambon, Pausina, Petrovich, Slavich, and the Zibilich Brothers. These oystermen did not file suit
for the direct effects of damage from the gusher, but instead filed suit for negligence over time in
1947 (see Chapter 5).
Upon completion of the initial surveys by the DOC and the LSU scientists, the oystermen
began filing petitions in Terrebonne Parish Civil Court for damages in October of 1933 (Doucet
vs. Texas Co., inter alia). As discussed in Chapter 5, oystermen in the Terrebonne Estuary
wanted to recoup damages from “the introduction of hydrogen sulfide gas, oil waste, and ‘other
deleterious substances’” (Blish 1933a, p. 1). The Texas Company wanted to proceed with the
trial at the earliest date, but the overall procedure was slow (Blish 1934). Once the Texas
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In 1997, Dugas and others note that there is not an inventory of oyster reefs. Also there has not been any attempt
to determine the amount of productive and unproductive reef acreage within the leased acreages (Dugas, Joyce, and
Berrigan 1997).
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Company received the petitions, they forwarded the claims to Dr. Coates, so he could begin
attempting to assess them in relation to his previous investigations related to the Texas Company
operations in Lakes Barre and Pelto (Blish 1933a). Dr. Coates thought the petition was “adroitly
done and probably represents a pretty strong appeal to the average Terrebonne jury” (Coates
1933b, p. 1). Dr. Coates also speculated that the DOC had informed either the oystermen or their
lawyer about the results of the previous studies (Coates 1933b). He thought it was almost like
they “had access to my report and to that of Prytherch” (Coates 1933b, p. 1). Dr. Coates brought
attention to the petition’s skillful wording which did not note the precise cause of the damages.
Instead of specifying hydrogen sulfide, the petition uses a more generic term: highly poisonous
gas (Coates 1933b).
In an attempt to resolve the problem, Dr. Coates suggested the first course of action taken
by the Texas Company should be to trace the pipelines from the Bay St. Elaine field to the
various outlets in Lakes Pelto and Barre (Coates 1933b). Dr. Coates presumed that the Texas
Company “unquestionably” had records about the dates when pipelines broke and when they
were repaired (Coates 1933b). The Texas Company confirmed that they in fact did have these
records (Blish 1934). The assumption was that the Texas Company was not “responsible at all
for the conditions” but there needed to be supplemental work done to be “absolutely certain
about this” (Coates 1933b, p. 2). The Texas Company concurred that further research needed to
be done to determine how the gas was being introduced into the water, how it was spreading
throughout the coastal area, and how it was settling in certain locations (Blish 1934).
Following the receipt of the DOC report, Dr. Gates, another LSU scientist, suggested to
the Texas Company that the scientific method was “absurd” (Gates 1934, p. 4). Dr. Gates
thought the report was mathematically inaccurate, lacked the proper control samples, and had no
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basis for arriving at the conclusion that the hydrogen sulfide was causing the oyster mortality
(Gates 1934). Dr. Coates believed that the DOC conducted the investigation in good faith, but
that it had an unsound conclusion (Coates 1934a). The scientists once again criticized the
knowledge level of a jury from Terrebonne Parish by assuming they would think the report
sounded scientific, but it would not be acceptable to a group of “fairly competent intelligent
men” (Gates 1934, p. 1). Dr. Coates thought the only way for the Texas Company to influence
the jury was to duplicate the investigation as closely as possible (Coates 1934a). The difficulty
with the case was that the cause of the damages was still unknown. The plaintiffs initially
claimed the hydrogen sulfide caused the damages, then it was destructive gases, and lastly it was
oil directly (Coates 1934a). Dr. Coates thought that they would eventually drop the claim that oil
was causing the mortality (Coates 1934a).
In an attempt to duplicate the work of the DOC, the Texas Company contracted Dr.
Gates, Dr. Choppin, and Dr. Coates to conduct the experiments on the beds previously surveyed
in 1933 by Clay and Gowanloch (Coates 1934d). A year had passed since the original DOC
survey, and the LSU scientists found the oysters in all the beds “in perfectly healthy condition
and with good flavor” (Coates 1934d, p. 1). At the time of the survey, David Cheramie was
planting oysters on a bed that his petition against the Texas Company claimed had been
destroyed (Coates 1934d). The scientists inspected all the natural gas pipelines related to the
complaints and found that there was no sulphur in the water surrounding these lines, suggesting
that gas was not leaking from the pipelines (Coates 1934d). This inspection found the sulfide
levels consistent with normal lake water and no evidence of oil pollution (Coates 1934c). There
was no evidence uncovered during these surveys that the Texas Company caused the oyster
mortality to occur (Coates 1934c). The report also suggests that the reason for the high sulfide
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levels found by Mr. Clay were attributable to the samples sitting too long causing the sulfates to
naturally convert to sulfides (Coates 1934b).

6.3. 1940s Responses
Similar to the process in the 1930s, the oil companies began a research consortium in
February of 1947 before oystermen began filing court petitions. It is unclear if the oil companies
had prior knowledge that a lawsuit was inevitable, or if they had learned from the past
experiences to begin formalized testing. Dr. Gardescu, a geologist who served as the scientific
liaison between the Texas Company legal division and the scientific division, accompanied Mr.
Loose, the Texas Company attorney, to the first meeting with the Texas A & M Research
Foundation (Gardescu 1947). Dr. Gardescu thought the consortium should consider a range of
topics covering disease and epidemics among oysters, oyster ecology, the depositional
environment in coastal waters, and the effect of oil and oil well brine on oysters (Gardescu
1947).
The first official meeting among the interested parties took place February 4, 1947
(Foundation 1947), which was approximately two months prior to the first set of lawsuits being
filed in Jefferson Parish for damages in Barataria Bay (Doucet vs. Texas Co., inter alia). During
this meeting, Mr. Loose, Dr. Gardescu, and Dr. Jakkalu, of the Texas A & M Research
Foundation, determined the objectives of the overall study focusing on the Texas Company
operations (Foundation 1947). The first goal was to determine if the “minor pollution (opinion
of Company)” from bleed water or the occasional discharge of oil was causing an increase in the
mortality of oysters, which was around eighteen to twenty percent of normal discharge of bleed
water rates (Foundation 1947). The second goal built off the first in trying to determine what
percentage of oil, bleed water, parasites, fresh water, sewage, and environmental changes caused
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oyster mortality (Foundation 1947). The third goal centered on correcting the problem of brine
discharges if they were detrimental to the oysters (Foundation 1947). The last objective focused
on the Texas Company’s desire to implement corrective action as soon as possible if the
preliminary reports showed their operating methods were in fact responsible for the deaths
(Foundation 1947).
The Texas Company also had a number of stipulations regarding personnel and
procedures. The Company wanted to select scientists based on “integrity, ability, and on their
presence of mind” (Foundation 1947, p. 2). Additionally, the results would not be released as
public knowledge or communicated freely with the scientific community (Foundation 1947).
The Texas Company also wanted individuals who could recount their methods, results, and
interpretations before a court (Foundation 1947). They ultimately reserved the right to approve
or disapprove individuals selected for the research team (Foundation 1947). The Texas
Company viewed the scientific work as important because it could enable them to forecast when
a large mortality period for oysters might occur in the future (Hopkins 1947g).
The initial agreement between the Texas Company and the Foundation eventually grew
into Project 9 in December of 1947 (Texas A & M Research Foundation 1947). The Foundation
was responsible for conducting the scientific research in coastal Louisiana, while the Donors
Committee was responsible for providing the funding for all costs and expenses (Texas A & M
Research Foundation 1947). The Donors Committee consisted of The Texas Company, The
California Company, Tide Water Associated Oil Company, Humble Oil & Refining Company,
and Phillips Petroleum Company. By 1947, these companies were facing 117 lawsuits over
pollution damages to oyster beds (See Table 5). Given that the Texas Company had a majority
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interest in both a resolution to this issue and the largest number of lawsuits, it was responsible for
fifty percent of the costs (See Table 4; Texas A & M Research Foundation 1947).
Project 9 quickly noted a major shortcoming in the defense’s argument. There was no
scientific research being conducted during the 1940-1946 period when the damages allegedly
occurred (Hopkins 1947b). The scientists were going to have to compare the amounts of bleed
water and oil being released in 1948 with the amounts in the years that damage occurred
(Hopkins 1947b). The scientists knew they could prove the presence of parasites that were
damaging the oysters, but the bleed water and oil pollution were going to be more difficult to
account for (Hopkins 1947b).
The perceived lack conservation knowledge by the Louisiana oystermen was something
the Foundation thought could be used to the Texas Company’s advantage during legal matters
(Hopkins 1947a). They wanted to find “old local oystermen” so they can testify to the
occurrence of oil in the water over time and that the quantity of oil they witnessed historically in
the bays was comparable to the concentrations used in their laboratory experiments (Hopkins
1948a, p. 19). The Foundation thought there were “practical oystermen” who were not part of the
plaintiffs roster, who could begin making oyster clutch transplants under the direction of
Foundation scientists (Nelson 1947, p. 3). This collaboration would be beneficial to foster a
relationship with the oystermen, and also “teach them better methods of oyster culture” (Nelson
1947, p. 3). The operation would not be expensive and “a little financial underwriting of the
right men would pay off handsomely later on in court” (Nelson 1947, p. 3). The Foundation also
noted the improvements to the oyster cultivation would be an added benefit (Nelson 1947). Dr.
Elsey, a biologist with the Foundation, thought that a northern company using methods that are
more advanced would be able to build a flourishing industry (Hopkins 1948b).
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Table 5. Summary of Lawsuits Filed Against Oil Companies Who Decided to Participate in
Project Nine
Total
Lawsuits
Filed

Defendants and others
Gulf Refining Company
The Texas Company

3

Freeport Sulphur Company, Philips Petroleum
Phillips Petroleum Company
F.F. Calaway

1

Humble Oil and Refining Company

16

The Texas Company
Berkshire Oil Company, Mar-Tex Realization Corporation
Humble Oil and Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur Company, Gulf
Refining Company, Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The California
Company, The Lafitte Company
William Bishop; Shelly Pellegrin
Tidewater Associated Oil Company
Philips Petroleum Company
Total

19
50
19
14
122

(Appendix 3)

6.4. Field Inspections Conducted
As part of the Foundation’s research, the scientists conducted numerous field trips to the
affected areas where they collected immense amounts of data. On the February 8th and 9th of
1947 trip, the scientists spoke with Hamilton Landry, who was a co-plaintiff on two 1947
lawsuits, an oystermen with beds in Bay Chene Fleur (Hewitt 1947). Landry saw a high
mortality in his oysters in June and July of the previous year, and he believed “that perhaps the
‘oil pollution’ has caused the high mortality” (Hewitt 1947, p. 1). However his formal petition
stated the damages occurred over the 1941 to 1947 period (Peltier, Rivet, and Blum 1947a). As
part of an April 11-14, 1947 field trip, the scientists approached Luke Zibilich and his brothers,
John and Joseph, about utilizing a portion of their beds for the study of oyster mortality (Hopkins
1947d). The Zibilich brothers were in favor of this because “it was the only way to prove the
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truth about oyster mortality” (Hopkins 1947d, p. 2). The Zibilich brothers also informed the
scientists that the oysters commonly begin dying as the temperatures warmed up and the most
deaths occur in September and October (Hopkins 1947d). During the May 12, 1947 survey,
Hopkins came across Betroul Cheramie’s beds (Hopkins 1947h). Cheramie, at the time, had
healthy, plump oysters, but made the comment that “they [the oil companies] might as well be
getting out their check-book” (Hopkins 1947h, p. 5). Cheramie thought that his oysters could die
at any time, and it would be the result of sulphur and oil waste pollution (Hopkins 1947h).
Similar to the 1930s, the DOC, the Texas Company, and the oystermen were still
attempting to conduct joint investigations. On one such trip on February 11-14th, 1947, the
group found oysters dying in Bastian Bay (Hewitt 1947). Mr. Loose, who heard about the dying
oysters from Dr. Gardescu, wanted Texas Company biologists to inspect the area immediately
(Hewitt 1947). During the follow-up trip, the biologists spoke with Mr. Tesvich, who also filed
suit in 1947, stated the oysters in this area had been dying for three to four years prior to the
events of 1946 that prompted these studies (Hopkins 1947f). Mr. Tesvich also speculated that oil
pollution had caused a decrease in the fish and mosquito populations (Hopkins 1947f). During
this late February trip, the biologists decided not to contact anymore oystermen by the end of the
trip (Hewitt 1947). They were apprehensive that they becoming “too closely identified with the
Texas Company in the minds of the people in this region and that we might do more harm to our
future investigation by being seen by more men at this time” (Hewitt 1947, p. 6).
In March 1947, Sewell Hopkins, a scientist with the Foundation, embarked on a trip to
the Houma area. He arrived at the Texas Company tank battery in Bay St. Elaine on Crooked
Bayou to find that it was discharging bleed water from two locations (Hopkins 1947e). At this
location specifically, Hopkins noted the status of several of oyster beds, some were plump and

151

plentiful, while others had soft mud bottoms lacking any oysters (Hopkins 1947e). The bayou
had also been channelized and dredged, which allowed tugboat and barge traffic (Hopkins
1947e). The wave action from these vessels caused silt to be deposited on top of the beds
(Hopkins 1947e). In November of 1947, the DOC Waste Control Division Inspectors recorded
bleed water discharge violations at this same battery (Coogan 1948). These violations remained
uncorrected by the time of the next inspection in January of 1948 (Coogan 1948). Hopkins next
moved onto John Jastremaki’s lease in Oyster Bayou, which was in direct view of the Lake Barre
Field (Hopkins 1947e). Jastremaki’s family had utilized this lease since 1904, and dredged if for
the preceding six years. It had begun to show an increase in empty shells and a decrease in live
oysters due to overcrowding (Hopkins 1947e). Jastremaki thought the bed bottom needed to be
cleaned off, the shells put on shore to dry, and the mud replanted with the dried shells (Hopkins
1947e). Jastremaki did not file lawsuits against the oil company and was assisting in the
investigation by lending a boat and captain (Hopkins 1947e).
Following the inspections by Sewell, the issue of Louisiana oystermen’s methods were
again brought into question. Some of the Foundation scientists thought the methods were
antiquated and were hastening the demise of the oyster industry (Hopkins 1947c). They
suggested that abandonment of depleted beds and ensuing movement of oystermen to new beds
had led them to deplete all the “good virgin bottoms” located in the bayous with hard bottoms
and then move into the bays with softer mud bottoms (Hopkins 1947c, p. 4). The issue of
dredging also came up, which had plagued Louisiana since the advent of the device. The oyster
dredge, while increasing harvest amounts and decreasing time and labor, scrapes the crust off the
bottom leaving only the soft mud forcing the oystermen to either move on or rotate beds until the
destroyed one rebuilds its crust (Hopkins 1947c). The report commented on the oystermen's
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reliance on the state to rehabilitate the damaged beds how effective they were with political
pressure that enabled harvesters to work these beds again prematurely (Korringa 1948). There
was also a heavy reliance on the state to generate the spat, rather than the oystermen taking that
responsibility (Korringa 1948).
In February 1948, the Omes brothers flagged down one of the Foundation research
vessels because their oysters were dying (Mackin 1948a). During the site inspection on February
24, Dr. Mackin discovered that crabs were responsible for the damage to the bore holes in the
shells, not oil or other waste substances, despite adamant opposition from the Omes brothers
(Mackin 1948a). Dr. Mackin suggested that their lack of knowledge about what was causing the
damage was indicative of their lack of experience and poor methods (Mackin 1948a). Dr.
Mackin inquired why the Omes brothers did not contact the DWF to conduct the inspection;
since they had made it clear they did not trust Dr. Mackin or the oil companies (Mackin 1948a).
There were two reasons. The first was that by the time a DWF inspector came out it would be
weeks later (Mackin 1948a). The second was they lacked confidence in the knowledge base of
the DWF staff on oysters (Mackin 1948a). This site inspection made it clear to that the
oystermen were truly in fear of losing their livelihoods (Mackin 1948a). The Omes brothers
were not part of the 1947 series of lawsuits, but did file a lawsuit in 1954 against Tidewater
Associated Oil Company and other oil companies for negligently allowing oil to flow into the
bayou due to improper embankments (Roccaforte 1954).
The field inspections mentioned here are just a few of many conducted by Foundation
personnel. They provide a long term, as compared to earlier month-long studies, study in both
the field and the laboratory, while also considering the overall ecological setting (Nelson 1949).
Their findings offer important insights into the complex oyster ecology. The first factor
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contributing to increased oyster mortality was high temperatures, which reduces the glycogen
due to excessive intensity and duration of spawning (Nelson 1949). The high temperatures also
increase the activity of predators and increase the oyster’s metabolism (Nelson 1949). The next
factor identified was the influx of fresh water to kill the predators, even though frequently
causing destruction to the beds, and it then allows a period of rebound and prosperity (Nelson
1949). Thirdly, the Foundation’s work identified a new parasite, Dermocystidium ostroarum,
that could be the primary reason for the oyster mortality (Nelson 1949). Lastly, the experiments
conducted specifically on oil and bleed water fail to correlate the relationship between these
substances and oyster mortality (Nelson 1949).

6.5. Politics at Play
Given the level of interest in the suits from all levels of government, it is no surprise that
there were debates and disagreements over what was causing the oyster mortality. Part of this
situation can be attributed to the evolving nature of scientific research and the perception of the
damages, but another major factor was the overall political climate of Louisiana. At the
beginning of this controversy the charismatic leadership of Huey P. Long, who would leave a
lasting legacy on the state through his methods and his colleagues was taking root (Jeansonne
1994). The Long tactics were not new to Louisiana, which given the overall dominance of
religion and racial issues in politics, supported personalities not issues and tolerated political
corruption in Louisiana (Jeansonne 1994). The Huey Long, Gerald Smith and Leander Perez
personalities and political approaches focused on vilification of their opponents, a capacity for
hatred, opportunism, and the desire to overwhelm their opponents in the polls (Jeansonne 1994).
When Huey Long was inaugurated in May of 1928, the Commissioner of the Department
of Conservation, Dr. V.K. Irion, refused to vacate his position prior to his term’s conclusion six
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months following the inauguration, which resulted in the Louisiana Supreme Court ruling on the
issue and which forced his resignation (Maestri 1929a). The new Commissioner, Robert
Maestri, began coordinating work to avoid duplication of efforts, which allowed him to eliminate
unnecessary employees (Maestri 1929a). To adequately address the mismanagement of funds,
personnel, and resources of the Commission, Maestri appointed a new cabinet and staff that
aligned with the views of the Long administration (Maestri 1929a). In order ensure each division
had management with practical business ability and conservation experience, Maestri appointed
new directors of each division (Maestri 1929a). Commissioner Maestri noted that he viewed the
past administrators of the Oyster Division as too “liberal in their discretion, and exercising the
authority given them by Legislative enactments,” which resulted in the monopolistic state of the
industry (Maestri 1929a).
The state officials had seen firsthand the anger and determination of the oystermen during
the conflict over interstate access to oysters by Mississippi residents prior to 1902 (St. Bernard
Parish Police Jury Minutes January 10, 1898). This conflict prompted a federal supreme court
lawsuit over state boundaries which resulted in warlike tactics between the two states’ patrol
boats, and the transition from parish to state control of Louisiana’s oyster resources (Legan
1988). The transition to state-level control prompted oystermen in St. Bernard Parish to form the
Louisiana Oyster Handlers Protective Association and protest the proposed legislation developed
by the newly established Oyster Commission (Daily-Picayune 1902). They created committees
to drum up support and talked about the possibility of “carrying on the fight, even into the halls
of the general assembly at Baton Rouge” (Daily-Picayune 1902). The Oyster Handlers were
deeply concerned about the lost revenue that “Mississippi fishermen have been thieving and
looting” from the Louisiana reefs (Daily-Picayune 1902). They also expressed apprehension
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about the ability of the Commission to write legislation that would not harm the oystermen and
constrict their livelihoods (Daily-Picayune 1902). Additionally, starting in 1914 the DOC
expressed concern about balancing the needs of the small individual oystermen with the more
organized corporate entities, who controlled a large number of leases (Payne 1914).
When the Texas A & M Foundation contracted with the LSU biologists, they found that
the DOC as still not cooperating with these academic scientists due to a strained relationship
with Mr. Gowanloch (Hopkins 1947b). The LSU biologists were seeking to gain access to the
damaged oyster beds as a follow up to DOC's original claim that it would take the dramatic step
of a suspending the oystermen’s leases for following year to ensure access (Hopkins 1947d).
The biologists, however, worried that given their past tense relationship with Gowanloch, he
might not grant access to these beds for testing at regular intervals (Hopkins 1947d). The Texas
A & M Foundation continued to worry about the views and demeanor of Gowanloch even
though he was under the direction of James McConnell the director of the Oyster and Water
bottoms Division (Gowanloch 1934). They feared that McConnell would take his lead from
Gowanloch (Gowanloch 1934).
In a May 1947 meeting, Dr. Hopkins discovered Gowanloch and McConnell’s trepidation
towards the oil industry was valid (Hopkins 1947h). Despite having previously agreed to give
permits to survey oyster beds, Gowanloch and McConnell revealed that they thought it was
“'political suicide’ for the DWF to give A & M Research Foundation men permits to sample
oysters on private beds or to use their boats” (Hopkins 1947h, p. 1). They were concerned that
oystermen would accuse them of selling out to the oil companies (Hopkins 1947h). By June of
1947, McConnell and Gowanloch were “seeing their fishermen friends turn against them…[and]
believing they had sold out to the oil companies” (Hopkins 1947h, p. 1). McConnell was also
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unwilling to let the scientists use the DWF boat because it was the one dedicated to patrolling for
oil pollution, so he thought it would be a conflict of interests to have it transporting the oil
company scientists instead of searching for violations (Hopkins 1947h). McConnell also
reminded Hopkins that the LSU biologists had testified for the oil companies in the 1930s, and
the oystermen still remembered this and saw t them as biased scientific investigators (Hopkins
1947h). The oystermen viewed the LSU biologists work as supporting the oil companies and
against the resource harvesters (Hopkins 1947h).
Both McConnell and Gowanloch believed the Texas A & M Research Foundation would
make an unbiased report, but they knew it was impossible for the oystermen to believe that this
was the case (Hopkins 1947h). Gowanloch thought that completely different people should be
involved in order to avoid personal bias persisting from previous disputes (Hopkins 1947h). The
DWF was worried that since the Texas A & M Research Foundation contract that did not allow
it to freely share data with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or other similar organizations it
would compromise any conclusions (Hopkins 1947a). Dr. Hopkins pointed out the concern over
matters going to trial and the need to preserve evidence prior to the use of evidence in court. Dr.
Mackin confirmed that court trials were expected and the defense lawyers would not be
amenable to sharing their evidence with the plaintiffs prior to the trial commencing (Hopkins
1947a). McConnell expressed concern that a trial could take an extended period of time, which
would leave the state and oystermen in the dark on a potential solution or the cause of the
damage (Hopkins 1947a). Dr. Hopkins assured him that if oil operations were identified as
causing oyster mortality, than the oil companies and scientists would find a way to alter
procedure and improve conditions (Hopkins 1947a). Dr. Mackin also pointed out that the
resources, both financial and personnel, were larger than the state’s. He argued that the
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Foundation would be able to complete the entire investigation in one to two years, whereas it
might take state officials seven to fourteen (Hopkins 1947a). Given this huge disparity, there
was a greater need for cooperation between the state and the Foundation (Hopkins 1947a). This
concept would be difficult to achieve when McConnell was telling the oystermen that “there was
no question…that oil was killing the oysters” (Mackin 1948b, p. 2).

6.6. Additional Scientific Work
In an attempt to determine the causes of the widespread mortality, the oil industry
continued to fund the Texas A & M Foundation, with the motivation that resolving the pollution
culpability issue would absolve the oil companies of future legal challenges. The scientific
research pointed to specific changes occurring in coastal Louisiana that were already known to a
certain extent by the oystermen. Over the course of the investigations, the scientists realized the
oysters were being seriously impacted by some sort of disease (Hopkins 1950). The areas that
were experiencing high mortality were seeing rates of infection with Dermocystidium that were
reaching epidemic levels in a seasonal rhythm (Mackin 1950). Seasonally there was lower
mortality during the cooler months, with higher rates in the warmer spring and summer months
(Mackin 1950). Dermocystidium destroys the tissues in the major organ systems by “lytic action
of the fungus cells” (Mackin 1950, p. 1). The disease’s environmental tolerances enabled it to
survive/thrive in the same salinity as oysters (Mackin 1950).
Despite a body of scientific research on Dermocystidium, there was still confusion about
its role in oyster mortality among state officials and oystermen. The inability to pinpoint the
cause of mortality, despite the number of studies, lay in the range of suspected causes and
ecological processes. For example, Dr. Prytherch’s investigations concluded that there was a
disease causing oyster mortality, but focused on the abundance of oysters and the probability that
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Nematopais was responsible for the damage given its similar distribution to oyster beds (Hopkins
1950). The focus on the Nematopais overshadowed the fact that there was another disease
causing the mortality and oil companies worried the actual cause, Dermocystidium, would be of
“dubious legal value” (Hopkins 1950, p. 1). However, the Foundation scientists were quick to
point out that Prytherch’s conclusion that a disease was causing the mortality greatly reduced the
liability of oil producers (Hopkins 1950). The discovery of this disease did not prompt
procedural changes within DWF, which could have changed regulations on oyster harvest
techniques. Instead DWF continued to rehabilitate overharvested beds, as they had been doing
for the preceding fifty years.
Additionally, DWF declined to cooperate with the Foundation scientists. The DWF had
contracted its own scientist, Dr. Malcolm Owen, to study the oyster mortality, but when the
Foundation scientists asked for titles of the reports being prepared by Owen, McConnell denied
that there were any reports (Mackin 1953b). Dr. Owen was the one investigator to ultimately
share the information with the Foundation for the betterment of science (Mackin 1953b). Dr.
Owen also suggested that the DWF should begin planting a seed oyster that was resistant to
Dermocystidium, since spat and young oysters were most vulnerable to the disease (Mackin
1953b). Dr. Owen held the opinion that “if a measurable quantity of oil is in the sea-water it is
injurious to oysters,” and used this belief as the basis for his recommendation to the DWF to
reduce and/or control pollution [type unspecified] (Mackin 1953b, p. 2).
The issue of salinity changes was not limited to the oyster beds. Scientists were looking
at the larger environmental changes going on in the coastal landscape. They began to note the
salinity changes further up the bayous and bays that occurred when canals were cut to facilitate
movement around the marsh (Mackin 1953a). This work built upon the earlier work of Percy
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Viosca, who examined the effects of the commercial and transportation canals in the marsh and
their effects on changing the natural vegetation and landscape (Viosca 1928). Dr. Owen’s
reports noted the need for a channel cut through the Mississippi River levees to deliver fresh
water to the brackish base and lower the salinity levels, which would also function to keep pests
at bay (Mackin, Welch, and Kent 1950). The salinity changes impacted how the oyster industry
utilized the Barataria Estuary. By 1950, the lower Barataria served exclusively as a fattening
area during the cooler months (Mackin, Welch, and Kent 1950). Studies conducted by Texas A
& M suggested that the beds on the west side of mouth of the Mississippi River were also going
to need to be abandoned if the oystermen wanted to continue to avoid large scale mortalities (see
Figure 9, Mackin, Welch, and Kent 1950). The salinity level of the water is critical to oyster
reproduction and growth, as well as the role salinity plays in regulating predators (Gunter 1955).
The scientific work coupled with the technological adaptations by the oil industry did not
prevent the oyster industry from forced adaptation to changing environmental conditions in
coastal Louisiana. This is evident in (Mackin, Welch, and Kent 1950).
Other coast resource users began to notice these changes as well. There was a public
campaign by the New Orleans Sportsmen Association to close the unused oil and gas canals to
prevent the intrusion of saltwater to protect the duck population (Pelt 1945). The damage was
seen as something that was ongoing and would continue unless the companies and the
, which compares the locations of the historic oyster beds with known leases in 1997.
The movement further inland to the areas of brackish water, rather than predominately-salt water
closer to the denuded barrier islands, is visually apparent. Additionally, these changes in
practices were documented by the Foundation scientists who observed specific areas in coastal
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Louisiana that were no longer productive and in order to maintain their livelihoods oystermen
needed to abandon beds in these locations (Mackin, Welch, and Kent 1950).
Other coast resource users began to notice these changes as well. There was a public
campaign by the New Orleans Sportsmen Association to close the unused oil and gas canals to
prevent the intrusion of saltwater to protect the duck population (Pelt 1945). The damage was
seen as something that was ongoing and would continue unless the companies and the

Figure 10. Comparison of Modern Oyster Leases and Historic Oyster Leases
(Adapted from The Nature Conservancy, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources SONRIS Data)

government started to manage the coastal marshlands in a successful manner (Pelt 1945). The
actions of this community brought the issue to the forefront as sportsmen have done elsewhere
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(see Colten 2006). These issue of habitat damages due to salt-water intrusion pre-dates the entry
of oil industry (Chapter 4, 80), but were exacerbated by the industry’s extensive use of canals
and pipeline systems for transportation across the marshy landscape. During the time period of
this study, the state did not attempt to regulate canal construction with the exception of any that
affected navigable waterways (see: Hebert and Legislature 1928). The increase in canals caused
not only a loss in habitat but forced oystermen to adapt where and how they utilized the
landscape.

6.7. Technological Responses
In addition to the environmental adaptations the oil industry made, they were continually
working to improve their production methods both on- and offshore. A driving force behind this
was the idea that state-of-the-art engineering techniques would bring about a better
understanding of the problems (Hebert and Anderson 1937). Industry personnel also thought it
was necessary to begin studying these problems and consolidating their position before economic
and political pressures forced them to change (Hebert and Anderson 1937). The continuous
improvement in methods, equipment, and materials has allowed for the large increase in depth in
Gulf Coast wells, among other things (Gray, Allen, and Tschirley 1956).
One major factor in production that is pertinent to this investigation is the improvement
and use of blowout prevention mechanisms. While the technology may not have initially been
the wholly effective, the industries attempt to self-regulate displays the anticipation of potential
disruptions in both economic and environmental situations. A blowout is the release of oil after
the pressure control system has failed, which frequently occurred when the drill pipe was being
removed from the well hole (Hubbard 1933). In the 1930s, it was common practice to
immediately equip a wildcat well or locations where gas producing formations exist with a
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blowout preventer as soon as the surface casing was set (Hubbard 1933). There were two types
of blowout preventers in use in the 1930s. One was the ram type, which has ram or piston built
in that immediately responds to pressure by tightening a packer around the drilling steam
(Hubbard 1933). The ram type utilizes the pressure from the pistons to apply the necessary
pressure to seal the well. The source of this pressure could be the mud pump, a boiler pump, or a
separate water pump specifically for this purpose (Hubbard 1933). The hosmer was the other
type blowout preventer that was a bowl mounted on the casing, which was latched around the
drill to seal off the steam and casing (Hubbard 1933). The pressure for the hosmer preventer
depended on the weight of the drill pipe or a screw-down arrangement applying the needed
pressure (Hubbard 1933). Many companies conducted daily blowout drills to ensure that each
crew properly trained and maintained the equipment in working order (Hubbard 1933). During a
blowout it is also important to shut off the flowline. This can be achieved by the incorporation
of fast-closing plug valves with geared compounding arrangements and pressure-operated valves
working in conjunction with the blowout preventer and successfully decreased the number of
blowouts (Williams 1936b). These initial self-regulatory practices enabled the industry to better
adapt to the later federal regulation that would result from the 1970s oil spills.
After the Doucet petitions were filled, the industry began to acknowledge the need to
avoid structural failures - particularly in terms of well blowouts. This was due to avoid time and
equipment loss and also to prevent and subsequent product loses (Williams 1936b). The oil
industry acknowledged that a blowout could cause extensive damage to the shrimp, oyster, fish
and fur industries, which could ultimately lead to legislative action (Williams 1936b). A typical
assumption was that any new legislation would be to more stringent and raise drilling costs in the
marshes to prohibitive levels (Williams 1936b). While such speculation on the part of oil
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companies may have been warranted following the state’s reaction to Doucet vs. Texas Company
et al. case, no state legislation points to a reaction to damages caused to coastal habitats during
this study period. The vast majority of state statutes focus on the state’s ability to manage leases
and prevent the waste of state resources. The laws that do refer to pollution specifically relate
back to cattle, rice, or sugar production, as well as, fresh water fish kills, but none mention
brackish or salt water. The defense in the Doucet Case questioned whether the bayous and
coastal Gulf waters could be classified as streams (Doucet v. Texas Co. et al. 1944, Volume II,
115). Act No. 157 of 1940 contains a provision to prevent the escape of oil or gas by drilling,
casing, and plugging the well to another strata, the pollution of fresh water, and to plug each
abandoned well (Henrick, Landry, and Cotton 1940). Yet, Act No. 157 failed to specifically
address the issues that the oyster industry was citing in its negligence petitions.
The state also wanted the oil industry to operate on sound footings, which would enable
them to withstand disruptive events and not cause additional damage. The State passed Act No.
218 in 1928, which allowed anyone holding a mineral lease to build breakwaters, platforms, fills,
islands, and other constructions in facilitate in their operations (Hebert and Legislature 1928). If
the location of the lease was in navigable water, the island or fill needed to be permitted through
the Register of State Land (Hebert and Legislature 1928). Oil companies used either earthen fill,
pilings, and wooden mats and superstructures depending on the landscape they were constructing
on (Hebert and Anderson 1937). Other factors in selecting the foundation type were the initial
cost, salvage value, maintenance costs, adaptability to drilling operations, sturdiness during times
of temporary overloads, and installation difficulties relative to the time, materials location, and
the need for special equipment (Hebert and Anderson 1937). The importance of sound
construction was exemplified in 1957 when Hunt Oil Company and Arkansas Fuel Oil
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Corporation suffered a blowout at their well in Duck Lake (Sarpy 1958). J. Ray McDermott
caused a blowout that caused extensive damages to the plaintiff’s property (Sarpy 1958). The
plaintiffs sought over $600,000 dollars and settled out of court for an undisclosed amount (Sarpy
1958). The plaintiff claimed the blowout's responsibility rested squarely with the defendant and
followed arguments presented in previous oystermen suits (Sarpy 1958). The plaintiffs claimed
negligence, incompetent workers, and operating without due regard for the plaintiff’s property
(Sarpy 1958).
In addition to blowout prevention, the companies began researching and developing
cathodic corrosion protection for pipelines, since pipelines were one of the most common
methods for oil and gas transportation. The technology was first developed in 1932, but did not
become practical economically until 1936 (Williams 1936a). The primary reason for the slow
adoption was a lack of on-site power, but with the development of wind-driven generators and
later small gas units, it became possible to install cathodic protection at any place in the line
(Williams 1936a). The cathodic pipelines need an electrical current to provide a charge to the
anode, which serves as the sacrificial metal while reducing the corrosion on the primary metal
(Williams 1936a). The cathodic pipeline was critical for south Louisiana, where a typical
pipeline would cross bayous, be in wet conditions, and go under lakes and bays (Williams
1936a). The Humble Pipeline Company had been successful using the wind-driven models in
the Anahuac-Baytown line to protect two river bottom pipelines from corrosion (Williams
1936a). In addition to cathodic pipelines, the companies were also researching ways to decrease
the amount of corrosion on drilling equipment that was regularly in contact with water and oil
mixtures during extraction (Rodgers and Shellshear 1937). The studies determined that to
decrease the occurrence of corrosion the production process needed to stop introducing oxygen
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into the oil and water mixture (Rodgers and Shellshear 1937). By decreasing the amount of
corrosion in both pipelines and production equipment, the oil industry lowered the chances of an
environmental disruption due to faulty equipment.
Another aspect to improving the safety and efficiency of production was reflected in
corporate recognition of the human aspect of production. Companies began to realize the
primary factor inhibiting safe and efficient operations was worker fatigue due to extended
exertion (Short 1947). The greater the exertion on a certain task, the greater the loss of alertness
and efficiency among the drilling crew (Short 1947). This revelation prompted operators to want
to incorporate “all possible measures for the reduction in crew fatigue…in the design of drilling
equipment primarily for the safety of the personnel, equipment, and the drilling operation itself”
(Short 1947, p. 78). The acknowledgement of this factor was important for the overall industry
because it had been thought that the majority of fatal incidents in offshore work were related to
the “deficiencies in the official structure of, largely due to widespread subcontracting and the
time pressure to complete projects and accelerate production” (Priest 2008, p. 139). These
incidents were not deviations from standard operating procedures and practices (Wright 1986,
Priest 2008). Despite these revelations, companies made few real improvements in safety
practices until the 1970s (Priest 2008), which coincided with two major spills in 1970 the Shell
Platform 26, and the Chevron Main Pass Block 41. The improvements in personnel safety
practices were coupled with safety devices to decrease blowouts and other improvements to
technology due to the heightened regulatory environment following the passage of federal level
regulations that Gulf Coast producers had not faced previously at the state level (Priest 2008).
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6.9. Conclusion
Examination of periods of contention in coastal Louisiana, makes it apparent that the
political climate had changed in terms of the oil industry and its relationship with the oyster
industry. In the 1930s, there was open cooperation in attempts to determine the problems among
the state, the oil industry, and the oystermen. By the 1940s, the relationship among the three
interested parties was vastly different. The state felt pressure from the oystermen not to
cooperate with the oil industry. The oil industry had disposable income to spend on studies and
personnel, while the state had to appeal to the federal level to get funding for investigations into
the causes of the mortality.
Information gleaned from the Sewell Hopkins Collection suggests that the oil industry
was still just as interested in the issue of oyster mortality in the 1940s, despite all the lawsuits, as
it was in the 1930s. The oil industry wanted to determine the exact cause of the mortality, so it
could resolve the problem if it was rooted in their production methods, but neglected the
possibility that the problem was more passive like the taste or quality of the oyster. Yet, the
oystermen showed varying degrees of cooperation in the process despite trusting the oil company
scientists to be present for an inspection more than they trusted the state employees. Many of the
oystermen requesting help from the oil company scientists ended up suing for damages and
settled for a nominal amount out of court. But the practice of recouping damages through legal
measures was something they learned from Doucet vs. Texas Company et al., and then they
could use that money to replant beds in other locations that would be more productive.
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Chapter 7. Conclusions
Following these two tumultuous periods marked by legal and scientific
wrangling/contention, life for oystermen on the coast did not change dramatically. The
disruptions that consistently battered the coast– tropical disturbances and fresh water influxes -continued. But, the coast was changing, not just with the integration of a new industry, but the
marsh landscape and water chemistry. These changes added a dynamic to the socio-ecological
system that the oystermen and the state were not readily equipped to adapt to.
The salinity alteration and land modification issues singularly did not seem to cause
disruption on the coast, but when assessed within the larger scale of regional ecological and
social change, coupled with a new poorly known industry, they provided enough uncertainty and
change to the familiar system that unanticipated disruptions occurred within a social or economic
frame that blame was easily assigned. The relationship between the oystermen and the coast is
particularly complex. It spans generations and contributes to the way communities and
individuals respond to disruptive events. Individual and community level responses are related
to human agency and place attachment, which is difficult to fit into a systematic model such as
panarchy, since individuals’ reasons, motivations, and feelings are constantly evolving within a
highly dynamic situation. During the surveys conducted by the Foundation scientists, it became
apparent that the oystermen’s primary concern was the loss of their livelihoods, which is directly
tied to the coastal landscape.
One of the primary adaptive practices to ensure livelihood continuity was geographic
mobility. The oystermen have always been mobile due to the distribution of bedding grounds
across the coast. The mobility across the coast was seen in the distribution of parish residency
versus the location of oyster leases, where forty-five percent of plaintiffs lived in different
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parishes than their oyster beds. The practice of mobility increased in response to early depletion
of beds in the 1880s, as oystermen moved further down the bayous. The assumed right to access
profitable and productive beds was complicated by the state imposing a leasing system, which
required the oystermen to claim specific beds on a more permanent basis. The original Act No.
153 in 1902 required the survey and staking of oyster beds by the Oyster Commission (Sanders
and Estopinal 1902). This policy tied oystermen to specific locations where they could not
relocate as easily if the common predators invaded, a tropical disturbance deposited silt on the
beds, or the salinity changed. The introduction of state laws in the early 1900s transitioned
control of oyster resources from the parish, or local control, to the state level, which also
prompted a period of growth and the beginning of the conservation methods by the state (Table
6).
However, when the oil industry entered coastal Louisiana and oyster mortalities
increased, the limits of traditional mobility and adaptive practices of the fisherfolk became
apparent. The first indicator of mobility was the shifting of production from the Terrebonne
Estuary, where the oil industry was developing, to the Barataria Estuary, where at the time it had
not yet begun drilling. The expansion of oil extraction to Barataria brought with it a perceived
threat to traditional livelihoods by releasing pollution in the oyster beds, and prompted a series of
lawsuits. But there were much larger processes going on in coastal Louisiana.
The adaptions to salinity, perceived damage by pollution, and landscape changes did not
alter the interests of the individual oystermen, who were driven by the established systems of
authority rooted in their social relations, identity, knowledge, technology, and rights of access to
common resources. The entrance of the oil industry coincided with multiple other influences
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Table 6. Coastal Louisiana System Characteristics and Adaptive Cycles
Adaptive Cycle
Characteristic
Adaptive phase
system starts in
Structure:
Institutional
Economic

Pre-1929
Growth and
conservation

1929-1944

1944-1970

Growth

Growth

α to K to r

r

r

Local to State
Growth of
cultivation

State

State to Federal

Resource exportation

Resource exportation
Perceived oil pollution
damages;
overharvesting; state
conservation; money
from lawsuit settlements
Tropical disturbances,
salinity changes,
crevasses, natural
predators, oil pollution
damage, newly
discovered parasites

Feedbacks

Overharvesting,
regulations

Perceived oil pollution
damages; overharvesting;
state conservation

Disturbances

Tropical
disturbances,
salinity changes,
crevasses, natural
predators, state
regulations

Tropical disturbances,
salinity changes, crevasses,
natural predators, oil
pollution damage

Adaptive phase
r
r
system ends in
r= exploitation K=conservation Ω= release

r
α= reorganization

affecting the coast, its ecology, and landscape. The overall issue was the large-scale mortality of
oysters, and the most logical conclusion was that since oil extraction was the new variable in the
coast, it must have been responsible. Over and over the oystermen acknowledged their ability to
adapt to environmental changes, such as temperature changes or increased fresh water, that
caused mortality, but the entry of the oil industry seemed to change their perception of what was
causing mortality. The ability to adapt to known disruptions enabled the oyster industry to
respond to the new perceived threat of the oil industry by being geographically and economically
mobile, while also still continuing to exploit the resources. The scale of mobility had changed
from the initial periods of oyster cultivation in the 1800s prior to the establishment of lease
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boundaries, but later the oystermen simply established multiple leases in various family
member’s (see Table 2).
The events of the 1930s and 1940s began to show the complex relationships among
adaptation, resilience, and human agency. These relationships make it difficult to fit the
evolving resource use and management activities into the panarchy model. While the panarchy
model did not fully explain this complex system, the core concepts it is built on, such as
feedbacks, triggers, reconstruction, instability, collapse, and adaptation, have been utilized in
other models. The panarchy model coupled with the Buras and Kanapaux matrix provided an
opportunity to question whether or not the model and that policy windows it presents adequately
represent the complex relationship among specific places, new regulations, and the conflicts and
disruptions that occurred in Louisiana between 1930 and 1970 I attempted to utilize the
framework developed by Bures and Kanapaux, but found that both industries were continually
exploiting their respective resources (Table 6). Since the model based on panarchy did not
succeed, it suggests the need to utilize a systematic analysis that does not look at society as a
rigid, predictable system. Karl Butzer proposes another model that attempts to look at the
political, economic, cultural, and historical factors that caused devolution (collapse) or the
adaptations that may have been attempted but failed (Butzer 2012). This model attempts to
incorporate cultural identity (Butzer 2012), which is not included in the typical panarchy
analysis, and cannot be overlooked when examining coastal Louisiana given the long-standing
attachment to place.
This was partially due to human agency, which is difficult to model and presents
difficulty when considered as a predictable system. The oystermen’s attitude of abandoning
damaged or overharvested leases for unharmed areas was not a systematic process and was
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motivated by their desire to maintain economic security. It was dependent on the location of the
beds, the planting methods of the oystermen, and the confidence of the oystermen in their ability
to rehabilitate the depleted beds. Jastremaki was confident in his ability to rehabilitate his beds,
whereas other oystermen chose to abandon the Lake Pelto area for better beds. Yet others, chose
to sue for the damages and relocate to the neighboring estuary where the oil industry was not a
perceived threat.
The oystermen were in a continual state of exploitation, while the state was coming
behind them in continual state of conservation – working to restore oyster beds. So neither was
prompted into a new adaptive cycle by disruptive events. The oystermen were not compelled to
improve their harvesting methods to offset depletion. Looking at the oyster harvest statistics
from the beginning of formal cultivation in 1897 to 1969, there is not a significant increase in
production (Figure 11). There is roughly a 100,000-barrel difference in production between
1897 and 1969. The average yearly production is just over 600,000-barrels, but extreme outliers
exist during a record setting lease year in 1908, producing 1,087,176-barrels, and following
Hurricane Camille in 1966, which only produced 184,343-barrels (Figure 11). The figure does
not show that state rehabilitation efforts were able to sustain the so-called renewable resource.
Looking at production over time, there are clear peaks and valleys that suggest improper
management of the oyster resources. The table also shows a drop-in production that could
potentially be attributed to the oil industry entering the Lake Barre and Lake Pelto area. Given
the work of Foundation scientists to demonstrate that disease, predators, or parasites were the
cause of increased mortality the fluctuations in production are better explained by these factors
than looking solely at disruptive events such as pollution, tropical weather events, or floods.
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Figure 11. Louisiana Statewide Oyster Production by Barrels
By looking at the larger picture of what was going on in the changing coastal
environment it becomes apparent that, the oyster industry’s exploitation of its key resource was
offset by consistent conservation programs initiated by the state. Louisiana agencies were
continually outlaying money to repair overharvested beds and plant seed oysters for commercial
harvests. These actions enabled the oyster industry to remain viable, and with the legal system
that was in place, oystermen were able to sue any entity for damages to their livelihood and then
use the settlement amount to re-bed oysters elsewhere. Despite clear points of conflict, the
regulations continued to be reactive rather than proactive in managing the coastal resources and
their stakeholders.
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39,767

79,665
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46,613

52,718

56,342

98,479
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44,760

22,460

24,681

37,204

55,239
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Cameron Verm.
Parish
Parish

106038

69,371

36,504

88,597

44,837

126,040

82,724

14,286

120,327 58,493

172,286
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Table 8. Key Words Searched for in Lexis-Nexis
Bed Damage
The California Company
Calcasieu Parish
Cameron Parish
Chevron, Inc
Exxon Corporation
Gulf Refining Company
Humble Oil and Refining Company
Jefferson Parish
Lafourche Parish
Lake Barre
Lake Pelto
Louisiana
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company
Louisiana Oil and Gas Company
Oil
Oil Exploration
Oil Spill
Oyster

Oyster Beds
Oyster Damage
Oyster Death
Oyster Lease
Phillips Petroleum Company
Plaquemines Parish
Pollution
Quality Exploration
St. Bernard Parish
St. Mary’s Parish
Shell Company
Signal Petroleum
Superior Oil Company
Terrebonne Parish
Texaco, Inc
Texas Company
Texas A&M
Tidewater Associated Oil Company
Trahan Drilling Company
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Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

Parish Case Number
10486

T

10488

T

Cheramie,
Davis

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10485

T

Charpentier,
Levy

Cheramie,
Roosevelt

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10477

T

10482

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

Date

Alceste Charpentier,
Reselus Charpentier,
Julien Charpentier

10/13/33

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10/13/33

John Pitre

10/13/33

Autin, Anecet

T

10/13/33

Defendants

10/13/33

Plaintiff et al.

P
a
r
i
s
h

10/13/33

Plaintiff

10482

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Doucet,
Ludwig

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

Duet,
T
Cheramie
(table cont’d)

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin
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Parish Case Number
10487
10478
10483
10484
10480

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

Pitre, Ramo

Martial Pitre

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

T

T

T

T

10489

Pierre Pitre

T

10536

Pitre, Ecland

Date

Andrew Guidry

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10/13/33

Guirdy,
Charles

10/13/33

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10/13/33

Eymard,
Hypolite

10/13/33

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

T

10/13/33

Eymard,
Duard

T

10/13/33

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

10/13/33

Duet,
Olezime

P
a
r
i
s
h

1/11/34

Plaintiff

10479

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

Toups, Pierre

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

T
Adam, Abel
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
10537
10534
10535
10538
10533

T

T

J

19721

Vujnovich,
George

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Date

St. Pierre,
Jockin

1/11/34

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

1/11/34

Rebstock,
Victor

T

1/11/34

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

1/11/34

Lafont,
Richard

T

1/11/34

Curole,
Andrew

T

4/21/47

Authement,
Phil C.

P
a
r
i
s
h

4/22/47

Plaintiff

19742

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants
The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

The Texas Company, William Bishop,
Shelly Pellegrin

Nick Curole

Peter Vujovich

Cheramie,
J
Amedee
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
19720
19722
19723
19724

J

J

J

19719

Pausina,
Stanley

Date

Hamilton Landry

4/22/47

Landry, Julio

4/22/47

Zeljko S. Franks,
Zvonimir T. Franks

4/22/47

Franks,
Joseph V.

J

4/22/47

Coulon,
Herbert

J

4/22/47

Collins, Jr.,
Levy

P
a
r
i
s
h

4/22/47

Plaintiff

19743

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

J
Pitre, August
(table cont’d)
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Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

Parish Case Number
19741
19744
2150
2151

P

P

20123

Peter Vujovich

Date

Vujnovich,
George

4/24/47

Zeljko S. Franks,
Zvonimir T. Franks

4/24/47

Franks,
Joseph V.

P

4/24/47

Begovich,
Jack

J

4/24/47

Begovich,
Jack

J

4/24/47

Adams,
Antoine

P
a
r
i
s
h

4/28/47

Plaintiff

2152

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Encalade,
J
Manuel
(table cont’d)
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Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

P
a
r
i
s
h

Date

Parish Case Number

Plaintiff

J

4/30/47

19760

Pausina,
Baldo

P

5/2/47

2158

Landry, Juilo

P

5/2/47

2157

Pausina,
Baldo

P

5/2/47

2156

Slavich, Simo

J

5/21/47

19822

Callais,
Edward

5/21/47

19821

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Hamilton Landry

Eunice Vinnet

Galjour,
J
Joseph J.
(table cont’d)
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P
a
r
i
s
h

Date

Parish Case Number

Plaintiff

J

5/21/47

19823

Vinet, Eunice

P

5/22/47

2170

Tesvich, Luke

J

6/5/47

19888

Eymard,
Hypolite

J

6/5/47

19890

Petrovich,
Vlaho

J

6/5/47

19889

Sandras, Alex

6/20/47

19931

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Luke E. Adams

Collin,
J
Ashton
(table cont’d)
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Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

6/20/47

19932

P

6/24/47

2183

Burkett,
Alfred

J

6/25/47

19956

Cheramie,
Bertoul P.

J

19951

Cheramie,
Kilrain

19958

Parish Case Number

J

Coulon,
Herbert

6/25/47

Plaintiff

6/25/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

Date

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.
Alexina Fabre
Coulon, Enola C.
Perrin, Herbert F.
Coulon, Mildred
Coulon, Olivin C.
Fiorelle, Jacob
Fiorelle, Eles
Coulon, Preston
Coulon, Margery C.
Rojas, William
Rojas, Ervin Coulon

Cheramie Duet

Morgan City
J
Packing Co.
(table cont’d)
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Defendants

The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

Parish Case Number
19954
19955
9032
19947

Eymard,
Hypolite

L

J

L

9035

Alisha Proug Collin,
Noles Collin

Date

Collin,
Ashton

6/25/47

Essay Ledet

6/25/47

Ledet, John
Daniel

6/27/47

Harrison Jambon

J

6/30/47

Jambon,
Sidney

J

7/1/47

Jambon,
Alcide

P
a
r
i
s
h

7/5/47

Plaintiff

9034

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Duet,
L
Cheramie
(table cont’d)
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Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

L

Parish Case Number
2204
9038

Callais,
Nelson

9039

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Cheramie,
Kilrain

2208

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

Tesvich,
Kuzma

9053

L

Martina &
Martina Inc.

Borne, Ellis

9047

L

7/24/47

P

Plaintiff

Morgan City
Packing Co.

9048

Date

L

7/24/47 7/24/47 7/24/47 7/15/47

L

7/14/47

P

7/15/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

7/9/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Morgan City
Packing Co.

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Tony Tesvich

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation
The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation
The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation
The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

9054

Cheramie,
L
Walter J.
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
9056

Mrs. Manuel Collins

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Leon Galliano

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Galliano,
Nelson
Guirdy,
Charles

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Hodge,
Notilla

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

St. Pierre,
Jockin

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Toups, Pierre

Manual P. Toups

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Martin Cenac

The Texas Company, Berksire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

9050

9052

Defendants

9051

Plaintiff et al.

9055

Collin,
Edward

9049

7/24/47

L

7/25/47

L

Plaintiff

13224

Date

L

L

7/24/47

L

7/24/47 7/24/47

L

7/24/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

7/24/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

T
Cenac, Henry
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
13223

Mrs. Oliver
Terrebonne

T

13226

The Texas Company, Berksire Oil
J. Averal Naquin, and Company, Mar-Tex Realization
J. Norman Naquin
Corporation

Naquin,
Claude J.

L

9057

Wallace Lafont,
Voorhies Lafont

The Texas Company, Berksire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Terrebonne,
Oliver

70045

Lafont,
Richard and
bros.

7/25/47

The Texas Company, Berksire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

7/28/47

Dusenbery,
Alcide

7/31/47

T

Cheramie,
Bertoul J. Jr.

13225

7/25/47

T

Plaintiff

13228

Date

T

7/25/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

7/25/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.
Bertoul P. Cheramie,
Patterson J.
Cheramie, Nelson G.
Cheramie, Rita C.
Trosclair, Early
Trosclair

Defendants

The Texas Company, Berksire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Bianchini,
J
Lawrence
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
2216

9/15/47

P

20048

9/15/47

P

2225

8/28/47

P

Eymard,
Hypolite

Vodopija,
John

2249

8/1/47

P

Bianchini,
Lawrence

Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

A. Franceski
& Sons

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

2235

7/31/47

J

Plaintiff

Armstrong,
James A

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

2232

Date

P

9/15/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/15/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Cognevich,
John

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Plaintiff et al.

Edward Callais

Earl J. Cognevich

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

2239

Cognevich,
P
Leon & Ralph
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
2243
2244

9/15/47

P

2233

9/15/47

P

Encalade,
Louis

2242

9/15/47

P

Denesse,
Eugene Jr.

Farac &
Rodriguez

2247

9/15/47

P

Denesse,
Eugene

Garma,
Anthony

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

2248

9/15/47

P

Plaintiff

Popich, John

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

John T. Farac, John
Rodriguez, Jerome
Jurisivich

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company
Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

2250

Date

P

9/15/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/15/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

P
Popich, Nick
(table cont’d)
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2234

Stella, Carlos

P

2238

Stella, Carlos

P

2245

Stipkovich,
John

2237

Parish Case Number

9/15/47

P

9/15/47

2254

9/15/47

P

2246

Date
9/15/47

P

9/15/47

Rodi,
Celeston

P

9/15/47

Reese,
Edward

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/15/47

Plaintiff

2253

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants
Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Esteve Rodi

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

Spanja, Sam

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Stuprich,
P
Frank
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
2252
2241

2240

P

Zibilich Bros.

P

Zibilich Bros.

9/30/47

P

2236

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Date

Yuratich,
Emile

9/15/47

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

P

9/15/47

Vasiljevich,
John

P

9/15/47

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

9/15/47

Taliancich
Bros

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/15/47

Plaintiff

2251

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

2259

A. Franceski
P
& Sons
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
2265

9/30/47

P

Crynjak, John

2262

9/30/47

P

Plaintiff et al.

Denesse,
Albert

Vlaho J. Stipelkovich
August Dennesse,
John Denesse, Henry
Denesse, Antoinette
Denesse, Marie
Denesse,, Joseph
Denesse, Leonie
Denesse, Leon
Denesse, Numa
Denesse, Melanie
Denesse, Zelonie
Denesse, Paul
Denesse, Patrick
Denesse

2261

9/30/47

P

Plaintiff

Hingle,
Xaavier

Emmett Hingle

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

or Zvonco
Kuludrovich

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

2259

Date

P

9/30/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/30/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Jurisich, A.L.

2263

Koludrovich,
P
Zvonimir
(table cont’d)
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Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

Table 9. Summary of Lawsuits Surveyed

Parish Case Number
2264

Seput, Gaspar

Mrs. Mary V.
Stipelkovich
Philomene Peavich,
Merko Markovich,
Jack Slavich

2260
2263

Defendants
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Tesvich,
Kuzma

Koludrovich,
Zvonimir

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company

Jurisich, Luke

Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway

A. Farac &
Son

Humble Oil and Refining Company,
Freeport Sulphur Company, Philips
Petroleum

Antunica,
A.V.

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

2266

P

Plaintiff et al.

2275

P

Plaintiff

2277

9/30/47

P

10/2/47

Date
9/30/47

T

10/11/47

P

10/11/47

P

10/11/47

P
a
r
i
s
h

9/30/47

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
Philips Petroleum Company

2276

Jurisich,
P
Frank
(table cont’d)
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Parish Case Number
2316
2350
2372
2398

P

7/13/48

2399

Vezich,
Zaninovich &
Co

L

7/15/48

9225

Currault,
Andrew

31950

Date

Callahan,
Pierre

11/18/47

Vasiljevich,
John

P

1/29/48

Lulich, Pasco

P

P

4/22/48

Mihaljevich,
John

P
a
r
i
s
h

P

7/13/48

Plaintiff

4/22/54

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

Adams,
J
Antoine
(table cont’d)

Gulf Refining Company, The Texas
Company

Gulf Refining Company, The Texas
Company

Gulf Refining Company, The Texas
Company
Phillips Petroleum Company, F.F.
Calaway
The Texas Company, Humble Oil and
Refining Company, Freeport Sulphur
Company, Gulf Refining Company,
Danciger Oil and Refining Company, The
California Company, The Lafitte Company
The Texas Company, Berkshire Oil
Company, Mar-Tex Realization
Corporation

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
William Sheashey
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Parish Case Number

4/8/58

T

California Company

Scott,
Lawrence

United States Oil of LA Inc
Gulf Refining Company, Louisiana Power
and Light, W.S. Young Construction Co.,
Sam Carline, Inc., H.L. Allen and Sons

62055

Petrovich,
Vlaho

Collins, Jr.,
Levy

T

21121

The Texas Company

4/12/61

Pitre, August

7/22/61

Omes, Joseph

J

Trosclair,
Joseph

5/12/64

Albert Lauzon

Tidewater Associated Oil Company,
William Sheashey

31951

5/3/54

J

Defendants

32013

4/22/54

J

Plaintiff et al.

45707

Date

J

Plaintiff

20944

P
a
r
i
s
h

10/5/60

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

George Blanchard

United States Oil of LA Inc, The Travelers
Insurance Company

7764

Petrovich,
P
Luke
(table cont’d)

Superior Oil Co
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P
a
r
i
s
h

Date

Parish Case Number

Plaintiff

T

10/14/66

27506

Pellegrin, Elie
P

T

12/30/68

30941

(J=Jefferson, L=Lafourche, P=Plaquemines, T=Terrebonne)

Voisin, Addie

Plaintiff et al.

Defendants

Texaco Inc,

Magnus Voison

Superior Oil Co, L.T.X. Unites
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Appendix 4. Supplemental Data for Chapter 5
Table 10. Pre-1930s Disruptive Event, Ecological and Economic Resilience
Anticipate
Formal Resilience
scientist
observe
Government
overharvesting
suggest new
policy
scientist note
salinity
changes in
Bayou cook
making natural
production
impossible

Reduce
Vulnerability

begin
widening and
leveeing the
MS river

Respond

Recover

Government
creates new
Legislation

closed seasons - to give
the beds time to recover

Recognize need to
reseed/rebuild the beds
closer to New Orleans
Establish water that have become
bottoms as
completely unproductive
state property
built crevasses
Require licenses, leases
to reduce pests
to be surveyed, and
and mimic
tonging the only method
natural MS
of harvest
river processes
Require the return of
shells to water
DOC pay to rebuild
destroyed levee from
1915 storm
Wave lease fees for
oystermen affected by
the 1909 hurricane

(table cont’d)
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Table 10. Pre-1930s Disruptive Event, Ecological and Economic Resilience
Anticipate

Reduce
Vulnerability

Respond

Recover

bought
learned
methods of
inlet/protected
beds from
Croatia

begin farming
and planting
oysters

restock reefs
following hurricanes
from areas not
damaged

have leases
for both seed
and reef
oysters

geographically
relocate if one
bed became
depleted

rebuild strong camps
following
exceptionally strong
hurricane (Chenier
Caminada)

Inherent Resilience
Community &
Family

evacuate the
camps down
the bayou

vertical
integration of
the industry
request
crevasses to
reduce pests
build camps
that ok to lose
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modify
landscape to
reduce travel
time to market
economically
flexible life
style

Rebuild stronger
boats
Challenge oyster
rights across state
lines

Table 11. 1930s – Oil Spill Resilience
Anticipate
Formal Resilience
Legislature
thought the
mineral lease
holders would
Government conduct
drilling
operations in a
responsible
manner

Reduce
Vulnerability

Respond

Board of Health issued
letter to buyers to refuse
oysters from beds within
10 miles of oil well

DOC contacts federal
government for
assistance in the
investigation
Close beds for 2 months
Conducted in-depth study
that found oil damaged
oysters
(table cont’d)
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Recover
Allowed the
oysters on the
beds to be
property of
oystermen so
eligible for
damages and
negligence
lawsuits
Post-spill
pollution
control
legislation
Make
oystermen
eligible for
Farm Bureau
Loans

Table 11. 1930s – Oil Spill Resilience
Anticipate

Reduce
Vulnerability

Respond

Recover

Inherent Resilience
Community
& Family

Attempt to sell to oyster
buyers that take lower
quality oysters
Contact the Department
of Conservation for
investigation
Economic flexibility work with other
oystermen, change to
trapping, change to
shrimping
Sued the Texas Company
for $144,830 in damages
based on negligence and
trespassing (not a statue
designed for oyster beds)
Attempt to move oysters
to locations not affected
by oil pollution

211

Sell boat
because the
beds were
destroyed
Ludwig Doucet
appealed and
received the
original claim
of $10,650 in
1944

Table 12. 1940s – Oil Spill Resilience
Anticipate
Formal Resilience
Legislature
thought the
mineral lease
holders would
Government
conduct drilling
operations in a
responsible
manner

Reduce Vulnerability Respond

Recover

Reseed depleted
oyster beds in
DWF conducts
Terrebonne with help in-depth study
from WPA

Allowed the
oysters on the beds
to be property of
oystermen so
eligible for
damages and
negligence
lawsuits

Creates Waste
Control Division

SCC created and
passes additional Post-spill pollution
measures for
control legislation
waste control

DWF request the
Oil Companies
SCC take action
conduct studies
about waste disposal
on coast
Inherent Resilience
Move to Estuary
not immediately
Community
impacted by the
& Family
perceived threat of
oil pollution

Replant beds to
increase
production where
it had previously
existed

Contact the
Department of
settle out of court
Conservation for for damages
investigation
Economic
flexibility - work
with other
oystermen,
change to
trapping, change
to shrimping
Geographic
mobility across
parish lines
Contact
Foundation
scientists for
survey help
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Doucet v. TX Co
establish
oystermen rights
over oil rights

Sue a second time

Vita
Audrey Grismore, born in International Falls, Minnesota, worked for several years as an
archaeologist for long term recovery projects following hurricanes and other environmental
compliance projects after receiving her bachelor’s degree from Hood College in Frederick,
Maryland. This work peaked her interest in the relationship of the long-term recovery process
with community resilience, leading her to pursue graduate school at Louisiana State University
in the Department of Geography and Anthropology focusing on historical geography.
Upon completion of her master’s degree, Audrey began work on her doctorate degree in
the Department of Geography and Anthropology at LSU. Prior to completion of her doctorate
degree, she returned to the field of long-term recovery as a historic preservation specialist with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Upon completion of her doctorate, she
will continue her employment with FEMA.
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